


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SERIES IIIB. SOUTH ASIA, VOLUME I

AUTHENTIC HUMAN DESTINY

The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger

VENSUS A. GEORGE



THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN VALUES & PHILOSOPHY

CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CONTEMPORARY CHANGE
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General Editor
George F. McLean

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This One



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To

my father

who guides me towards my destiny from above

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ABBREVIATIONS

1. SHANKARA:

AB	Aatmabhooda
AU	Aiteriya Upahishad
BG	Bagavat Giita
BGB	Bagavat Gitta Bhaasya
BSB	Brahma-Suutra Bhaasya
BU	Brihadaaranyaka Upanishad
BUB	Brihadaaraanyaka Upanishad Bhaasya
Ch.U.	Chanduukhya Upanishad
CU	Chandoogya Upahishad
GKV	Gaudapaadakaarika Bhaasya and Maanduukhya Upanishad Bhaasya
Ke.U.	Keena Upanishad
Ke.U.B.	Keena Upanishad Bhaasya
KU	Kaatha Upanishad
KUB	Kaatha Upanishad Bhaasya
Ma.U.	Manduukhya Upahishad
MU	Mundaka Upanishad
MUB	Mundaka Upanishad Bhaasya
PI	Panchadassi
PU	Prasanna Upanishad
SU	Svetaasvatra Upanishad
TUB	Taittiriya Upanishad Bhaasya
UI	Upadeshasaahasrii
VC	Viveekachudaamani
VSS	Vedaantasaara of Sadaananta Gogindra

2. HEIDEGGER:

2.1. ORIGINAL WORKS:

BH	Brief ueber den Humanismus
ED	Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens
EM	Einfurhrung in die Metaphysik

FD	Die Frage nach dem Ding
FS	Fruehe Schriften
FW	Der Feldweg
GL	Gelassenheit
GP	Die Grundprobleme der Phaenomenologie
HD	Erlaeuterungen zu Hoelderlins Dichtung
HT	Heraklit
HW	Holzwege
ID	Identitaet und Differenz
KM	Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik
N I	Nietzsche I
N II	Nietzsche II
PM	Parmenides
PT	Phaenomenologie und Theologie
SD	Zur Sache des Denkens
SF	Zur Seinsfrage
SG	Der Satz vom Grund
SP	"Nur ein Gott kann uns retten", <i>Der Spiegel</i> Interview
SZ	Sein und Zeit
TK	Die Technik und die Kehre
UK	Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes
US	Unterwegs zur Sprache
VA	Vortraege und Aufsaezte
VS	Vier Seminare
WD	Was heisst Denken?
WG	Vom Wesen des Grundes
WM	Was ist Metaphysik?
WN	Wegmarken
WP	What is das -- die Philosophie?
WW	Vom Wesen der Wahrheit

2.2. ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS:

BPP	Basic Problems of Phenomenology
BT	Being and Time
BW	Basic Writings
DT	Discourse on Thinking
EB	Existence and Being

EGT	Early Greek Thinking
EP	The End of Philosophy
GE	German Existentialism
IAD	Identity and Difference
IM	An Introduction to Metaphysics
KPM	Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
LH	Letter on Humanism
PLT	Poetry, Language, Thought
QB	The Question of Being
QCT	Question Concerning Technology and other essays
SI	"Only a God can Save Us, <i>Der Spiegel</i> Interview with Martin Heidegger"
TB	On Time and Being
WCT	What is called Thinking?
WIP	What is Philosophy?
WL	On the Way to Language
WT	What is a Thing?

FOREWORD

Metaphysics can be deceptive. At first sight it can seem to be removed from concrete life. In reality it plumbs most deeply to grasp the real nature and meaning of what generally is perceived only on the surface. This ability is a hallmark of great thinkers.

Professor Vensus George in this masterful work takes us deeply into the thought of two of the world's great thinkers. Shankara is the leading thinker in the great metaphysical traditions of India. According to one chronology, after Hinduism had been reformed and replaced by Buddhism, and after this, in turn, had served for the thousand years predicted by the Lord Buddha, a new reformation was needed. It was Shankara who reargued the original truths of the Hindu vision and brought about its restoration throughout India. The acuity of his philosophical insight has remained the basic point of reference for Indian metaphysics ever since. This enabled it to retain its spiritual insight regarding the deep meaning of human life, which it plunges definitively into eternity so that all of life is suffused with divine meaning.

Heidegger has performed an analogous service for modern thought. After the Reformation and a long exploration of the capacities of human reason, rationalism had come to the limits of its forces. By mid 20th century it had degenerated into totalitarian forces engaged in massive pogroms and holocausts within, and in attempts at mutual destruction without. It was essential that the mind be able to break beyond this conflict and to plumb anew the sources and meaning of being. This was the contribution of Martin Heidegger who received the phenomenological relay from Husserl and transformed this exploration of intentionality into the study of Being as emerging into time. Indeed as he moved to Being itself in the second stage of this project he approached ever closer to the areas and issues treated so long before by Shankara.

Both thinkers confront directly the key question of authenticity for human life: is this realized by closing in upon itself as self-sufficient or does it require a transcendence of self to absolute Self in terms of which relations to others acquire a sacred meaning. In response, where Shankara takes us into the depth of Being as Self, Heidegger renews our understanding of beings as emerging there-

from into time, and of the Being they thereby express. Rarely has the depth and meaning of being been so incisively and clearly illuminated as by these two thinkers. Never, also has their thought been brought together in so mutually enlightening a manner as in the present work.

It might be objected that it is difficult to compare the thought of persons so different in time, but as this line of argumentation is advanced it threatens to result in the loss of the ability of humanity to learn from the past -- or to learn it all. This cannot be.

What Professor George does is rather to analyze the method and metaphysical structure of the thought of each of these thinkers, thereby enabling the reader to obtain a solid grasp of their description of the path of authentic human destiny to absolute Being and life in the divine opened.

This done, he proceeds to the work of comparison, showing their points of convergence and thereby enabling the reader to appreciate anew the force and depth of the insights of each. Finally, he analyses the differences between the two which makes it possible to appreciate empathically the limitations of the approach of each.

The result is magnificent insight along with a humbling awareness of the human difficulties in achieving full understanding of the munificence of Being. Thereby one gains a better sense of what can be known of the infinite richness of Being, which yet ever remains to be explored more fully by the human mind and manifested creatively in the life of persons and peoples.

This work of Vensus George on the paths of Shankara and Heidegger toward authentic human destiny marks an important milestone on our pilgrimage toward the eternal in time.

George F. McLean

PREFACE

Shankara and Martin Heidegger are two seminal and originative thinkers, representing the Indian and Western traditions, who left their marks on the thinking of their respective times. Both were dissatisfied with the thinking and culture of their eras.

Shankara was unhappy about the condition of his society in which the practice of Hinduism had come to be reduced largely to ritualism and the caste system dominated every aspect of life. Shankara saw the need to transform Hinduism, both in its philosophy and practice. By proposing Advaita Vedaanta, he attempted to restore Hinduism as a true path to authentic human destiny.

Martin Heidegger was shocked by the dominance of science and technology and of subject-centered thinking as this resulted in forgetfulness of true human destiny in Being.

Thus, both Shankara and Heidegger were concerned with helping people find their true paths to genuine life. Their efforts in showing the way to authentic human destiny form the theme of this work entitled, *The Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger*.

Coming to the end of this project, I look back gratefully to those persons and institutions, who have stood by me in this effort. In a special way I acknowledge the support and encouragement received from Dr. George F. McLean, Ph.D., once a student of T.N.P. Mahadevan and R. Balasubramaniam at The Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, The University of Madras, and now Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, in conceiving and accomplishing this work. At The Catholic University of America, Washington D.C., he directed my first explorations of the metaphysics of Shankara. It was during a meeting with him in February, 1996, that the idea of working out this extended project emerged. Since then, he has been a source of encouragement to me until the completion of this work.

I wish to acknowledge also the deep background received from Dr. Ignatius Viyagappa, Ph.D. at The Institute of Philosophy and Culture of the Satya Nilayam in conjunction with The University of Madras in my initial explorations of the thought of Martin Heidegger, published as *From Being-in-the-World to Being-*

toward-Being (Nagpur: SAC Publications, 1996).

I am grateful also to the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy for publishing the present work.

Finally, I remember with gratitude Reverend Father Roc Gerald Majella, S.A.C., who has taken a great deal of trouble and contributed enormously in the preparation of the manuscript. I express my sincere thanks to the Pallottine community in India and especially at Pallotti Illam, Madurai, for their concern and support throughout the period I was working on this project.

Vensus A. George, S.A.C.

INTRODUCTION

The human person can live one's life in two ways. Either one can be caught up in everyday cares and worries, or one can transcend them and live a life focused on one's authentic destiny. But the problem one faces, often, is to find the right means to make the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity. History has provided humankind with many great souls (*mahaatmaas*), who have shown the way to authentic living. Our concern, now, is to look into the paths to authentic human destiny, proposed by two great personalities, representing the Indian and the Western traditions, viz., Shankara and Martin Heidegger, respectively. In the first and the second sections, we attempt to study the lives, backgrounds and the thoughts of these thinkers. The last section will spell out the plan, with the help of which, we would analyze the Shankarite and Heideggerian paths to authentic human destiny.

1. SHANKARA'S LIFE AND THOUGHT

In this section, we would like to consider the exact period in which Shankara lived, his family and intellectual background, the significant events of his life, his search for the Divine, his deep religiosity and the desire to reform Hinduism, thereby taking it to its original glory. We would also highlight Shankara's thought, by indicating some of his significant literary contributions in the field of religion and philosophy, his role as the commentator par excellence and the importance of his Advaitic school of thought.

1.1. SHANKARA'S LIFE AND BACKGROUND

Shankara was born in a Nambudhiri family,¹ at Kaladi, a small village on the West coast of South India. There is no consensus, among the historians of Indian thought, about the exact dates of his birth and death. According to Telang, Shankara belonged to the middle or the end of the sixth century A.D. Sir R.C. Bhaandaarkar suggests 680 A.D., as the year of Shankara's birth. Anandagiri, in his biography of Shankara, *Samkaravijaya*, proposes that he was born in 44 B.C. and died in 12 B.C.² None of these is based on sound evidence; they are only possible dates. Today the generally

accepted dates of Shankara's birth and death are 788 A.D. and 820 A.D., respectively.³

Though it is difficult to determine the exact dates of Shankara's life, still the fact that he is an historical figure and a thinker of extraordinary merit, is beyond any doubt. He, indeed, is an academic prodigy. It is said that, at the age of ten, he not only memorized the scriptures, but also wrote commentaries on them. He is said to have written the illustrious commentary on Brahma-Sutras, when he was just twelve years old.⁴ As a young boy, Shankara was totally dissatisfied with the society in which he lived. At that time in history, Hinduism, in its practical aspect seemed to give primary importance to ritual practices and sacrifices. In the Hindu society, the caste system⁵ was prevalent, and the lower castes were treated with contempt by the higher castes, especially by the priestly class. The enlightened teaching of Buddha called for a transformation of hearts and interior attitudes, which were not given due importance, in the religious life of the people. Besides, Buddhism with its teaching worked towards the equality of all men by not accepting the disparities of the caste system. This message of love and equality of all, and the non-acceptance of the ritualism of Hinduism, attracted many, especially people of the lower castes, to Buddhism. As many embraced Buddhism, Hinduism began to lose its significance, and no longer had its former influence on the lives of the people. At the time of Shankara, Hinduism was at its lowest ebb. Though a boy, Shankara realized the need for change and transformation in Hinduism both in its philosophy and in its practice. He saw the need to understand the lofty truths of Hinduism in a new light and wanted his people to live by this new understanding of the scriptures.

At this time his father died. Shankara was puzzled at the phenomena of life and death and wanted to find a solution to these mysteries of life. He saw the passing nature of this world and this life. *Mohamudgaram: The Shattering of Illusion*, which is believed to have been written by him at this period, reveals clearly the state of his mind and his insight into life at this early age. In this work Shankara writes:

Who is thy wife? Who is thy son?

The ways of the world are strange indeed.

Whose art thou? Whence art thou come?
... Behold the folly of man:
In childhood busy with his toys,
In youth bewitched by love,
In age bowed down with cares. . . .
Birth brings death, death brings rebirth,
Where then oh man is thy happiness?
Life trembles in the balance
Like water on a lotus leaf.⁶

Shankara impelled by his desire to turn his society into the way of truth, obtained his mother's permission to enter the monastic life. He traveled to the banks of the river Narmada, where he met the great sage and philosopher Gaudapaada, who directed Shankara to his pupil, Govindapaada, a renowned teacher. Under his guidance Shankara gave himself to the practice of meditation and yoga, attained complete mystical realization, and began to teach others.

He wandered as a teacher from place to place, engaging with leaders of other schools of thought in discussion, making them realize their erroneous doctrines and practices. Of the many such debates Shankara's debate with Mandan Mishra, a great thinker of the time, is worth noting. Mandan Mishra held that the vocation of the householder is superior to that of a monk (*sannyasin*). Shankara convinced Mandan Mishra, of the falsity of his belief. As a result, he became a monk and a disciple of Shankara, taking a new name Suresvaraacaarya, who later is said to have annotated Shankara's commentary on the *Brahma-Suutras*.⁷

Besides conducting debates to enlighten the minds of the people, Shankara also established monasteries (*mutts*), in order to perpetuate the truths of Advaita Vedaanta. Shankara was not only a debater, a philosopher and a mystic, but also a man of human kindness and filial affection. He openly violated the law which governs the order of *Sannyasins*, by conducting funeral services for his mother, and thus had to face many objections from his community.⁸ Shankara's short but active life came to an end at Kedarnath in the Himalayas at the age of thirty-two.⁹

1.2. SHANKARA'S THOUGHT

Though Shankara's life was short, his literary output was enormous. Shankara was the commentator par excellence of the Vedas. He wrote commentaries on the *Bagavad Giita*, the *Vedaanta-Suutras* and on all the major Upanishads. In these and his other works such as the *Upadeeshusaahasrii*, the *Viveekachudaamani* and other works, he elaborated the main lines of Advaita Vedaanta. Besides, Shankara also wrote many hymns in praise of popular deities to help ordinary people in their way to God. Many additional works, such as, *Atmahoota* and the *Mohamudgaram* are attributed to him.¹⁰

In his major works Shankara intended to formulate an integral speculative system of great logical subtlety. Though, he gave prime importance to the scriptures, he was not hesitant to use logic and reason to elaborate his doctrine of Advaita on firm philosophical grounds. George Thibaut, in his introduction to the *Vedaanta-Suutras*, notes:

The doctrine advocated by Shankara, from a purely philosophical point of view, and apart from theological considerations, is the most important and interesting one which has arisen on the Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the view represented by Shankara, nor any other non-Vedic systems, can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedaanta in boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation.¹¹

Though no one denies the philosophical subtlety of Shankara, still as a commentator of the scriptures, he is not given the prime place by some authors. S. C. Chakravarthi remarks:

Shankara was a great intellectual of his time. He was also a past master of dialectics. He was well qualified to be the founder of a new system. . . . But when he took upon himself the role of the commentator, he had not right to forget his position and foist upon the Upanishads a philosophy of his own.

... As an exponent of the art of dialectics he may be looked upon as a great success, but as an interpreter of the Upanishads, he is a huge failure.¹²

S.K. Das shares almost the same view, when he says:

He (Shankara) overrides others (other commentators) by the sheer force of his greatness, . . . in particular of his logic of absolutism and his logic of apprehension. The whole host of other commentators exhibit in their interpretation what may be called the thoughts arrested development, . . . (that) they all point by force of their unconscious logic to the Advaita Vedaanta of Shankarite type as their natural culmination.¹³

Even though these authors do not seem to recognize Shankara as an authentic interpreter of the Upanishads, still they accept him as a subtle thinker, who has given a logical and philosophical basis to the later systems of Vedaanta, and gave new life to the Hindu Vedic culture through his writings, debates and example.

Though our intention here is not to decide as to whose interpretation of the *Sutras* is superior or faithful to the scripture, in response to the contention of these scholars and to justify Shankara, it should be noted that his interpretation of the scripture is based on his own inner experience and mystical vision of truth. A religious genius, like Shankara, while interpreting the scripture cannot be faithless to his own inner experience of *Brahman*.¹⁴ Dr. Radhakrishnan rightly points out that "he (Shankara) is a philosopher and a poet, a servant and a saint, a mystic and a religious reformer."¹⁵

2. HEIDEGGER'S LIFE AND THOUGHT

Here, we would like to look into the life and background of Martin Heidegger, focusing on his multifaceted personality and on the quality of seeking, which is characteristic of him. In attempting to understand Heidegger's thought, the threefold interpretations given by different thinkers will be analyzed.

2.1. HEIDEGGER'S LIFE AND BACKGROUND

Martin Heidegger, who is acclaimed as a seminal thinker and a significant philosopher of the present era, sometimes is referred to as "a man without a biography".¹⁶ Though, this might be an exaggeration, yet his life was simple and normal as that of an ordinary German professor. Except for the period between May, 1933 to February, 1934 during which he was involved with Hitler's Nazi party, his life was basically uneventful.¹⁷ He was born at the little town of Messkirch, in Southwest Germany on September 26, 1889. For the most part he lived and worked there, in the town of his birth -- except for the five years at Marburg -- until he died on May 26, 1976, four months before his eighty-seventh birthday.¹⁸ Some of his writings highlight his life and his multifaceted personality. *The Course of My Life*,¹⁹ *A Recollection*,²⁰ and *My Way to Phenomenology*²¹ give biographical details regarding Heidegger's life, education, academic pursuits and the influence of other thinkers on him. His essays *Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?*²² and the *Pathway*²³ point to Heidegger's desire for oneness with nature, which one can experience only in the simple, still, calm and rustic life of the country. Such a natural environment gave him the perfect space and the solitude²⁴ needed for his philosophical search.

All through his life, Heidegger was a seeker. As every seeker must be, Heidegger was courageous in his seeking. He was never afraid of going wrong while seeking. But, when he realized that he was in the wrong, he was never apologetic about it; nor did he regret his going astray from the truth. Instead, he courageously moved forward and continued his search. This is clear from the statements he made during the *Der Spiegel* Interview.²⁵ It is this attitude that made Heidegger isolate himself from the National Socialism and to resign the office of Rector of Freiburg University.²⁶ He did not count the cost of choosing what is true, when he knew that something was the truth. Bernhard Welte, gives the following tribute to Heidegger:

He (Heidegger) was always seeking and always underway. At various times he emphatically characterized his thinking as a path. He traveled this path without ceasing. There were bends and turns along it; certainly there were stretches, where he went

astray. Heidegger always understood the path as one that was given him, sent to him. He sought to understand his word as a response to an indication to which he listened without respite. For him, to think was to thank, to make a grateful response to that appeal.²⁷

2.2. HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT

The 'matter-for-thought' of Heidegger's seeking has been received with great interest, even though he himself has been suspect due to his involvement with Nazism. Heidegger is one of the few thinkers to whom much attention is paid by researchers and scholars, even during his lifetime. Therefore, it is natural that there are differences of opinion among the Heideggerian scholars regarding the manner in which his philosophy is viewed and interpreted. One opinion says that the whole of Heidegger's thinking is contained in his major work, *Being and Time*, as it anticipates all the themes that occur in his later writings.²⁸ Yet there is another view, which recognizes three separate periods in Heidegger's path of thinking.²⁹ There is a third view, which speaks of two periods in Heidegger's thinking that are named as Early Heidegger or Heidegger I and Later Heidegger or Heidegger II. This view is held by a number of reputed commentators of Heidegger. According to them there came about a shift³⁰ in Heidegger's thinking that made him move from the early phase to the latter phase. Even they differ among themselves regarding the nature of the shift. Thinkers, like John Wild, Alphonse de Waelhens, Lazalo Versenyi and some others, say that there is a break in Heidegger's thought, the nature of which is such that there is no bridge leading from Heidegger I to Heidegger II. In other words, they speak of a complete break between the two phases. There are others, such as Otto Poeggeler, William J. Richardson, Walter Schulz and Werner Marx, who, though they recognize the shift in Heidegger's thinking, hold for a coherence and unity of both the phases. In other words, they see the two phases, not as isolated from each other, but as a continuity, both in content and aim, though the perspective is different. Thus, for them, Heidegger II is an explication and an interpretation of Heidegger I, from the perspective of Being.³¹

The view of the second group of thinkers, seems to be in agreement with what Heidegger himself thought about the shift in his thinking. For Heidegger, the change involved in the shift is neither a break in his thinking, nor an abandoning of the earlier standpoint for the later. To quote him: "This turning (shift) is not a change of standpoint from *Being and Time*, but it is the thinking that was sought which first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which *Being and Time* is experienced."³² Besides there are some topics which Heidegger promises, at various places in *Being and Time*, that he would take up in the section of 'Time and Being',³³ for example, the fuller development of the idea of phenomenology,³⁴ of ontology,³⁵ and the discussion on language.³⁶ The fact that Heidegger wanted to publish these topics in the unpublished section of *Being and Time*, viz., 'Time and Being', from a different perspective, substantiates Heidegger's claim that the change envisaged in the shift is already present at the initial stage of *Being and Time*. Heidegger clarifies this point when he says: "Only by way of what (Heidegger) I has thought does one gain access to what is to be thought by (Heidegger) II. But the thoughts of (Heidegger) I becomes possible only if it is contained in (Heidegger) II."³⁷ Thus, the 'matter-for-thought' *Being and Time* has not really changed even after the shift, but the perspective with which it is considered is changed. Heidegger remarks: "... the road (*Being and Time*) has taken remains even today a necessary one, if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being."³⁸ Commenting on this point J.L. Mehta concludes that the writings after the shift are a critique and a commentary on *Being and Time*.³⁹ Therefore, for Heidegger, the completion of the shift "is not a turning to a new position, but rather a return to the original point of departure and a return to the ground upon which the circle-of-thought has rested from the beginning."⁴⁰

Two events seem to have made Heidegger bring about the shift in his thought. They are the failure of *Being and Time* to accomplish its intended task of clarifying the meaning of Being and Heidegger's political involvement. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger raises the question of Being⁴¹ and analyzes it in relation to time.⁴² He chooses the existential analysis of Dasein⁴³ to clarify the meaning of Being, as he has the ontic, ontological and ontico-ontological priority.⁴⁴ In this endeavor, that which he interrogates (*das Befragte*) is Dasein; that which is interrogated (*das Gefragte*) is Being; and that which is

to be found out by asking (*das Erfragte*) is the meaning of Being.⁴⁵ Even though it was Heidegger's aim, he did not succeed, as he only dealt with the preparatory analysis of Dasein and his relationship to temporality, while the section three that should have treated the relationship between temporality and Being, viz., 'Time and Being' did not appear as per the original plan.⁴⁶ Heidegger indicates the inadequacy of *Being and Time* to accomplish the task of clarifying the meaning of Being at the end of the written portions of *Being and Time* as follows:

. . . Our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein's being remains only one way which we take. . . . Whether this is the only way or even the right one at all, can be decided only after one has gone along it. The conflict as to the interpretation of Being cannot be allayed, because it has not been enkindled. . . . it is of the kind which cannot get enkindled unless preparations are made for it: Towards this alone the foregoing investigation is on the way.⁴⁷

Thus, it is clear that the published portion of *Being and Time* has failed to achieve its original aim. The reason for the failure of *Being and Time* was that, though Heidegger wanted to break with the metaphysical tradition and subjectivistic thinking, he was not able to be completely out of it at that time.⁴⁸ So in *Being and Time*, he raises the question of Being from the subjectivistic perspective, even though he did not want to do so. Thus, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger has his legs, as it were, in two boats. On the one hand, he wants to extricate himself from the metaphysical-subjectivistic thinking and, on the other hand, he is unable to pull himself out of the very thinking he detests. "Throughout *Being and Time* there is a tension owing to the fact that the work lies halfway between metaphysical thinking and the new way of thinking."⁴⁹ For example, Heidegger speaks of Dasein's essence as existence in the sense of transcendence, and yet limits it by saying that every existence is one's own, i.e., an owned selfhood. Again, authenticity of Dasein is reached by the call of conscience, which cannot be controlled by Dasein. But authenticity is attained only when Dasein resolutely owns the call in anticipation of his own death. These examples from

Being and Time indicate that it was bound to fail, as it was attempting to give a new way of thinking without fully being out of the metaphysical thinking.⁵⁰ To quote Heidegger:

The adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that abandons subjectivity (Heidegger II) is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of *Being and Time*, the third division of the first part 'Time and Being' was held back. . . . The section in question was held back because thinking (Heidegger I) failed in the adequate saying of this turning (shift) and did not succeed with the help of the language of Metaphysics.⁵¹

Besides, the failure of *Being and Time*, Heidegger's political involvement, may be another event that might have influenced Heidegger to make the shift in his thinking. Martin Heidegger actively supported, especially in his public addresses at the University of Freiburg and to many workers' groups, the cause of Hitler and the National Socialist Party,⁵² besides being an active member of the party for ten months between 1933 to 1934. One might wonder why such an outstanding thinker of the time, who was supposed to be the spiritual leader of the academic community and the nation,⁵³ could so easily fall in line with the thinking of Hitler and the Nazi Party.

One reason was Heidegger's belief in himself, as the philosopher-prophet, who was called to guide the German nation in that troubled period of the 1930s, like Fichte in the early 1800s. Besides, he also believed that with his national and international reputation as a philosopher he could do something to alter the destiny of Germany for the better. It would have been wrong for any person of Heidegger's standing to remain unmoved when his nation went through such turmoil. So as an authentic patriotic citizen of Germany, he might have felt within himself that he should give spiritual direction to the German nation. It was probably what the nation expected of an outstanding thinker like Heidegger.⁵⁴ Just as Plato attempted to bring about a philosopher-king at Syracuse by genuine support and education, so also Heidegger felt that the particular political situation of Germany in 1933, called him to guide the political leader of Germany.⁵⁵ This may have made Hei-

degger support Hitler and his National Socialist Party, which was the dominant political force in the 1930s.

Another possible reason was his belief that Adolf Hitler was a practical and wise man, an efficient leader of the German nation, in whose hands the Germans must place their destiny. The 1930s was a period of general political confusion. There were about 22 political parties in Germany, with divergent views on national policies.⁵⁶

As none of these parties was able to solve the nation's problems, a strong leader and a national party was the need of the time. Heidegger saw in Adolf Hitler and in the National Socialist Party an answer to this need and so spoke in favor of Hitler.⁵⁷ Though an initial impression of Heidegger during the early months of his tenure as the Rector of the Freiburg University, he realized that he needed to make some compromises with the officials of the party to get a wider audience for his views.⁵⁸ Heidegger did have his differences with the party specially as he was against its racist tendencies. But, he still believed that the movement could be guided, by the presence of intellectuals, like him, within the party.⁵⁹

Heidegger's belief in himself as a philosopher-king to guide the German destiny, his belief in Hitler and his party as the salvation of the German nation, and the belief in his and other intellectuals' ability to direct the course of the National Socialist Party came to a standstill when circumstances forced him to resign from his office of Rector in spring 1934.⁶⁰ After his resignation, the intellectuals of the Nazi Party attacked Heidegger personally in their writings.⁶¹ He was constantly watched, especially, during his lectures.⁶² In 1934, he was prevented from participating in the International Philosophical Congress in Prague and in 1937 he was excluded from the German delegation for the International Descartes Congress in Paris.⁶³ Heidegger was declared as the most expendable professor and was sent to the Rhine to build fortifications.⁶⁴ From these happenings after his resignation as the Rector, Heidegger realized that he was unrealistic in believing that he could change the course of National Socialism which was racism, social Darwinism, an active form of Subjectivism and a philosophy of will-to-power. It also dawned on him that besides having no control over this type of world view, he himself was in its hold as long as he was an ardent supporter of the National Socialism of Hitler. This awareness made Heidegger undertake a study on Nietzsche's philosophy of will-to-power from 1936-1944

of his concern, while in Heidegger II Dasein is the lighting-up-place of Being.

3. PLAN OF THIS WORK

Having looked into the lives, backgrounds and thoughts of Shankara and Heidegger, we could give a brief sketch of this work entitled *The Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Martin Heidegger*. As the title itself suggests, the aim of this work is to expound the paths of Shankara and Heidegger to authentic human destiny and analyze them in comparative light, bringing out their similarities and differences. We accomplish this task, in three parts and nine chapters.

Part One elaborates the Shankarite path to authentic human destiny. For Shankara, it is a movement from *aparaa vidhyaa* to *Paraa vidhyaa*, i.e., a transition from the phenomenal state to the noumenal state. The clarification of the Shankarite path is done in three chapters, dealing with the phenomenal state, the noumenal state and the transition, respectively. The first chapter deals with *aparaa vidhyaa*, the phenomenal state of man. In this state man is caught up in himself under the domination of *maayaa* in its cosmic and individual aspects. Here one identifies oneself and one's destiny with one's life in this world. Living such a state, man has no thought about his ultimate destiny. In analyzing *aparaa vidhyaa*, we consider its nature, consequences and characteristics. The second chapter highlights the *Paraa vidhyaa*, the noumenal state of man. In it, the goal of *Paraa vidhyaa*, its nature and characteristics are considered. In the third chapter we attempt to study *Brahmaajijnaasa*, the process of movement from *aparaa vidhyaa* to *Paraa vidhyaa*. Here, besides distinguishing the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa* from the goal of *Brahmaanubhava*, we also look into the three stages of *Brahmaajijnaasa* and the end of the process, viz., *Samaadhi*.

In Part Two, we attempt to study the Heideggerian path to authentic human destiny, which is a movement from care to transcendence. Chapters four, five and six state the Heideggerian path, each analyzing care, transcendence and the transition, respectively. Chapter four looks into Dasein's being-in-the-world, as a state of care, in which he is caught up in and concernfully involved with entities and other Daseins. It also treats the three concerns that mark

Dasein in this state of care, viz., the epistemological, the relational and the existential. Chapter five deals with the state of transcendence, in which Dasein lives a Being-centered existence. Here, we will elaborate the goal, the way and the attainment of Dasein's life, characterized by being-toward-Being. Chapter six looks at the process of the path to authenticity. Besides clarifying *Ereignis* as the state in which Dasein's movement from care to transcendence takes place, it considers the two stages of this path and its end, viz., Dasein's total authenticity. In order to bring these points into focus, themes from early and later Heidegger are also taken up for consideration in this chapter.

Part Three builds on the work already done in parts one and two, aiming to bring to comparative light the striking similarities and differences that exist between the paths of Shankara and Heidegger to authentic human destiny. Chapter seven focuses on the similarities between the paths of Shankara and Heidegger, while Chapter eight attempts to throw light on the differences that are found in these two paths. In both chapters, we bring together the similarities and differences respectively, under the themes: man, Being and the path. Chapter nine attempts a critique of the paths of Shankara and Heidegger to authentic human destiny and other related issues. In the conclusion, we indicate the fundamental pre-suppositions and the similarity of purpose that underlie the paths of Shankara and Heidegger, and open the possibility of raising the issue of authentic human destiny from the global perspective.

NOTES

1. A sect of Brahmins, who are the priestly class of the Hindu society.

2. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1947), pp. 447-448.

3. We have chosen these dates based on the authority of V. Bhattachariya. He says: "Our old traditions are so divergent that, according to them as well as modern researches, we shall have to place Shankara some time between 6th century B.C. and 9th century A. D.; viz., 6th century B.C., 4th century B.C., 1st century B.C., 4th century A.D., 6th century A.D., and 9th century A.D (i.e., 788-820). The last date is accepted by many a scholar." Vidhusherhar Bhatta-

charyya, ed. & trans., *The Agamasuastra of Gaudapaada* (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1943), p. lxxix, no. 8 (hereafter: *ASG*).

4. Cf. S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 532.

5. There are four castes in the Hindu society: *Brahmins* (the priestly class), *Kshatriyas* (the rulers), *Vaisyas* (the artisans), and *Suudras* (the slaves).

6. Shankara, *Crest-Jewel of Discrimination (Viveekachudaamani)*, trans. Swamin Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood, 3rd ed. (California: Vedaanta Press, 1978), p. 2.

7. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 448.

8. Cf. *ibid.*

9. Cf. Swami Prabhavananda, *The Spiritual Heritage of India* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), pp. 279-282.

10. Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 450.

11. George Thibaut, trans., *The Vedaanta-Suutras with the Commentary by Shankaraaacharya, The Sacred Books of the East* [hereafter: *SBE*], Vol. XXXIV, ed. F. Max Mueller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890), p. xiv.

12. Sures Chandra Chakravarti, *Human Life and Beyond* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1947), p. 52.

13. Saroj Kumar Das, *A Study of Vedaanta* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1937), pp. 29-30.

14. Cf. Troy Wilson Organ, *The Self in Indian Philosophy* (London: Mouton & Co., 1964), p. 93.

15. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 450.

16. Thomas Sheehan, ed., *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker* (Chicago: Precedent Publishing Inc., 1981), p. 3.

17. Cf. *ibid.*, p. v.

18. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 3.

19. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "The Course of My Life", in J.J. Kockelmans *Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to his Philosophy* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), pp. 1-2. This small 'write-out' written in 1914, contains biographical details that accompanied Heidegger's doctoral dissertation.

20. Cf. Thomas Sheehan, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, pp. 21-22.

21. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "My Way to Phenomenology",

Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: New American Library, 1975), pp. 234-241.

22. Cf. Thomas Sheehan, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, pp. 27-30.

23. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 69-72.

24. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 28.

25. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 45-67.

26. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 52.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

28. Cf. Roger Waterhouse, *A Heidegger Critique: A Critical Examination of the Existential Phenomenology of Martin Heidegger* (New Jersey: Humanitas Press, 1981), p. x.

29. Cf. Vincent Vycinas, *Earths and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961). Vincent Vycinas speaks of the phase of Dasein, the phase of Being and the phase of earth and gods, as three phases in Heidegger's way. Cf. also James M. Damske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 183-186. Damske speaks of the first, the middle and final stages of Heidegger's thinking.

30. Heidegger himself explicitly accepted that there was a shift in his thought. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Brief ueber den Humanismus", *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), p. 325 (hereafter: *BH*, *Wegmarken*). Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings: From 'Being and Time' (1927) to 'The Task of Thinking' (1964)*, ed. D. F. Krell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1978), pp. 207-208. Cf. also William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. xvi, xviii, xx. The shift has come about in relation to five books Heidegger has written after *Sein und Zeit*, viz., *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1928), *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1928), *Was ist Metaphysik?* (1929), *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (1930) and *Einfuehrung in die Metaphysik* (1935). The first two books continue the theme of *Being and Time*, while in the next two already the tone is set for the transition, and Being gains prominence over Dasein. In the last book, especially in its later part, the shift is inaugurated.

31. Cf. J.L. Mehta, *Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 350-351.

Cf. also A. Borgmann, "The Transformation of Heidegger's Thought", *Personalist*, 47 (1966), 485-486. Thinking in the line of the second type of thinkers, Johnson J. Puthenpurackal speaks of the relation between Heidegger I and Heidegger II as 'unity of thinking and difference in perspective'. Thus, for him, the way of Heidegger is a movement from a hermeneutical circle (Dasein) to an alethological circle (Being). Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, *Heidegger: Through Authentic Totality to Total Authenticity*, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), pp. 229-254.

32. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 325.; *BIV*, p. 208.

33. Cf. Otto Poegeller, "Being as Appropriation", trans. R.H. Grimm, *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975): 164.

34. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 12th ed. (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972), p. 357 (hereafter: *SZ*); Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), pp. 408-409 (hereafter: *BT*).

35. Cf. *SZ*, p. 230.; *BT*, pp. 272-273.

36. Cf. *SZ*, p. 349.; *BT*, pp. 400-401.

37. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. xxii.

38. *SZ*, p. vii.; *BT*, p. 17. It is an interpolation made by Heidegger in the 7th edition of *Being and Time*, in 1953.

39. Cf. J.L. Mehta, *Heidegger: The Way and the Vision*, p. 344.

40. Otto Poegeller, "Being as Appropriation", pp. 165-166.

41. Martin Heidegger uses two German terms "*Sein*" and "*Seiende*". The former is translated in English as 'Being', while the latter is rendered as 'being'. For Heidegger, there is a fundamental difference in the meaning of these two terms. The former is referred to as the 'Being of beings' (*Sein des Seiendes*). Being itself is not a being, but the ultimate condition, which allows all beings to exist. It is a process, which gives being passage from nothingness to existence and by which beings remain in existence. It is often referred to in Heidegger's writings as the Ground or the Source, as it sustains beings in its self. Cf. Rudolph J. Gerber, "Heidegger: Thinking and Thanking of Being", *Modern Schoolman*, XLIV (1967): 205-206. Cf. also *SZ*, pp. 2-8.; *BT*, pp. 21-28.

42. Cf. *SZ*, p. 1.; *BT*, p. 19.

43. The term 'Dasein' has been translated in various ways. William J. Richardson renders it as 'There-Being'. R.J. Gerber translates it as 'Being's-place'. It derives from the German term 'Da' (there) and 'Sein' (Being). For Heidegger of *Being and Time*, Dasein is not equitable with man. While man is a being, Dasein is a process. It is a process of being a 'self', as Dasein's nature is such that it is an ability to be. Dasein's selfhood lies in its ability to revolve upon being itself. This process comes to pass only in man. So Heidegger speaks of Dasein 'in' man. It provides the horizon in which the inner-worldly things are rendered manifest. The entire self-structure, i.e., Dasein, is neither masculine nor feminine, but neuter, as Dasein may come to pass in an 'I' or in a 'thou'; in a male or in a female. But Dasein is not an impersonal process, but pre-personal in that it is an *a priori*, which renders individual selves possible. Hence, often the neuter pronoun 'it' is used to refer to it. Cf. John D. Caputo, "Heidegger's Original Ethics", *New Scholasticism*, 45 (1971): 128. Cf. also *SZ*, p. 11.; *BT*, p. 32. But Heidegger does not follow this distinction between man and Dasein, in his later writings, as he uses them as synonyms. Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 346.; *BW*, pp. 228-229. So there is an inconsistency in Heidegger's use of these terms. We translate it as 'human person' or 'man', as in the last analysis the self-structure of which Heidegger speaks in the term 'Dasein' is the human entity. In clarifying the nature of Dasein Heidegger distinguishes between two types of analysis, viz., the existential-ontological and the existential-ontical. The first pair refers to the realm of structures underlying Dasein, while the second pair refers to the level of the concrete acts of exist-ence. It is in the latter that the former is actualized in its various pos-sibilities. Man is existential and ontic; but Dasein is that which con-stitutes the 'Da' of 'Sein' in man. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 11-13.; *BT*, pp. 32-34. Cf. also James M. Damske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Hei-degger*, p. 17. In later Heidegger, Heidegger ignores this distinction as well.

44. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 13-15.; *BT*, pp. 34 -35.

45. Cf. Otto Poegeller, "Being as Appropriation", pp. 164-165.

46. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 165. For the design of *Being and Time* as planned originally. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 39-40.; *BT*, pp. 63-64.

47. *SZ*, pp. 436-437.; *BT*, pp. 487-488.

48. Cf. Michael E. Zimmermann, "The Foundering of Being

and Time", *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975): 102.

49. *Ibid.*

50. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 106. Cf. also Otto Poegeller, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, 2. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983), p. 180.

51. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 325.; *BW*, pp. 207-208.

52. Martin Heidegger, *German Existentialism*, trans. Dagobert D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965), pp. 19-20, 42 (hereafter: *GE*).

53. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 18.

54. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 15.

55. Cf. Leon Goldstein, "Heidegger and Plato on the Good" *Philosophy Today*, 22 (1978): 332-354. Cf. also Michael E. Zimmermann, *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity* (London: Ohio University Press, 1981), p. 174. Cf. also Martin Heidegger, "Nur noch ein Goett kann uns retten: Spiegel-Gespraech mit Martin Heidegger", *Der Spiegel*, 26 (1976): 193 (hereafter: *SP*); Martin Heidegger, "Only God can Save Us: *Der Spiegel* Interview with Martin Heidegger", trans. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan, p. 46 (hereafter: *SI*).

56. Cf. *SP*, p. 196.; *SI*, p. 48.

57. Cf. *ibid.*

58. Cf. *SP*, p. 198.; *SI*, p. 49. Heidegger, in this interview, regrets making such compromises with the National Socialist Party. He says further that he had made no such statements that would amount to a compromise since 1934. Cf. *ibid.*

59. Cf. Karl A. Moehling, "Heidegger and the Nazis", *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan, p. 35.

60. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 37.

61. Cf. *ibid.*

62. Cf. *SP*, p. 204.; *SI*, p. 53.

63. Cf. *SP*, p. 204.; *SI*, p. 54.

64. Cf. *ibid.*

65. Cf. Michael E. Zimmermann, *Eclipse of the Self*, pp. 178, 196-197.

66. Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. xvi.

67. Cf. James M. Damske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 91.

PART ONE

FROM *APARAA VIDHYAA* TO *PARAA VIDHYAA*: THE SHANKARITE PATH

Part one looks into the Shankarite path to authentic human destiny. For Shankara, this path is a movement from *aparaa vidhyaa* to *paraa vidhyaa*, i.e., a transition from the phenomenal to the noumenal state. In other words, in order to attain his authentic destiny man must move from being caught up in the hustle and bustle of everyday living to a transcendental state in which he realizes that his true self is not what he experiences everyday, but is identical with the supreme Self, viz., *Brahman*. In this part, we attempt to elaborate the Shankarite path in three chapters. The first chapter deals with the *aparaa vidhyaa*, the phenomenal state of man. It is a state in which man is caught up in himself under the sway of *maayaa*, in its cosmic and individual aspects. Man identifies himself and his destiny with his life in this world. Living such a state of life, man has no thought about his ultimate destiny, as he is concerned about the everyday living of the present. In analyzing *aparaa vidhyaa* in this chapter, we consider its nature, consequences and characteristics. The second chapter highlights the *paraa vidhyaa*, the noumenal state of man. Here, the goal of man is to come to the true realization of his self (*Aatman*) as one with the ultimate ground of every reality, i.e. *Brahman*. The nature of *paraa vidhyaa* consists in the identity of *Brahman* and *Aatman*. Besides clarifying the goal and the nature of *paraa vidhyaa*, the second chapter also enumerates its characteristics. In the third chapter, we analyze *Brahmaajijnasa*, the process of the movement from *aparaa vidhyaa* to *paraa vidhyaa*. Here, we attempt to distinguish the process of *Brahmaajijnasa* from the goal of *paraa vidhyaa* (*Brahmaanubhava*), elaborate the three stages of *Brahmaajijnasa*, viz., the physical, the moral and the intellectual preparation, and highlight the end of the process, viz., *Samaadhi*.

CHAPTER I

***APARAA VIDHYAA:* THE PHENOMENAL STATE OF MAN**

This chapter looks into the nature, consequences and characteristics of *aparaa vidhyaa*. The phenomenal state of man is characterized by superimposed knowledge. The cause of such a knowledge is *maayaa*, which has two aspects, viz., the cosmic and the individual. With the help of these aspects, the *maayaa* brings about significant changes in man's perception of himself and his experience of the world. Besides, we will also consider some of the fundamental characteristics of *aparaa vidhyaa* in this chapter.

1.1. NATURE OF *APARAA VIDHYAA*

This section elaborates the nature of *aparaa vidhyaa*. It is a state that is characterized by superimposition. Besides analyzing the nature of superimposition, the section looks into its cause, viz., *maayaa*.

1.1.1. SUPERIMPOSITION

Superimposition literally means the mistaken ascription or imputation of one thing for the other. By superimposing, one attributes to a thing qualities of an essential nature which do not belong to it. In his introduction of the *Vedaanta-Sutras*, Shankara defines superimposition as "the apparent presentation (to the consciousness), by way of remembrance, of something previously observed, in some other thing."¹ In other words, superimposition takes place, when the qualities of one thing which are not immediately present to the consciousness, through memory are given to or projected upon another thing that is present to the consciousness and identified with it.² In the example of the snake being superimposed on the rope, or a man being superimposed on a tree stump in semi-darkness, the rope and the tree stump, which are presented to the consciousness are in fact taken as a snake and as a man respectively, through the mistaken attributions of what is known and remembered in some pre-

vious perception. Thus, the judgments 'this is a snake' and 'this is a man' are the results of a positive identification between what was experienced from the previous experience (snake and man) and what is perceived right now (rope and tree stump).³

The idea of superimposition (*adhyaropa*) has been interpreted differently by four branches of Advaitic School. The so-called *Anyathakhyatvaadins* define it as the superimposition of attributes of one thing on another thing. For example in the act of superimposition, the attributes of one thing, snake for instance, are superimposed upon the rope, even though snake does not exist at all at the place where one perceives the rope. The *Atmakhyativaadins* maintain that in superimposition the modification of the qualities in the thing perceived is brought about by internal organs. In the above-mentioned example, the form of the snake is superimposed on the external thing, namely, rope, by the internal organs. Thus the form of the snake appears externally even though it is not in fact there. The *Akhyativaadins* define superimposition as the error founded on the non-apprehension of the difference between the superimposed (unreal) and something which is superimposed (real). Others define *adhyaropa* as the fictitious assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed.⁴

Though all these views differ in one or the other point, they all converge in the central idea of superimposition as mistakenly considering one thing as the other. Advaitins illustrate this theory by the examples of the desert which in a mirage appears to contain water, and shells scattered on a beach which on a moonlit night appear like silver pieces.⁵ According to Shankara the attributes of non-self (*anaatman*), i.e., the world of thought and matter (*maayaa*) which has only phenomenal and relative existence, are falsely superimposed on *Brahman*. Thus the ultimate reality, the absolute and changeless *Brahman*, appears as the multiplicity of the world of phenomena due to false superimposition of the unreal on the real. "The obstruction that prevents the recognition of the self (*Brahman*) . . . is the superimposition of what does not really exist and is not self-evident in the self (*Brahman*)."⁶ Thus, as long as one remains in the spell of *adhyaropa* or superimposition, one will consider the world of multiplicity and of names and forms (*nama-rupa*) as the ultimate and absolute reality.

After describing the nature of superimposition, Shankara

raises a question which could possibly be raised by a critic, namely, whether this theory of superimposition is applicable to absolute and changeless *Brahman*? We can superimpose something or an attribute of something on another object only when we perceive the object on which we superimpose the quality in question. For instance, one can superimpose the idea of the snake on a rope only if the rope is presented to one's perception. Therefore, in order that there take place superimposition, understood in the sense of mistakenly attributing one thing for the other, the presence of the object on which something is superimposed is necessary. This being so, how can one superimpose the phenomenal world on *Brahman* who is absolute, infinite and not apparent to our senses? In other words, the knowledge of *Brahman* belongs to the level of transcendental knowledge (*Paaraa vidhyaa*), and how can one who has not known the reality of *Brahman*, still being in the level of phenomenal knowledge (*aparaa vidhyaa*), superimpose the world of phenomena on *Brahman*?

To this contention Shankara replies that *Brahman* is not non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the ego, and the interior self is well-known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation. Nor is it an exception to the rule that objects can be superimposed only on other objects before us, i.e., in contact with our senses, for ordinary people superimpose on the sky, which is not the object of sense perception, the dark-blue color.⁷ Thus, Shankara does not deny the possibility of one superimposing an object which is not an object of his sense perception, on some other thing. But his main argument for the superimposition of the phenomenal world on *Brahman*, is based on the 'ego-idea' which is the object of everyone's experience.

Here Shankara seems to point to two stages of superimposition. Firstly, the 'ego-idea' is superimposed upon the inner self, which is absolute existence and reality. As a result of this first superimposition one loses the universal idea of *Aatman* being the absolute existence, and considers oneself as an individual. Secondly the 'ego-idea' reaches outward as it were, and identifies itself with the body, physical and mental attributes and actions, without ever being aware of the true nature of the 'I'. Thus, by attributing individuality and other qualities to oneself, he sees multiplicity everywhere and superimposes on *Brahman* the multiple world of names and forms (*maa-*

yaa) which is constituted of individuals like himself and different from himself. One identifies everything in the world of *maayaa* with oneself. The inner self, which is the absolute principle, looks on as if it is a witness (*saakshin*). It is completely unaffected by these false attributes, yet makes them all possible, for without it *maayaa* cannot exist. Thus, the world of appearance, basically depends on the 'ego-idea' and once the 'ego-idea' is removed from the consciousness the *maayaa* also disappears.⁸

1.1.2. MAAYAA: THE CAUSE

Maayaa is the cause of superimposition. It is *maayaa* which causes different modes of thinking, projections of worldly appearance and various conflicting ideas. It is antagonistic to knowledge and is the source of all the contradictions, relativities, dichotomies and polarities of human existence. There is a touch of mystery to the reality of *maayaa*, and the human intellect cannot attempt to exhaust its manifold forms, modes and possibilities. If not for *maayaa*, human existence, would not have any novelty and sense of wonder. *Maayaa* is not an empty concept that attempts to explain the passing nature of reality; it has a scriptural foundation. Starting from the Vedas, the Upanishads and the *Giita* give an account of *maayaa*, as affecting the human world and existence. We could elaborate briefly the meaning of *maayaa* as understood in the scriptures.

We find the beginnings of the doctrine of *maayaa* in the *Rig Veda*. Here the term '*maayaa*' is used for supernatural powers that belong to gods. The god *Indra* is said to assume many forms through *maayaa*.⁹ Thus, *maayaa* means a power to transform oneself and assume various forms. Besides, it also indicates the names, forms and multiplicity of the visible universe. Thus, the diversity we experience in daily life is *maayaa*. In the Upanishads, we find an indirect reference to *maayaa* as that which 'covers' or 'veils' the truth.¹⁰ The Upanishads also give direct statements about *maayaa*. In Svetaasvatara Upanishad we find a direct reference to the term '*maayaa*', and the Lord who possesses it is called *Maayin*.¹¹ The Lord *Maayin* is said to be the maker of the whole world, who creates the world with the help of *maaya*.¹² Brihdaaranyaka Upanishad associates *maayaa* with god *Indra*, who takes many forms because of it. Thus, in these two instances *maaya* refers to what is within a

person or to a quality peculiar to him rather than something that exists outside. Thus, the word '*maayaa*', derived from the root '*ma*' which means 'to form' or 'to build', is taken in the Upanishads as the creative power of God by which he fashions the universe. The Upanishads do not suggest that the world built by using the power of *maayaa* is illusory. In the *Giita*, *maayaa* is associated with *Ishvara*. It is the power which enables *Ishvara* to produce multiple natures. It is an energy (*shakti*) of *Ishvara*, i.e., the power of self-becoming (*aatmavibhuuti*). This power is called *maayin*.¹³ Thus *Ishvara* and *maayaa* are dependent and beginningless. At a later stage of the *Giita* thought *maayaa* gradually comes to have a delusive character as it hides the real from our experience.¹⁴

Thus, the doctrine of *maayaa* has its foundation in the scriptures. Shankara takes up this doctrine and interprets it from the perspective of Advaita Vedaanta. For him the question -- when and how superimposition occurred or the 'ego-idea' brought about the phenomenal world -- is not something we can intellectually grasp. That is why Shankara maintains an enlightened agnosticism with regard to the origin of *maayaa* and its relationship to *Brahman*. We could proceed with our discussion as did Shankara himself, noting that *maayaa* is both a statement of fact and a principle.¹⁵ As a statement of fact it is the present, the past and all possible worlds. "It is a domain of antithetical situations, subject-object distinctions, paradoxes and antinomies,"¹⁶ that characterize the world of our everyday perception. As a principle, like *Brahman*, *maayaa* is eternal and beginningless. "*Maayaa* is beginningless (*anaadhi*), for time arises only within it; it is unthinkable (*acintya*), for all thought is subject to it; it is indescribable (*anirvacaniya*), for all language results from it."¹⁷ In this sense *maayaa* has been described by Vedaantins as the inexplicable power of the supreme Lord, by which all the changes in this world are brought about.¹⁸ As the phenomenal world, it cannot be considered either a being (*sat*) or a non-being (*asat*). Though the world of appearance is unreal (*asat*) in the sense that it does not exist to the one who has attained the true and the highest knowledge, it is real (*sat*) in the sense that it appears to exist as long as ignorance persists. *Maayaa* is known to the consciousness, the witnessing agent and therefore is taken as real. But, at the same time it cannot be regarded as real as the absolute reality (*Brahman*). Nor can it be viewed as co-existent with *Brahman*, as it

loses its existence as soon as knowledge is attained. It can be compared to a fog that covers the sun from our view, but when the sun is in full view the fog vanishes. *Maayaa* is real in the sense that it presents objects to our perception, but unreal in that it is not transcendently existing as *Brahman*. Thus, *maayaa* is something mysterious. It seems to have no definite beginning in the sense of having a definite cause. At the same time it produces something that has the appearance of reality; and this appearance loses itself, when the truth of knowledge dawns. So, we could say that *maayaa* is a principle that cannot fully be explained, and which is the source of the fact that there are plurality and diversities in the universe.¹⁹

To the question -- how *maayaa* causes these dichotomies, contradictions, plurality and subject-object distinctions -- Shankara replies that it is due to the nature of *maayaa* that is made up of three qualities (*gunas*), namely *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. It is by the presence or the absence of these three *gunas* in varying degrees that different stages in the cosmic cycle take place.²⁰ When *sattvaguna* is predominant there is produced the *jnaanashakti*, which is responsible for the working of the whole cognitive process. With preponderance of *rajas* and *tamas*, there is produced the *kriyashakti*, which has two powers, namely, the concealing power (*avaranashakti*) and the power of projection (*vikshepashakti*).²¹ It is by the power of concealment that *maayaa* veils the true nature of *Brahman* and *Aatman*. A small cloud by obstructing the vision of the observer conceals, as it were, the solar disc which extends over many miles. Similarly, *maayaa* enshrouds man's spiritual intelligence and conceals the self (*Aatman*) which is unlimited and not subject to transmigration, thereby preventing our realization of its identity with *Brahman*. *Avernashakti*, therefore, is the negative aspect of concealment. It is that force which enables *maayaa*, so to enshroud *Aatman* that he becomes the subject of pleasure, pain and misery.²² The projecting power of *maayaa* is always present with the concealing power. It is the positive aspect of *maayaa* that brings manifold realities into the world; it constitutes the world of names and forms. *Vikshepashakti* is identical with the power of creating. With this power, *maaya* creates the appearance (*vivarta*), superimposes (*adhyasa*) the unreal on the real and leads one to error (*bhranti*), like that of a 'rope-snake' or a 'shell-silver'. Therefore, that power of *maayaa* which creates the illusion or mistaken impres-

sion on the self (*Aatman*) is called *vikshepashakti*.²³ Thus, by the simultaneous interplay of the concealing and the projecting powers, *maayaa* veils the true and real nature of the absolute reality, and at the same time 'forms' or 'creates' the world of appearance, just as ignorance conceals the nature of the rope and creates the illusion of a snake.²⁴

Maayaa appears in two different modes, namely, the collective or cosmic (*samasti*) and the individual (*vyasti*). From the collective point of view it is seen as one; whereas from the individual point of view it is many. Advaitins explain the two modes using the illustrations of the trees and the lake. From the collective point of view a group of trees is considered as a forest or a grove, while at the same time a grove can be seen as many individual trees. Again, water in a lake can be considered as one from the collective mode, yet from the individual aspect it can be seen as different quantities of water. Similarly, *maayaa* can be considered as aggregate and individual. The individual *Maayaa* is called *avidhyaa*.²⁵ *Maayaa*, in its cosmic aspect is the principle of individuation. It is *Brahman's* power of becoming or appearing as many. Therefore, the origin of the world-process and the changes that take place in the world are attributed to cosmic *maayaa*. It is the capacity to bring the entire existence appearing as objective to the finite consciousness. Thus, in cosmic *maayaa*, the idea of origination, which implies power and will, is more apparent. But it denies the objectively real and manifests the objectively false. Collective *maayaa* is the mysterious primeval ignorance that exists eternally in relation to consciousness and which is free from all forms of differentiation. Here the *sattvaguna* predominates. The individual *maayaa* (*avidhyaa*) is the principle of ignorance that intercepts things from view. Thus, in it, the idea of obscuration is more prominent. *Avidhyaa* brings about such obscurations by misinterpretation of one thing for another, like a rope for a snake. It denies knowledge of identity and projects subjectively false ideas. In it *rajasguna* and *tamasguna* dominate.²⁶

1.2. CONSEQUENCES OF APARAA VIDHYAA

According to Shankara whether it be in its cosmic or individual aspect, *maayaa* veils the true nature of *Brahman*, the absolute reality. It serves as the limiting adjunct (*upaadhi*) for *Brahman*, just

as the sun's rays are veiled by the clouds. Now, we shall elaborate the effects of *maayaa* in both of these aspects.

1.2.1. EFFECTS OF COSMIC MAAYAA

The cosmic *maayaa* leads to the appearance of the world of names and forms. In the cosmic absorption of everything in *Brahman*, there comes about a sudden change, when *Brahman* wills to evolve from within and express itself. This, in turn, disturbs the indeterminate *maayaa* and its constituent elements, viz., the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. When *Brahman* accepts *maayaa* in its *sattvic* element, it becomes *ishvara*. *Brahman*, in association with *sattva* is the all-knower, because everything is reflected in its intelligence. As veiled by cosmic ignorance *Brahman* is called *ishvara* or *sagunaa Brahman*. *Ishvara* is the supreme Lord, who is worshipped by the ordinary people as their personal god in the form of different deities. According to Shankara, *Brahman* with qualities is a step lower than *Brahman* with out any qualities (*nirgunaa Brahman*). *Ishvara* is the highest manifestation of the absolute *Brahman* in the phenomenal world. Besides he is the highest reality the human mind can grasp and the human heart can love. Shankara also holds that the *ishvara* is omniscient, omnipotent and has ultimate power over inferior limiting adjuncts. The limiting adjuncts that are characteristic of *ishvara* with *sattvic* element are superior limiting adjuncts (*niratisayoopaadhi*). *Ishvara*, in association with the *tamasic* element, acquires lower limiting adjuncts (*nihinoopaadi*). *Ishvara*'s superior limiting adjuncts direct the inferior limiting adjuncts by *rajasic* elements of *maayaa*; thereby there originate the elements of nature. To quote Shankara: "The Lord (*ishvara*) endowed with superior limiting adjuncts", ²⁷ "rules the souls with inferior adjuncts".²⁸ Thus, *ishvara*, in association with *maayaa* and the constituent *gunas* form the material and efficient cause of the cosmic order. The lower limiting adjunct of *ishvara* lies at the root of the evolution of the five subtle elements (*suukshmabhootas*), viz., the ether (*aakashaa*), the air (*vaayu*), the fire (*teejas*), the water (*aap*) and the earth. These elements do not intermix as they are pure and simple elements. They have distinctive qualities: *aakashaa* -- sound, *vaayu* -- energy, *teejas* -- heat and light, *aap* -- taste and the earth with the potency of affecting smell.²⁹

From the subtle matter originates the gross matter (*mahaabhuutas*) by a process of five-fold combination (*pancikarana*). It consists in the combination of parts of every subtle element in different proportions to form the gross matter. Since *mahaabhuutas* are combinations of all subtle elements, the former imbibes the qualities of the latter. As a result, the *mahaabhuutas* are not entirely different from *suukshmabhuutas*, as the latter is the cause of the former, just as a piece of cloth is not different from the threads that make the cloth.³⁰ From the *mahaabhuutas* and their various compounds of integration and differentiation, there arises the cosmic system of fourteen worlds: three in the higher region, four in the middle region and seven in the lower region, viz. the *satyalokas*, the *jnaanalokas* and *tapalokas*, respectively. The *satyalokaa* is formed out of combinations of elements, in which the *sattvaguna* is dominant. In this *loka*, the souls enjoy an expansive life. In virtue of the rhythmic vibrations of life-current passing through, it is possible for the souls in the *satyaloka* to move progressively, enjoy a better life and understand a wider vision of truth. Those who live here are full of life, their knowledge is intuitive, their delight serene and their lives easy. *Jnaanaloka* evolves when the various combinations of elements are dominated by *rajasguna*. It is an intermediate state that is characterized by coarse matter, life and mind. Though there is coarse matter in this state, there is order and coherence so that life can grow and mind can function progressively. The life here is freer; there is clarity of vision, freedom and delight. The *tapaloka* evolves when the combinations of elements in *tamasguna* predominate. Due to the activity of *tamas*, this state is full of darkness and is not conducive to the development of higher life and mental activity. In this sphere, darkness, ignorance, contradictions, perplexities and confusions prevail. Since it is far removed from the center of life, one cannot have life and bliss in this state. Besides, as *tamas* dominates, the life-force cannot make itself felt.³¹

Apart from the evolution of *suukshmabhuutas*, *mahaabhuutas* and the three *lokas*, by the combination of elements with the three *gunas*, the cosmic *maayaa* also brings about the three cosmic stages of existence and three cosmic orders of existence: the cosmic waking-consciousness (*Virat*), which is conscious of the totality of concrete existences inhabiting the threefold regions and in which *Brahman* is limited by the cosmic gross body; the cosmic dream-

consciousness (*Hiranyagarba*), in which *Brahman* has the totality of cosmic subtle body as its limiting adjuncts (*upaadhi*); and the cosmic sleep-consciousness (*ishvara*), in which the *Brahman* has for its *upaadhi* the cosmic causal or bliss body.³²

Cosmic *maayaa* also gives rise to the conception of *ishvara*, as the creator (*Brahma*), the sustainer (*Vishnu*) and the destroyer (*Siva*). These three gods are nothing other than *ishvara* with reference to different *gunas*. When *ishvara* is limited by *maayaa* in its *sattvic* aspect, i.e., *sattva* as the predominating *upaadhi*, it is called *Vishnu*. He sustains and preserves the cosmic order. When *ishvara* has *maayaa* with *rajas* as the dominant *upaadhi*, it is called *Brahma*. He is the creator of the cosmic order. When *maayaa* with *tamas* predominates *ishvara*, it is called *Siva* or *Rudhra*. He is the destroyer of the universe. Thus, *ishvara* with the help of *sattva* preserves, *rajas* creates and *tamas* destroys.³³ In this manner, cosmic *maayaa* brings in the illusion of the plurality of the material world, plurality of gods, plurality of kingdoms of beings, plurality of cosmic order and the plurality of the stages of existence. Thus, the cosmic *maayaa* is the source of our perception of multiplicity in the universe.

1.2.2. EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL MAAYAA

The individual *maayaa* (*avidhya*) makes one perceive his true self (*Aatman*) as *jiiva*. The unit of existence conscious of its physical covering is called *jiiva*. It does not possess knowledge of its identity with *Brahman*. *Jiiva* is bound by good or bad actions which determine its existence in the higher or lower regions. It enjoys the physical and gross things, as it has a body which, with its appetites, originates out of the *mahaabhutas* and their various combinations. Because of the physical body and its appetites *jiiva* experiences hunger, thirst, sleep, anger and all such states.³⁴ The physical body which *jiiva* possesses is the fleshy covering, which it casts off at its death.³⁵

Other than the physical body, the *jiiva* has what is called a subtle-body. It survives death and accompanies the individual *jiiva* beyond death. This includes a number of elements. Firstly, the *praana*, which is the individual vivifying principle in *jiiva*. It consists of all the vital currents that support and preserve the organic

existence of *jiiva*. *Praana* "preserves the physical frames in existence, regulates the entire physiological process and makes the performance of higher functions possible in the physical frame."³⁶ It is present in every part of the physical body and makes each part alive and working. There are five types of *praana*, each of which guides different life-systems and their functions. When *praana* regulates the respiratory system, it is called *mukhya praana*; *praana* as related to the digestive system is known as *samaana*; when *praana* helps the functioning of lower organs, it is called *apana*; while guiding higher organs, it is called *udaana*; and as a principle helping the circulatory system, *praana* is *vyaana*.³⁷ Secondly, the sense organs are outlets through which mind can perceive objects and objects can give themselves to the mind. There are five sense organs, viz., the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose. These are evolved from the *sattvic* aspect of the five subtle elements (*suukshmaabhuutas*). Each of the senses have a corresponding perception, viz., sound, touch, sight, taste and smell respectively.³⁸ Thirdly, there are the five organs of action, with the help of which *jiiva* as a bodily and conscious organism can move about. They include the tongue, the hands, the feet, the organs of generation and the organs of evacuation.³⁹

Fourthly, there is what is called the central organ (*antahkarana*). It is sometimes called the eleventh sense, as *antahkarana* is different from organs of sense and organs of action. Its main function is to make *jiiva* experience manifold things one by one in succession. It is capable of experiencing all types of sensations. *Antahkarana* is the inner organ of knowledge and that of volition. It is passive in that it gives knowledge, while it is impulsive as it excites action. *Antahkarana*, as the faculty of reflection and the faculty of desire, deliberation and will, is called the *manas* (mind). The *manas* has a number of modifications (*vrutti*) relating to the intellectual and volitional states. The modifications of the intellectual state are doubt (*vicikitsa*), cognition (*dhi*), belief (*sraddha*) and retention (*dhriti*). The modifications corresponding to the volitional state are desire (*kaama*), decision (*samkalpa*), deliberation (*vikalpa*), fear (*vi*), shame (*hri*), pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*dukha*).⁴⁰ These *vruttis* are classified into three classes depending on the predominance of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.⁴¹ When *antahkarana* reflects the things truly, it is called *buddhi* (intelligence). *Buddhi* is

the faculty of right apperception or discriminating knowledge. While *manas* gives *jiiva* knowledge, weighs reasons for and against, and deliberates, *buddhi* helps *jiiva* to apprehend and perceive rightly.⁴² Other than *manas* and *buddhi*, *antahkarana* has another faculty called the faculty of retention (*ahankaara*), which is the 'I-sense' or the sense of individuality, which makes the *jiiva* experience itself as the 'I' and say 'I exist' (*asmi*).⁴³

Besides the gross and the subtle bodies, there is a third type of body *jiiva* experiences as a result of *avidhyaa*, viz., the causal body or the bliss body. It is the innermost level of *avidhyaa*. This body comes about owing to the predominance of *sattvaguna*, as it is purely composed of the *sattvic* aspect of *maayaa*.⁴⁴

Avidhyaa makes *jiiva* experience three states of experience (*avasthaa*), viz., the individual waking-consciousness (*visva*), the individual dream-consciousness (*taijasa*) and the individual sleep-consciousness (*pragna*). In the state of individual waking-consciousness, the *jiiva* is characterized by the individual gross body. In this state, *jiiva* experiences the world of external objects through the senses and the mind. The perceptual world becomes its field of knowledge and enjoyment. The objects are known and enjoyed as real existing things outside the mind. The world is also perceived by the *jiiva* as a series of states and it is understood in relation to *jiiva* itself, as the subject (knowing I). The cognitive process, in this state, also involves three aspects, viz., instrumental (*pramaana*), the objective (*premeya*) and the consequent (*phala*). The *visva* state of *jiiva* is identical with the *virat*, the cosmic waking-consciousness. *Jiiva's* individual state of dream-consciousness is known as *taijasa*, which has the subtle body as its object. In this state, *jiiva* is conscious of what is within and enjoys subtle objects. In *taijasa* the consciousness is withdrawn from external objects and rests on the impressions (*vaasanas*) of the waking state that remain within the mind. Thus, the senses are fully at rest in *taijasa*. In the dream-state, there is no body consciousness and no space-time restrictions as in the waking state. Even though the content of dreams is traces left from the waking state, it flows with freedom and proper sequence. *Taijasa* is identical with the cosmic dream-consciousness, *Hiranyagarba*. *Jiiva's* individual deep sleep-consciousness is characteristic of the bliss body. In this state, the *jiiva* enjoys bliss. Behind the bliss body, the innermost of all beings, exists the *Brahman*. Thus, in this

state, there is no duality that characterizes the other states. In it, neither the subject that knows nor the object is known, as it is an undifferentiated consciousness in which the contents of waking and dream states come together. It is the state of highest serenity (*sam-prasaada*). But it is not a state of unconsciousness, for after *jiiva* awakes from a state of deep sleep it knows that "I slept soundly and that I did not know anything". Thus, *jiiva*, in this state also has the 'I-consciousness' after it awakes.⁴⁵

Besides, due to the influence of the individual *maayaa*, the *jiiva* is seen as having five sheaths (*koshas*). They are the sheath of body (*annamaayaakosha*), the sheath of vital force (*pranamaayaakosha*), the sheath of mind (*manomaayaakosha*), the sheath of knowledge (*vijnaanaamaayaakosha*) and the sheath of bliss (*anandaamaayaakosha*). The sheath of body is the covering of coarse body that is purely flesh. It is a dense cover. The next three sheaths are related to the subtle body: the sheath of vital force is the life currents supporting the preservation of organic existence; the sheath of mind includes mind and the organs of action; and the sheath of knowledge consists in *buddhi* and five organs of sense. Finally there is the sheath of bliss, which is the innermost of sheath of *avidhyaa*.⁴⁶

All these *koshas* serve as *upaadhis* that individuate *jiiva*, making it forget its true nature and condition. Shankara notes that the *jiiva* is to be considered as a mere appearance of the highest self, like the reflection of the sun on water. It is neither directly the highest self, nor a different thing. Just as when one reflected image of the sun trembles another reflected image does not on that account, tremble also, so when one soul is connected with actions and results of actions another soul on that account is not connected likewise. Thus, *jiva* appears to be numerous due to ignorance, yet one soul's actions do not affect the other.⁴⁷ In consequence the *jiiva* is not aware of its divine reality and becomes the worshiper of *ishvara*, the Lord of *maayaa*. In fact, *jiiva* and *ishvara* are the result of *maayaa* and disappear as true knowledge is attained.

The cosmic *maayaa* and *avidhyaa* individualize *Brahman* as *ishvara* and *jiiva*, besides giving the illusion of the plurality of existence. To the question "why must there be an emergence of the infinite process of becoming from *Brahman* through *maayaa*?", often the answer given is that it is the *liila* of *Brahman*. The term '*liila*' means a sport or a playful activity. *Liila* lies in ignorance and

it can never reveal the true nature of reality. We cannot ascribe any specific reason why the *liila* of *Brahman* takes place, except saying that it is an appearance suitable to the capacity and understanding of the one to whom it does appear. *Liila*, therefore, is real to the one, whom it appears, but does not mean anything to *Brahman*, who sportily assumes the appearance.⁴⁸ In other words, *liila* is a self-imposed limitation on the part of *Brahman*, which does not impair the integrity of the absolute. But it satisfies our volitional and emotional nature by making us conceive the absolute as a personal existence that can fulfill our pragmatic need for love and devotion.⁴⁹

1.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF *APARAA VIDHYAA*

In the preceding sections of this chapter, we have looked into the nature and consequences of *aparaa vidhyaa*. Now, in order to clarify this notion further, we could take up briefly the issue of its characteristics. According to Shankara *aparaa vidhyaa* has four significant characteristics, viz., it involves subject-object distinction, it is mediate and indirect, it is knowable by *pramaanas* (means of knowledge), and it is a caused knowledge. In the following section, we shall analyze these characteristics of *aparaa vidhyaa*.

1.3.1. SUBJECT-OBJECT DISTINCTION

Empirical experience, as we well know, is the everyday human experience which involves the subject-object duality. For example, in perceiving an object such as a table or a book the perceptual knowledge comes about as a result of someone seeing or touching the table or the book in question. Thus, empirical experience always involves the distinction between the 'experiencer' and the 'experienced', the 'knower' and the 'known'. In his introduction to Shankara's *Aatmaboodha*, Swami Nihilananda writes of empirical experience as follows:

Empirical experience involves the distinction between the 'seer' (*drig*) and the 'seen' (*drya*), the subject (*vishayi*) and the object (*vishaya*), the 'ego' (*aham*) and the 'non-ego' (*idem*). The seer is the perceiver, identical with the subject and the ego, and

is of the nature of consciousness and intelligence. The seen is the thing perceived, identical with the object and the non-ego, and is insentient by nature. Therefore, the seer and the seen, the subject and the object, the ego and the non-ego are mutually opposed and must never be identified with each other.⁵⁰

Both the subject and the object are essential to, and inseparable from, empirical experience. Without one of them, an empirical experience is not possible. Though an object might exist outside, there is no actual empirical experience unless there is a knower who by his intellect makes possible the experience of the particular object. "An object may exist independently of a knower; and the knower becomes self-conscious while revealing something which may be an external object or an internal idea."⁵¹ Thus, the basic element that characterizes every empirical experience is the presence of the duality of the subject and the object.

All the means of empirical knowledge (*pramuṇas*) presuppose the subject-object distinction and operate in the realm of duality. Even scriptural knowledge is empirical in the sense that it is intended for an agent who is able to know. For Shankara says, "The meditation taught in the Vedaanta texts, whose aim is the realization of the self, represented by the Upanishads, is possible only if the self is the agent."⁵² Thus, without a subject or a knower, the purpose of the scripture cannot be realized. In other words, if there is no one to know what is revealed in the scriptures, scriptural knowledge is not possible. But, though scriptural testimony is empirical, confined to the realm of phenomena and involves duality, it is superior to other means of knowledge since scripture reveals the highest reality and helps one to remove ignorance (*avidhyaa*).⁵³

1.3.2. MEDIATE AND INDIRECT

Empirical knowledge is obtained by the use of senses, *manas* and *buddhi*, in the actual presence of the object sensed and understood. In other words, when one comes into contact with an object, with the help of the external senses and internal faculties of knowing, the knowledge of that object is obtained. But if it happens that one lacks the senses or other faculties of knowing, the empirical know-

ledge of objects is not possible. Therefore, the mediums like senses, mind and intellect are equally essential to empirical experience as are the subject and the object.

Since empirical knowledge is attained by means of external and internal mediums, such as senses, mind and the intellect, it is a mediate and indirect knowledge. In other words, it is a representative knowledge. One comes to know the objects not directly and immediately, but the object is known as the senses, mind and intellect represent it. Thus, it is with the help of the representative idea of the object that the object is known. Empirical knowledge, therefore, is different from direct and immediate knowledge. Here one experiences knowledge about a reality intuitively and directly, without the help of any medium of knowledge. In such a knowledge, the activities of the senses, mind and the intellect are suspended, and one is open to the knowledge without any mediation of these external and internal faculties of knowing. On the other hand, as empirical knowledge fundamentally and essentially is dependent on physical and mental faculties of knowledge, it is basically mediate and direct knowledge.

1.3.3. KNOWABLE BY *PRAMAANAS*

Empirical knowledge is known by various means of knowledge (*pramaanas*). Vedaanta recognizes six *pramaanas*, which can be divided into two groups, based on the subject-matter each group is dealing with. The first group attempts to give knowledge of empirical realities, while the second group is the source of knowledge of the transcendental reality. The former are five, viz., perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumaana*), comparison (*anumaana*), supposition (*arthapatti*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*). The latter group consists of one *pramaana*, viz., *sabda*.⁵⁴ We could give a brief consideration of each of these *pramaanas*.

Perception is an important means of empirical knowledge. Its value consists in presenting to our consciousness the manifold reality of this world, even though it does not prove its validity. According to Vedaantic thinkers, perception gives us the knowledge of reality, but fails to explain the difference. In other words, perception has the cognitive element as it reports or gives information about the mere existence of realities, but does not have the recognitive ele-

ment, as it does not have such characteristics as assimilation and clarification of difference. It can be held as a source of valid knowledge, if it is not contradicted by subsequent experience or by any other *pramaanas*. The process of perception takes place in this manner. The *manas* comes in contact with the senses, the senses with the object and the *manas* with the consciousness immanent in it. As the result of these contacts, the mind is modified in the form of the object, which, in turn, leads to an identity between the perceiving-consciousness and the object-consciousness. The modification of the mind (*vrutti*), in taking the form of the object, destroys the ignorance, and the object is revealed to the perceiving consciousness. Thus, perception involves the conformity of the mental order to the given objective order.⁵⁵

Inference is a process of acquiring knowledge of a particular thing with the help of a mark it possesses, even though there is no way of directly perceiving it. Vedaantins basically follow the *Nyaaya* doctrine of inference, with some minor modifications. In inference, the invariable concomitance (*vyaapti*), between the middle term (*heetu*) and the major term (*saadhya*), is established by frequent experience. For example, the concomitance of fire and smoke is presumed from their existing in the kitchen. *vyaapti*, i.e., the concomitant relationship between *heetu* and *saadhya* is not an inference, but a permanent impression (*samskaara*) left upon the consciousness by the observation of positive instances and non-observation of negative instances. Once *vyaapti* is established, then one can proceed to make an inference by linking the *heetu* and the minor term. For example, by linking smoke to fire in *vyaapti*, one can conclude that there would be fire in the mountain if one finds smoke there. In order to present the inference one has made in this manner to others, a five-member syllogism is proposed. The members of the syllogism are:

There is fire in the mountain.

Because there is smoke in the mountain.

Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen.

This mountain has smoke.

Therefore, it has fire.

The first premise of the syllogism states the conclusion to be

proved. The second gives the reason (*heetu*), while the third is the major premise, in which we have an illustration of the concomitance of *heat* and *saadhya*. The fourth premise links the middle term and the minor term. The fifth restates the proved conclusion.⁵⁶

Comparison, as a *pramaana*, is based on similarity (*sadrisya*) between two objects. In it, a particular thing is felt to be like another thing. For example, a *gavaya* is experienced as an animal similar to a cow. The cause of such an experience is the functional activity of consciousness of similarity between the things compared. *Upamaana* is not perception, as the similarity experienced is not presented to the senses, but rather it is directly given to the perceiving consciousness. Neither is it a remembrance or a recognition, as the similarity experienced is not what we had already been known, forgotten and now remembered or recognized. Rather, the similarity is presented to the consciousness as something completely new. Comparison is also not an inference; knowledge of similarity is attained by direct experience and not inferred through the function of *vyuapti*.⁵⁷

Supposition consist in presuming the cause of a thing from its effect, which presumption is based on a negative mark (*vyatireeki linga*). The usual example given to illustrate *arthaapatti* is: the earth differs from other elements because of its smell. *Arthaapatti* is not an inference, but an implication or a hypothesis. It is the supposition of the cause. In other words, *arthaapatti* suggests the cause from the given effect. For example, when one is told that Devadatta is not at home, one presumes that he must be out of station. In other words, the fact of Devadatta's not being at home is caused by his being out of station. This presumption of the cause of Devadatta's being not at home is based on *arthaapatti*.⁵⁸

Non-perception is the source of knowledge of non-existence (*abhaava*). For Vedaantins, non-existence is not a mere negation of being, but it is something that has a real existence and it is perceived by a *pramaana* called *anupabdhi*. *Abhaava* is an existence, which is identified with its *locus*, but in it we do not experience any objects. In other words, *abhaava* implies the existence of the *locus* without any object. Though, the object of *abhaava* is absent, it is capable of being perceived as absent. Therefore, *abhaava* has a reality. In order to apprehend the nature of *abhaava* we require a specific *pramaana* which would give us the knowledge not only of the *locus* of *abhaava*,

but also the absence of the object. That *pramaana* that gives us knowledge of *abhaava* is *anupalabdhi*. It helps us to experience the absence directly in relation to its *locus*.⁵⁹

Other than the above-mentioned *pramaanas*, Vedaantins accept testimony (*sabda*) as a valid source of knowledge. This is of two kinds, based on the source of *sabda*. It is personal, if the source of information is a person, whereas it is impersonal if the information is based on the authority of the *Sruti*. The former cannot be accepted unconditionally, because it is possible that the person, the source of authority, can either deliberately misrepresent the truth or in good faith can present falsity as truth. The latter can be accepted unconditionally, as it is based on the authority of the *Sruti*. It is eternal. *Sabda* (word) is understood in relation to its *artha* (meaning). The word and its meaning are inseparably related to things, as they directly refer to things and express things. The denotative potency of the *sabda* is co-eternal with itself. All words are endowed with an inherent denotative potency from eternity. Therefore, the relationship between language and thought, words and things are *a priori*, and the system of names is not created, but manifested from all eternity. Thus, according to Vedaantins, *sabda* as scriptural testimony has an eternal dimension and so it can be accepted unconditionally as a true *pramaana*.⁶⁰

According to the Vedaanta school of thought, all these *pramaanas* are valid means of knowledge, as they give us knowledge of this phenomenal world. But we cannot hold them as absolute because their scope is limited to the empirical order. When considered in relation to the *Para-vidhya* their reality and the truth they give cease to exist. As a result we cannot make use of them in the transcendental order. This does not mean that these *pramaanas* are useless. They are useful, valid and necessary as long as we are under the hold and sway of empirical consciousness or the *juva*.⁶¹

1.3.4. CAUSED KNOWLEDGE

An empirical experience is transient and of a passing nature; it does take place in time. Thus empirical experience has a beginning, i.e., when an object is presented to the individual consciousness through the medium of senses and grasped by the intellect one begins to have an empirical experience. Likewise, if the subject or the

object of that particular experience exists no longer, then empirical experience no longer exists. Experience of a particular person does not exist when the person is dead or if the object of experience is destroyed. Thus, empirical knowledge is a caused knowledge. Since it is a caused knowledge, the individual can gain more of it by his own effort. By study, hard work, listening to others who know better and research, empirical knowledge can be attained and developed. Again, one can attain this type of knowledge by use of many modern techniques and technologies. For example, the knowledge of a language and its best use can be achieved by using new techniques of language learning and the modern technological inventions, such as, computer and audio-systems. Therefore, the acquisition of empirical knowledge, depends on each individual, especially on the effort he makes and the facilities available for him.

NOTES

1. *BSB*, I, i, pp. 11-12.
2. Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction*, 2nd ed., (Honolulu: The University Press Hawaii, 1962), p. 33.
3. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 34.
4. Cf. *BSB*, I, i, pp. 2-3.
5. Cf. Shankara, *Self-knowledge (Aatmabhooda)*, trans. Swami Nihilananda (New York: Ramakrishna Vivekananda Center, 1980), Introduction, p. 42 (hereafter: *AB*).
6. Shankara, *Panchaadasi*, trans. Hari Prasad Shastri (London: Shanthi Sadan, 1956), I, 13 (hereafter: *PI*).
7. Cf. *BSB*, I, i, pp. 3-4.
8. Cf. *VC*, pp. 13-16
9. Cf. Shankara, *Brihdaaranyaka Upanishad Bhaasya*, trans. Swami Madhvananda, 5th ed. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1975), II, v, 19 (hereafter: *BUB*).
10. Cf. F. Max Mueller, trans., "Kaatha Upanishad", *SBE*, Vol. XV, part II, I, ii, 4-5 (hereafter: *KU*).
11. Cf. F. Max Mueller, trans., "Svetaasvatara Upanishad", *SBE*, Vol. XV, part II, IV, 10 (hereafter: *SU*).
12. Cf. *BUB*, II, v, 19.
13. Cf. Radhakrishnan S., trans., *Bagavad Gita* (London:

Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1949), XVIII, 61 (hereafter: *BG*).

14. Cf. *ibid.*, VII, 25, 14.

15. Cf. *VC*, p. 12.

16. Ramkant A. Sinari, *The Structure of Indian Thought* (Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1970), p. 134.

17. Eliot Deutsch, p. 29.

18. *AB*, Introduction, p. 52.

19. Cf. Dasgupta S., vol. I, p. 443.

20. Cf. *AB*, Introduction, p. 52.

21. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 57.

22. Cf. Swami Nihilananda (trans.) *Vedaantasaara or The Essence of Vedaanta of Sadaananta Gogindra*, 3rd. ed. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1968), II, 52, p. 42 (hereafter: *VSS*).

23. Cf. *ibid.*, II, 54, p. 58.

24. Cf. *ibid.*

25. Cf. *AB*, Introduction, p. 58.

26. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture* (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1987), pp. 106-109. Cf. also *PI*, I, 15-17.

27. *BSB*, II, iii, 45, p. 509.

28. *Ibid.*, II, iii, 43, pp. 507-508.

29. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 129-130.

30. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 130-133.

31. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 133-135.

32. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 135, 152-153.

33. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 128. Cf. *AB*, Introduction, p. 59.

34. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 135-136.

35. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 150.

36. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

37. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 137-141.

38. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 142.

39. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 150.

40. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 145-146. Cf. also *BUB* I, v, 3.

41. Cf. *PI*, II, 12, 14, 15.

42. Cf. Swahanenda Swami, *Chaandogya Upanishad* (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1975), VII, 17-20 (hereafter: *CU*).

43. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 146-148.

44. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 152.

45. The Upanishads postulate a fourth state, viz., the *tuuriya* as distinct from the other three states. It is an absolute self-transcending state which bypasses the limitations of time, space and causality. This state is completely free from *avidhya* and its products which vitiate the other three states. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, p. 152-153. Cf. also E.I. Warriar, *Sri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga and Shankara's Advaita* (India: Vohra Publishers and Distributors, 1990), pp. 116-118. Cf. also *BUB*, IV, iii, 15.

46. Cf. *AB*, p. 131. Cf. also Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 150-153.

47. Cf. *BSB*, II, iii, 50, pp. 515-516.

48. Cf. *ibid.*, II, i, 33.

49. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 45-46.

50. *AB*, Introduction, p. 43.

51. A. Ramamurthi, *Advaitic Mysticism of Shankara* (West Bengal: The Center of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Vishvabharati, Shantiniketan, 1947), p. 15.

52. *BSB*, II, iii, 39, p. 497.

53. Cf. Shankara, "Taittiriya Upanishad Bhaasya", *Upahishad Bhaasyas (Aitareeya, Isha, Kaatha, Keena, Mundaka, Prasana and Taittiriya Upanishads)*, trans. Swami Gambhirananda, Vol. II (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1957), II, viii, 5 (hereafter: *TUB*).

54. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 175.

55. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 176-184.

56. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 192-202. Vedaantins make use of inference to establish the unreality of the empirical existence and the reality of trans-empirical existence. The inference is stated as follows: "The manifold existence is false, because of its being different from *Brahman*. All that is not *Brahman* is false, like the silver in the mother-of-pearl." *Ibid.*, p. 202.

57. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 203.

58. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 204 -205.

59. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 214 -217.

60. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 205-208.

61. Cf. Eliot Deutsch, p. 69.

CHAPTER II

***PARAA VIDHYAA:* THE NOUMENAL STATE OF MAN**

In the last chapter, we looked into the phenomenal state of man, as considered by Shankara. This chapter attempts to study the noumenal state of man. According to Shankara, man's ultimate destiny does not consist in being caught up in the phenomenal existence; rather, man is called to live at a depth at which he must experience the source of the universe within himself. The task of man is not to search for his ultimate destiny outside, but to move into himself and discovering the ultimate in the cave of his heart. It is not a new knowledge, but a realization of what one really is. *Paraa vidhyaa*, therefore, is nothing else but a self-realization in which one experiences *Brahman* (*Brahmaanubhava*) as one's own indwelling spirit (*Aatman*). This chapter deals with the goal, nature and characteristics of *paraa vidhyaa*.

2.1. THE GOAL OF *PARAA VIDHYAA*

The goal of *paraa vidhyaa* is *Brahman*, the ultimate universal spirit behind the universe and *Aatman*, the ultimate principle in the individual. Only when one has true knowledge about both *Brahman* and *Aatman*, can one begin to experience the oneness between these two. In this section, we will clarify these two notions, in preparation for the analysis of the nature of *paraa vidhyaa*.

2.1.1. *BRAHMAN*

The word '*Brahman*'¹ is derived from the Sanskrit root '*brih*' which literally means 'to gush forth', 'to grow', 'to be great', and 'to increase'. The suffix '*man*' added to the root '*brih*' signifies the absence of limitation. Thus, the term '*Brahman*' etymologically means that which is absolutely the greatest.² So '*Brahman*' denotes "that first . . . reality from which the entire universe of our experience has sprung up."³ In the words of the *Vedaanta-Suutras*, "*Brahman* is that omniscient, omnipotent cause from which pro-

ceeds the origin of the world.”⁴ Thus, the term ‘*Brahman*’ signifies the absolute and unlimited reality which is the substratum and the foundation of the world we know, and on which everything depends for its existence. *Brahman* is self-sufficient and does not depend on anything else for its existence. Hence it must be spiritual entity, since matter is not self-sufficient, limited and subject to change. George Thibaut, in his introduction to the *Vedaanta-Suutras*, says that whatever exists is in reality one, and this one universal being is called *Brahman*. This being is absolutely homogeneous in nature; it is pure Being, Intelligence and Thought. Intelligence or thought is not predicated of *Brahman* as its attribute, but constitutes its substance. *Brahman* is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities and whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable can only be denied of it.⁵ Thus, *Brahman* is without qualities (*nirgunaa*), beyond the order of our empirical and worldly experience. We cannot grasp *Brahman* with our empirical experiences, since the being of *Brahman* is necessary for anything to exist, and even for the possibility of empirical experience. In other words, *Brahman* is *a priori* and cannot be grasped by *a posteriori* or limited experience.

Because of our inability to grasp the true nature of *Brahman*, whatever positive description is developed about *Brahman* will remain in the level of phenomenal experience, and *Brahman* is beyond all phenomena. That is why we find contrary characteristics attributed to *Brahman*. In Brhadhaaranyaka Upanishad, we read that *Brahman* is “light and not light, desire and absence of desire, anger and absence of anger, righteousness and absence of righteousness.”⁶ Kaatha Upanishad speaks of *Brahman* as “smaller than the small, greater than the great, sitting yet moving, lying and yet going everywhere.”⁷ *Brahman* is light and not light, in the sense that it is only because there is *Brahman* that there is light and darkness. Again there exist small and the greater only because *Brahman* exists.

At the same time the word ‘existence’ cannot be attributed to *Brahman* and to the empirical world in the same way, for *Brahman*’s existence is different in nature. The existence of *Brahman* is opposed to all empirical existence, so that in comparison with this it can just as well be considered as non-existence. *Brahman* is the being of all beings.⁸ The nature of *Brahman* is so transcendent, that

it cannot be compared with anything in the world we know. At the same time, *Brahman* is present in all its manifestations, for without the Being of *Brahman* nothing can exist. Yet the empirical experience of *Brahman* is not possible. Thus, *Brahman* is that unalterable and absolute Being which remains identical with itself in all its manifestations. It is the basis and ground of all experience, and is different from the space-time-cause world. *Brahman* has nothing similar to it, nothing different from it, and no internal differentiation, for all these are empirical distinctions. It is non-empirical, non-objective, wholly other, but it is not non-being.⁹

Shankara repeatedly speaks of, and strongly defends, the absolute, unchangeable, attributeless nature of *Brahman*, alluding to many texts in the scripture which points to the *nirgunaa Brahman*.¹⁰ Commenting on the Upanishadic text, "as a lump of salt is without interior or exterior, entire and purely saline taste, even so is the self (*Brahman*) without interior or exterior, entire and pure intelligence alone",¹¹ Shankara points to the oneness of *Brahman*. In the lump of salt there is nothing other than salt, so too *Brahman* is nothing other than itself. It is the absolute being without a second.¹² Shankara also uses the example of the sun reflecting in water and appearing as many, in order to bring home the same truth. He says that just as the reflection of the sun in water increases with the increase of water, and decreases with its reduction, it moves when the water moves, and it differs as the water differs, so is the self. The sun seem to conform to the characteristics of water, but in reality the sun never has these increasing or decreasing qualities. So also *Brahman*, which from the highest point of view always retains its sameness, seems to conform to such characteristics as increase and decrease of the limiting adjunct owing to its entry into such an adjunct as a body.¹³

For Shankara, therefore, *Brahman* is a principle of utter simplicity. There is no duality in *Brahman*, for no qualities are found in his concept of *Brahman*. It is also simple in the sense that it is not subject to inner contradictions, which would make it changeable and transitory. Though Shankara uses logic and arguments to understand the nature of *Brahman* and to speak of *Brahman*, still for him in its reality *Brahman* is not a metaphysical postulate that can be proved logically, but must be experienced in silence.¹⁴ Thus, *Brahman* is one: It is not a 'He', a personal being; nor is it an 'It',

an impersonal concept. It is that state which comes about when all subject-object distinctions are obliterated. Ultimately, *Brahman* is a name for the experience of the timeless plenitude of Being.¹⁵

2.1.2. *AATMAN*

The term '*Aatman*' comes from the Sanskrit root '*an*' which etymologically means 'to breathe'. It is often rendered as 'soul' or 'self', and signifies the most fundamental being of the individual. There is no one who can deny the existence of the self for it is the basis of all individual actions. Everyone is conscious of the existence of his self and never thinks that he is not.¹⁶ To doubt the existence of the self would be a contradiction in terms because then one would doubt the existence of the very doubter who engages in the doubt. The doubter of the self is often compared by Advaitins to a person who searches for the necklace while wearing it; or to a person who wears the spectacles on his face and at the same time looks for them elsewhere. Without the existence of the self, it is impossible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation. For the knowledge of the self is not established through the so-called means of right knowledge, but it is self-established.¹⁷ Thus, the very existence of understanding and its functions presuppose an intelligence known as the self which is different from them, which is self-established and which they subserve.¹⁸ The very possibility of knowledge and the means of knowledge (*pramaanas*) have relevance if there exists the self which is the source of all knowledge. Therefore, *Aatman* is beyond all doubt, "for it is the essential nature of him who denies it."¹⁹ Therefore, Shankara believed that it was the nature of the self and not its reality, which is to be proved. "The self must seek itself in order to find what it is, not that it is."²⁰

Having established the existence of the self, we can turn now to the discussion of the nature of the *Aatman*. *Aatman* is the deathless, birthless, eternal and real substance in every individual soul. It is the unchanging reality behind the changing body, sense organs, mind and ego. It is the spirit, which is pure consciousness and is unaffected by time, space and causality. It is limitless and without a second.²¹ Vedantins speak of three states of consciousness, namely the waking state (*vishwa*), the dream state (*taijasa*), and the state of dreamless sleep (*pragna*). The basic underlying principle which wit-

nesses all these three states of one's existence is the pure consciousness (*chaitanyam*), the self. It is because of the presence of this ultimate substratum, that the body, the senses, the mind and the intellect function properly. At the same time it is not identified with these, nor affected by the changes that take place in the body, in the other sense or intellectual functions. Thus, *Aatman* is the "unrelated witness of the experiences of the three stages, which include a man's diverse activities."²²

Shankara gives a number of illustrations to clarify the nature of the self, especially in its role of being a witness (*saakshin*) to all activities of body, mind, senses, and intellect. Firstly, Shankara gives the analogy of a king's court. In the court, the king sits in his high throne as the observer of the activities of his ministers, councilors and all the others present. But because of his majesty as the king, he is unique and different from all. So too the self which is pure consciousness dwells in the body as a witness to the functions of the body, mind and other faculties, while at the same time it is different from them by its natural light. Thus, the witness is the absolute consciousness, the unchanging intelligence that underlies the finer and the grosser bodies. It is neither *ishvara* nor *jiiva*, but it is *Aatman* which is untouched by the distinction of *ishvara* and *jiiva*.²³

To those who come with the objection that the self is not only a mere observer or witness, but also participates in the activities of the body, Shankara replies using the analogy of the moon and the clouds. The movement of the clouds on a moonlit night suggests that the moon is moving, whereas in fact it is the clouds that move. Likewise, the activities of the mind and senses create the illusion that the self is active.²⁴ To the one who would say that activity belongs to the senses or other faculties and considers them the self, Shankara gives the following illustrations. Just as the iron filings become active at the presence of the magnet, so also it is the presence of the self that makes the body, the senses and all the other faculties active. It is fire which makes the iron ball red-hot. So also neither can the mind, the intellect or the body combined make the self. It is the self which is the source of all their activities. Just as a man who works with the help of the light that is inherent in the sun does so without ever affecting the sun, so too the mind, the body, the intellect, and the senses, engage in their respective activities with the help of the self,

but without exerting any influence on the self.²⁵ All these illustrations point to the basic and absolute nature of the *Aatman*. The following Upanishadic statement bears witness to this reality. "That the imperishable is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the understood understander. Other than It, there is naught that hears; other than It, there is naught that thinks; other than It, there is naught that understands."²⁶

The terms '*Brahman*' and '*Aatman*', both basically denote one and the same underlying principle: the former stands for the underlying and unchanging principle of the universe; while the latter refers to the unchanging reality in the individuals. Both of these terms are used in the Upanishads and by the interpreters as synonyms they do interchange these two terms in the same sentence. Commenting on the Upanishadic statement "Who is an *Aatman*? What is *Brahma*?",²⁷ Shankara remarks: "By *Brahman*, the limitations implied in the *Aatman* are removed, and by the *Aatman* the conception of *Brahman* as a divinity to be worshipped is condemned."²⁸ These two terms fundamentally refer to one and the same reality, which is the ground of everything. In other words, these two terms stand for two different descriptions of the same ultimate reality, from the point of view of the universe and the individual. The ultimate reality represented by these two terms is the goal of *paraa vidhyaa* or *Brahmaanubhava*.

2.2 NATURE OF *PARAA VIDHYAA*

We have analyzed the goal of *paraa vidhya*, in the preceding section. Here, we must attempt to clarify the nature of *paraa vidhyaa*, in which the *Brahman*-realization is attained by the seeker. We elaborate the nature of *paraa vidhyaa*, by looking into its meaning and clarifying the identity between *Brahman* and *Aatman*.

2.2.1. MEANING

Paraa Vidhyaa or *Brahmaanubhava* is the ultimate and noumenal state of man. The term '*Brahmaanubhava*' is a compound word, which consists of two Sanskrit words, viz. '*Brahman*' (absolute reality) and '*anubhava*' (intuitive experience or knowledge). The term '*anubhava*' means not a mere theoretical or intellectual

knowledge, but the knowledge obtained through an integral experience. *Anubhava* is not the immediacy of an uninterrupted sensation, where the existence and the content of what is apprehended are separated. It is related to artistic insight rather than to animal instinct; it is an immediate knowledge.²⁹ Thus, literally the term '*Brahmaanubhava*' means the integral and intuitive experience of the absolute reality. When we speak of the intuitive experience of *Brahman*, from the Advaitic point of view there arise many basic questions as to the nature of *Brahmaanubhava*. How is it possible to have an experience if there is no subject to experience and no object to be experienced? Besides, if there is no duality in an experience, can it be described? If *Brahmaanubhava* is an experience, and if it has no duality in itself as an experience, then what is the nature of the experience involved in *Brahmaanubhava*? These questions stem from the fact that the Advaita philosophy of Shankara, does not permit the possibility of duality in this fundamental experience.

Possession of intellectual knowledge about the nature of *Brahman* and that of *Brahmaanubhava* is the first step towards the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava*. Obtaining intellectual knowledge by the study of the Scriptures, especially by understanding the meaning and the import of the Vedaantic statements like 'That art Thou', is necessary for *Brahmaanubhava*. In knowing the nature of *Brahman* intellectually, one can work towards the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava*. When we speak of the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava*, we use the term 'attainment' (*labdha*) in a figurative sense (*upacara*).³⁰ In an empirical experience we attain some new knowledge, i.e., knowledge which had not previously existed as far as we were concerned. In *Brahmaanubhava*, however, we do not attain anything new, but only realize what we are, i.e., our true nature, the identity with *Brahman*. According to Shankara, we are *Brahman*, and *Brahmaanubhava* is that experience by which we recognize our own real nature.

Many texts in Shankara's works point to the fact that the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava* consists in the recognition and the realization that one's real and true nature is *Brahman*. "The state of being *Brahman* is the same as the realization of the self."³¹ "Perfect knowledge . . . is the realization of the *Atman* as one with *Brahman*."³² "When a man knows the *Atman*, and sees it inwardly and outwardly as the ground of all things animate and inanimate he

has indeed reached liberation.”³³ “No man who knows *Brahman* to be different from himself is a knower of truth.”³⁴ “My self is pure consciousness, free from all distinctions and sufferings.”³⁵ Thus, *Brahmaanubhava* which is the experience of identity with *Brahman*, is an attainment only from the point of view of the aspirant or the seeker of truth. From the absolute of *paramaarth*a point of view there is no attainment of *Brahman*.

2.2.2. IDENTITY OF *BRAHMAN* AND *AATMAN*

From what has been said about the nature of *Brahmaanubhava*, so far, there arises the question, how, at all, can we know or have any kind of knowledge about this experience called *Brahmaanubhava*? No empirical means of knowledge (*pramaana*) can help us in this regard, except scriptural knowledge. Though scriptural knowledge is limited to the level of duality, still it provides knowledge about the reality of *Brahman* and enables us to have an intellectual understanding of *Brahman*.

Shankara holds the authority of the scriptural testimony in our intellectual understanding of *Brahman*. Nothing else on earth, except the scriptures, can reveal to us the nature of *Brahman* and of *Brahmaanubhava*. In this regard Shankara is very clear; he does not substitute any *pramaana* than the scriptural testimony, for the attainment of the intellectual knowledge about *Brahman*. He does make use of all the other *pramaanas*, but only to elucidate, clarify and demonstrate what he accepts on the basis of scriptural authority about *Brahman* and *Brahmaanubhava*. He says, “The fact of everything having its self in *Brahman* cannot be grasped [intellectually], without the aid of scriptural passage ‘That art Thou’.”³⁶

The word ‘*upanishad*’ (scripture) derives its meaning from its capacity to lead to the truth those who, having been thoroughly dissatisfied with the things seen and unseen, seek liberation from ignorance, which is the source of bondage and suffering. The *Upanishads* are capable of accomplishing all these, for in them the highest end of life is embodied.³⁷ The scriptural knowledge of *Brahman* is contained in the *Upanishadic* statements (*mahaavaakyas*), which are also called ‘*Vedaantic aphorisms*’. Only by studying them and being guided by the teacher (*guru*) can one have the intellectual knowledge about *Brahman* and *Brahmaanubhava* which is the first

step towards the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava*.

There are four fundamental Vedic statements, which point to the nature of *Brahmanubhava*. They are:

That are Thou (*tat tvam asi*)³⁸

I am Brahman (*Aham Brahmsmi*)³⁹

This Self is Brahman (*Ayamatma Brahma*)⁴⁰

Brahman is consciousness (*Prajnanam Brahma*)⁴¹

Shankara is of the opinion that all these Vedaantic statements are not merely figurative, but essential statements about *Brahman*. These *mahaavaakyas* assert the absolute identity between *Brahman* and *Aatman*. The most fundamental of all these four aphorisms is the *mahaavaakya* 'That are Thou', (*tat tvam asi*). Now, we will consider the meaning and import of this aphorism.

Before entering into the discussion of the meaning of the Vedaantic statement, we need to consider the type of meanings a word or a sentence can have or the different senses in which it can be used. According to Advaitins, the meaning of a word or a sentence can be of three types. Firstly, the primary or direct meaning which is conveyed by the word. Secondly, the implied meaning or *lakshana*, which is the meaning conveyed by the word by way of implication. Thirdly, the suggested meaning, which is the meaning hinted at by the word, through association.

The implied meaning or *lakshana* is of three kinds. The first of the *lakshana* is *jahallakshana*, which consists in discarding the direct meaning of a sentence or a word completely in favor of its indirect or implied meaning. For example, in the sentence 'The Cowheard village is in the Ganga',⁴² the phrase 'in the Ganga' is used to mean 'on the bank of the river Ganga'. This is a case of *jahallakshana* because the direct meaning 'in the Ganga' is discarded in favor of the implied meaning 'on the bank of the river Ganga.' The second *lakshana* is the *ajahallakshana* in which the direct meaning is not completely given up, but the sentence in question hints at the real meaning of the sentence. We can obtain the direct meaning by associating with some object related to the idea expressed in the sentence. For instance, in the sentence 'the red color is running', the direct meaning of the sentence is not completely discarded, but hinted at. Its direct meaning can be obtained by asso-

ciation with a red object that runs, for instance, a red horse. The third meaning by implication is *jahadjahallakshana*, which consists in giving up a part of the direct meaning and retaining the other part. In the example 'this is that Devadatta', the association of place, time and the conditions of the meeting of Devadatta now and then are given up and the Devadatta, who is one and the same in both the instances, is accepted.⁴³

The great aphorism '*tat tvam asi*' (That art Thou) is often open to misunderstanding, especially when seen from the point of view of ignorance. The direct meaning conveyed by 'That' (*tat*) to those who are in the spell of ignorance is the idea of a personal God associated with the universe. That God is creator, preserver and destroyer, and is endowed with omniscience, Lordship and great power. In other words the primary meaning of that is the *sagunaa Brahman* or *Ishvara*.⁴⁴ The direct meaning of the word 'Thou' (*tvam*), in the context of the Brahadaaranayaka Upanishad is Sevetaketu, the son of Uddalaka, who is the hearer of this Upanishadic statement and the one to whom this aphorism is addressed. Thus, 'Thou' directly refers to any individual who is a willing hearer of the scriptures as taught by the teachers. In other words, 'Thou' primarily conveys the idea of '*jiiva*', the individual soul. It is associated with the individual body, has little knowledge, and is characterized by the limitations such as birth and death, hunger and thirst, pain and pleasure. The term, 'art' (*asi*) states merely a complete identity of the 'That' and the 'Thou.' Thus, the direct sense of this Vedaantic saying '*tat tvam asi*' (That art Thou) points to the identity between *Ishvara* and *jiiva*.⁴⁵

But the direct meaning of the saying 'That art Thou', namely, the full union or identity between *Ishvara* and *jiiva*, does not seem to agree with the actual fact, since such an identity is not possible. *Ishvara* and *jiiva* are too far apart and different from each other. For the former is the powerful and supreme Lord, while the latter is limited and a worshiper of *Ishvara*. Therefore, an absolute unity or identity between *Ishvara* and *jiiva* seems to be impossible. Nevertheless, identity is a realized fact as is seen in the direct and immediate experience of great teachers. Since identity is a fact and the identity between *Ishvara* and *jiiva* seems an impossibility the scriptural statement '*tat tvam asi*' cannot be interpreted in its direct meaning, for such an interpretation would falsify the scriptural

statement. Shankara clearly speaks of this point in his *Brahma-Suutra Bhaasya* as follows:

If God becomes identical with the transmigrating soul God will cease to exist; and as a result, the scripture will become useless. Similarly if the transmigrating soul becomes God, there will be none to follow the scriptures, which will certainly become useless. This will also contradict such means of proof as common experience.⁴⁶

Therefore, in order to interpret the identity statements we must enter the realm of implied meanings.⁴⁷ We know well, by now, that *Ishvara* and *jiiva* are the result of ignorance and the superimposition of the unreal on the real. Thus the implied meaning of 'That' is *nirgunaa Brahman*, the pure consciousness who is absolute and without attributes; 'Thou' by implication refers to the self (*Aatman*), the pure consciousness which is the reality underlying the mind-body system. Hence this aphorism means that *Brahman* and *Aatman* are absolutely one and the same.

Having determined that the Vedantic statement "That art Thou" is to be interpreted by way of its implicit meaning, it is important to decide which of the three *lakshana* is applicable in the interpretation of this aphorism. *Jahallakshana* is not applicable in the interpretation of 'That art Thou' because by using this *lakshana* we can derive the meaning by implication if the implied meaning is not contained already in the original sentence. For instance, the sentence 'The cowheard village is in the Ganga' does not contain the phrase 'on the bank of the river Ganga,' and thus this meaning is not explicit. So by using *jahallakshana* one could derive the phrase 'on the bank of the river Ganga' by implication. But in the statement 'That art Thou' the words 'That' and 'Thou' have their direct meanings and are explicitly stated, i.e., they refer to *Ishvara* and to *jiiva* respectively. Hence it is not proper to discard the direct meaning 'That' and 'Thou' and give them the implied meaning of using *jahallakshana*.

Ajahallakshana, as mentioned above, consists in not wholly discarding the real meaning of the sentence, but hinting at it. For example, in the sentence 'the red color is running', the direct mean-

ing is absurd. This absurdity can be removed, by not abandoning the direct meaning of the sentence but associating it with an object of red color that runs, for instance, a red horse. But the sentence 'That art Thou' cannot be interpreted using this second *lakshana*. The terms 'That' and 'Thou' clearly express their meaning, and in fact nothing of the direct meaning is excluded from 'That' and 'Thou'. Hence, there is no reason why one should bring in some element that is not excluded from the direct meaning of 'That' and 'Thou'. Therefore, *ajahullakshana* is not applicable in interpreting the sentence in question.

Jahadajahullakshana is precisely that which is applicable in interpreting identity statements like 'That art Thou'. In this kind of implied meaning, a part of the sentence is given up and the other part is retained. In the example "this is that Devadatta," the part which involves contradictions, viz., his life in the past and in the present, i.e., the person Devadatta, is retained. Likewise in the *mahaavaakya* 'That art Thou,' the conflicting imports, namely immediateness, remoteness, and differences are given up and the absolute, pure consciousness which is common to both 'that' and 'thou' is retained.⁴⁸ It is according to this third *lakshana* that, 'That art Thou' and all other Vedaantic statements pointing to the identity of *Brahman* and *Atman* must be interpreted.

The *mahaavaakya* 'tat tvam asi' is not tautological or superfluous. It and all such statements are concrete representation of a movement of thought from the ontological level of particularity to another of universality and yet to another of unity. When the latter state of unity is attained the distinctions between the former are negated. One begins with the individual consciousness, passes on to an universal consciousness, and finally arrives at the pure consciousness that overcomes the separate reality of both the individual and the universal. It is this state of unity which constitutes the ground of all multiplicity and individuality.⁴⁹ The unity is obtained by stripping away the incompatible and the contradictory elements of the 'That' and 'Thou' and thereby arriving at the common element or basis.⁵⁰ In the illustration, 'this is that Devadatta', the Devadatta seen now is identified with the Devadatta seen years ago, despite all the accidental differences like physical conditions, mental states and places of meeting. What makes one identify the person of Devadatta as the same is the elimination of the differences. In the same way the

negation of the apparent contradictions of 'That' and 'Thou' would lead us to the fundamental and absolute reality.

In fact, in the recognition of the person of Devadatta now, one has gained nothing new about the person of Devadatta, except the accidental qualities, but only recognized Devadatta whom one had already known. In the same way the Upanishadic statements do not reveal anything new about *Brahman* or add anything new to its nature. Nevertheless, they are of immense value, since they remove the false notion of difference between the individual self and the *Brahman*. When ignorance, on which is based the difference between 'That' and 'Thou' is removed, they cease to be different, and we are able to experience their identity. In other words, the intrinsic nature of 'That' and 'Thou' is one and the same. The words 'That' and 'Thou' in their implicit sense (*lakshana*) point to the same reality, as the terms 'I' and 'the tenth' indicate one and the same person in the sentence 'I am the tenth'.⁵¹ Thus, the identity statement 'That art Thou' clearly shows, that *Brahmaanubhava* or *paraa vidhyaa* is a non-dual and unique experience of the identity of *Brahman* and *Aatman*, which is the absolute and fundamental reality behind both the universe and the individual.

2.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF *PARAA VIDHYAA*

Having analyzed the goal and nature of *paraa vidhyaa*, we could now look into some of its characteristics. The study of the characteristics would elucidate the concept of *Brahmaanubhava* further. There are basically four characteristics: unity experience, immediate and direct experience, indescribable experience and uncaused experience. We shall elaborate each of these characteristics.

2.3.1. UNITY EXPERIENCE

Brahmaanubhava does not have an object of experience, nor does it have a subject of experience, in the empirical sense because *Brahman* is neither a subject nor an object. Shankara speaks of *Brahmaanubhava* as "pure knowledge and pure bliss, not smitten with suffering like sense perception, but serene (*prasana*), ever content and homogeneous or undifferentiated (*ekarasa*)."⁵² Since

Brahmaanubhava is pure experience (*avagatimatra*) and pure knowledge (*keevala jnaana*), there is no possibility for the self or *Brahman* to become the subject or the object of *Brahmaanubhava*.

Brahman cannot be said to be the knower of *Brahmaanubhava*, because if *Brahman* is constantly aware of its bliss then that is the nature of *Brahman*. Hence there is no sense in maintaining that *Brahman* cognizes its own bliss. If, on the other hand, *Brahman* is supposed to be knowing its bliss interruptedly then in the intervals, when it does not cognize itself, it must do something else. The result of such a view would lead to the consideration of *Brahman* as changing and non-permanent.⁵³ So, either way, *Brahman* cannot be said to be the subject or the knower of *Brahmaanubhava*. It, therefore, is "neither *Brahman*-consciousness nor self-consciousness; it is pure consciousness without the subject-object duality."⁵⁴ Shankara uses the example of fire and light to illustrate the impossibility of *Brahman* being the subject of *Brahmaanubhava*. Fire cannot burn itself, but burning is the very nature and essence of fire. Neither does light enlighten itself, but enlightening other objects and things is the very nature of light. In the same way, *Brahman* is essentially knowledge and being. So, we cannot say that *Brahman* knows itself, for its very nature is knowledge. "As the fire does not burn itself," says Shankara, "so the self does not know itself."⁵⁵

Shankara, likewise, holds that *Brahmaanubhava* is an objectless experience. When speaking of it, one often thinks that it is an experience of *Brahman* by the self, which way of looking at *Brahmaanubhava* stems from ignorance (*avidhya*), for in fact *Brahman* is none other than one's own self. *Brahmaanubhava* does not mean experiencing *Brahman* as an object, but the realization of the real nature of one's own self.⁵⁶ Unlike empirical experience, *Brahmaanubhava* is not an experience of *Brahman* as an object, for it is not different from *Brahman*. When one attains *Brahmaanubhava*, one does not experience *Brahman* objectively (*vastu*) but recognizes his true nature which is *Brahman*. "In *Brahmaanubhava*," says, Shankara, "the differences of the experiencer (*labdha*), the experienced (*labdhya*) and the experience (*upalabdhi*) are totally absent."⁵⁷ Thus, *Brahmaanubhava* is a non-dual and unique experience, which in no way involves the distinction between the subject and the object.

Though Shankara strongly defends the non-dualistic nature of

Brahmaanubhava, many scriptural texts seem to contradict his position. Some passages in the Scriptures refer to *Brahman* as 'all-knowing *Brahman*' or as the 'eternal *Brahman*' (*vijanata*).⁵⁸ Besides, Shankara himself alludes to the scriptures and speaks of *Brahman* as a witness (*saakshin*) of all actions that take place in the world of phenomena.⁵⁹ *Brahadaaranyaka Upanishad* gives the analogy of the union between two lovers as an illustration to clarify the notion of *Brahmaanubhava*. A man fully embraced by his beloved wife does not know anything, either internal or external, and is fully absorbed in the one whom he loves. So the infinite being fully embraced by the supreme self does not know anything at all, either internal or external.⁶⁰ Again, in the same *Upanishad*, there is another illustration pointing to duality in *Brahmaanubhava*. When a lump of salt, which is a product of the sea-water, falls into the sea, it becomes fully dissolved in the water and becomes one with it, to such a degree that it can never again be separated from the sea-water. In the same way, in *Brahmaanubhava* the individual self enters into the supreme self, loses its separate identity and becomes one with the supreme self.⁶¹ *Mundaka Upanishad* states: "As the flowing rivers disappear in the ocean quitting name and form so the knower, being liberated from name and form, goes into heavenly person (*Brahman*), the higher than the high."⁶²

All these illustrations, whose intent and purpose is to describe the nature of *Brahmaanubhava*, seem to point to a duality in *Brahmaanubhava*, between *Brahman* and the self. They portray *Brahmaanubhava* as that experience by which the self attains *Brahman*. The idea of *Brahman* as the "witness" or as the 'eternal knower' suggests that *Brahman* is a subject distinct from the self as object. That the self is embraced into *Brahman* like a lover is embraced by the beloved, that the self is dissolved into *Brahman* as salt dissolves into salt-water, that the self enters *Brahman* as rivers merge into the ocean -- all indicate that in *Brahmaanubhava* there is a union of two distinct entities. In other words, all these illustrations show that "the self and *Brahman* are two distinct realities and the self's oneness with *Brahman* is a result of its union with *Brahman*. This means that *Brahman* is the goal of the self or that *Brahman* is the object of higher realization."⁶³ As a result, *Brahmaanubhava* amounts to an experience of *Brahman* by the self, i.e., the self is the subject whose object of experience is *Brahman*.

This description of *Brahmaanubhava* is incompatible with Shankara's Advaitic understanding of *Brahmaanubhava*. He considers it as an experience which involves no duality. If *Brahmanubhava* is the experience of the self, whose object is *Brahman*, then this experience cannot be absolute, but only transitory and limited because the individual self or the experiencer is limited. According to Shankara, the dualistic consideration of *Brahmaanubhava* is a result of ignorance, which consists in mistakenly accepting the phenomenal (*vyavahaara*) and the relative as the transcendental (*paramaurtha*) or the absolutely real. As long as one is under the sway of ignorance, he is not going to see the true nature of *Brahmaanubhava*. In reality, *Brahman* is neither a knower nor a witness. The word 'knower' is used of *Brahman* figuratively to indicate pure knowledge, which is the nature of *Brahman*.⁶⁴ For Shankara says that 'the immutable consciousness, that is *Brahman*, is spoken as the 'eternal knower' by a figure of speech (*upacara*) just as by virtue of its heat fire is regarded as the agent of heating'.⁶⁵ All concepts of duality enter only if these texts are interpreted from the phenomenal point of view. But Shankara holds that if the Upanishadic texts are given the right interpretation, they in no way conflict with the tenets of Advaita Vedaanta.

Commenting on the illustration in which the self is said to be embraced by the supreme self, Shankara argues that the supreme self is not different from the individual self. In fact they are one and the same self, the pure consciousness. Due to ignorance we see the supreme self as the individual self. The individual self is embraced by its own real nature, which is the supreme self. Therefore what is embraced and what embraces are one and the same. They are not two different realities, but are identical. However, the empirical self thinks of the supreme self as something different from itself before it has realized its real nature. The idea of embracing is meaningful only from the point of view of an empirical self. But what actually happens in *Brahmaanubhava* is that the self realizes its real nature by giving up ignorance.⁶⁶ The terms in other illustrations like 'entering' (*preveesa*), 'merging' (*aapti*) and 'attaining' (*labdha*) are used figuratively, like the words 'witness' or the 'eternal knower'. They have meaning and significance only from the relative point of view. Shankara clearly points to this truth in his commentary on *Brahadaaranayaka Upanishad*. He says:

We hold the definite conclusions of all the Upanishads that we are nothing but the self or *Brahman*, that is always the same, homogeneous, one without a second, unchanging, birthless, undecaying, immortal, deathless and free from fear. Therefore, the statement 'he is merged in *Brahman*' is but figurative (*upacara*) meaning the cessation of differences created by ignorance as a result of knowledge.⁶⁷

Therefore, for Shankara, these problems -- whether *Brahmaanubhava* has an object or not; if it has an object how can it be non-dual; and if it does not have an object, how can it be considered as an experience of *Brahman* -- arise only when one seeks to understand and explain the objective experience of *Brahmaanubhava* from the standpoint of empirical experience. From the standpoint of absolute knowledge there are no such problems. True knowledge is non-dual; *Brahmaanubhava* is nothing but *Brahman* itself. One can attain *Brahmaanubhava* only by directly and immediately being *Brahman*. In *Brahmaanubhava*, there is no distinction of *Brahman* and the experience of *Brahman*. The direct and immediate experience of *Brahman* is *Brahmaanubhava*.⁶⁸ In other words, *Brahmaanubhava* is a non-dual and subject-objectless experience.

2.3.2. IMMEDIATE AND DIRECT KNOWLEDGE

Since *Brahmaanubhava* is non-dual, subjectless and objectless experience, it must be immediate and direct.⁶⁹ So, unlike the empirical experience, it cannot be obtained through our sense, mind and intellect. It is immediate and direct because it consists in recognizing and realizing one's own true nature; no mediation is necessary to know one's true self. "The consciousness of objects (which arise out of the functioning of the eye and other faculties) is mediately known: for it depends on an intervening reflection of the self (in order to be known). But as it is the self of the phenomenal consciousness, *Brahman* is immediately known."⁷⁰

In order to demonstrate the immediate and direct nature of *Brahmaanubhava*, Shankara alludes to the Upanishadic illustration

of a group of people crossing a river. When they had crossed the river, in order to ascertain whether all in the company had arrived at the other side of the river one person began to count the members of the group. He counted everyone except himself. Each time he counted he found one person missing from the group, until he came to realize that he himself was the missing person, for whom he had been looking. In such realization, neither was there any effort involved, nor was there any intervention or mediation of any other factor, for the missing person and the one who was looking for the missing person are one and the same or identical with each other. Hence there is no need for any mediation to recognize his own self.⁷¹ All that is needed in the direct realization, is recognizing one's own self as the true self (*Brahman*). Therefore, *Brahmaanubhava* is the direct experience of the reality of oneself. It is direct and immediate experience and is never obtained through any media like senses, mind and intellect.

2.3.3. INDESCRIBABLE

Since *Brahmaanubhava* is without subject-object duality and is immediate and direct experience, it is indescribable: the very notion of description involves duality. In the empirical realm, any experience, however small or great, can be given at least some description. What can be known through various means of empirical knowledge (*pramaanas*) can also be expressed in words, using our own everyday or philosophical language. What is not known or experienced through empirical means of knowledge cannot also be expressed in words. As *Brahmaanubhava* is trans-empirical, non-dual and undifferentiated, it is indescribable. As *Brahman* is beyond all phenomena, the experience of *Brahman* also is beyond the realm of phenomenal language. Shankara says: "It is only to the object of knowledge and not to the non-objects that a word or an idea can be applied. *Brahman*, which is the self of them and also of the ego is not within the scope of a word or an idea."⁷² Maanduukya Upanishad speaks of the indescribable nature of the *Brahman* in the following passage:

Not inwardly cognitive, not outwardly cognitive,
not bothwise cognitive, not a cognitive-mass, not

cognitive, not non-cognitive, unseen, without which there can be dealing, ungraspable, having no distinctive mask, non-thinkable, that cannot be designated, the essence of the assurance of which is the state of being one with the self, the cessation of development, tranquil, benign, without a second . . . is the self (*Brahman*).⁷³

Since *Brahman* is indescribable and unknowable, *Brahmaanubhava* is also indescribable. A thing can be defined when it can be distinguished from other things, because of its distinguishing characterization. But there is nothing different from *Brahman*, from which it can be distinguished. Nor can anything be said about *Brahman*, so that it can be distinguished on that basis. Therefore, one can speak of *Brahmaanubhava* only by way of negation, by denying the qualities of the empirical experience superimposed on *Brahmaanubhava* by ignorance. In the empirical realm, any experience, however small or great, can be given at least some kind of description. *Brahmaanubhava* is trans-empirical and cannot be described because of the very fact that it is non-dual and undifferentiated. The words and languages we use refer to the phenomenal world (*maayaa*) and to the relative realities. As *Brahman* is beyond all that is phenomenal, *Brahmaanubhava* cannot be described in ordinary language. For Shankara says: "It is only to the object of knowledge and not to the non-objects that a word or an idea can be applied. *Brahman*, which is the self of them and also of the ego is not within the scope of a word or an idea."⁷⁴

Yet the Upanishads do attempt to define *Brahman* as 'reality' (*satyam*), 'knowledge' (*jnanam*), and 'infinite' (*anandam*).⁷⁵ In fact, this description is not true of *Brahmaanubhava*, for it does not elevate our conception or understanding of *Brahman* to a higher level, or remove our conception of finitude. It only negates the qualities of 'unreality', 'ignorance' and 'finitude' superimposed upon *Brahman*. The description of *Brahman* as "infinite knowledge and reality" is a logical impropriety. By this very impropriety this description of *Brahman* serves to show the logical uniqueness of *Brahman* and that of *Brahmaanubhava*. By its striking oddness the phrase preserves as well as reveals, to some extent, the great mystery of *Brahman*. It preserves the mystery because we have no idea what

infinite knowledge is, though we know what knowledge is. It reveals the mystery of *Brahman* because it effectively shows the uniqueness of *Brahman* by differentiating it from all objects and empirical subjects.⁷⁶

2.3.4. ETERNAL AND UNCAUSED:

Brahmaanubhava is of the nature of *Brahman*. Since *Brahman* is eternal *Brahmaanubhava* is an eternal experience. Therefore, one cannot speak of it as taking place in some particular moment in time. Unlike empirical experiences, *Brahmaanubhava* is an experience which is without a beginning or an end. In empirical experience there is the distinction between the 'knower,' the 'known,' and the 'knowledge'. In *Brahmaanubhava* there are no such distinctions, for Shankara says, "the knower is the eternal knowledge. The known and the knowledge are not different"⁷⁷ in *Brahmaanubhava*.

Thus, *Brahmaanubhava* is the knowledge of an ontological state of absolute oneness and unity between *Brahman* (the unchanging, eternal reality in the universe), and *Aatman* (the unchanging, eternal reality in the individual).⁷⁸ Therefore, *Brahmaanubhava* is as eternal as *Brahman* and *Aatman*. It is not something that is caused by the individual who is striving to reach this state of unity. It is not an experience that takes place in time and which has *Brahman* for its object. For Shankara, the attainment of the self or *Brahman* cannot be the obtaining of something which has not been obtained before, for in *Brahmaanubhava* there is no difference between the person attaining and the object attained.⁷⁹ If *Brahman* is said to attain something other than itself, it becomes the attainer and the non-self, i.e., the object of attainment, because *Brahman*, the pure consciousness and eternal knowledge, is the one absolute reality.⁸⁰

As eternal *Brahmaanubhava* is uncaused. There is nothing that can cause *Brahmaanubhava* directly; it is an experience which cannot be effected (*asaadhya*). Any attempt to cause *Brahmaanubhava* is meaningless, since the finite and the limited cannot effect or cause a trans-empirical or transcendental experience. As *Brahmaanubhava* is pure consciousness, it is essential for the attainment of anything; therefore the very attempt to attain it, indicates its attain-

ment. In other words, all means of attainment are based on *Brahmanubhava* or pure consciousness, and so nothing can be attained without presupposing it. Therefore the self or *Brahman* is the basis of all knowledge and in attaining *Brahmaanubhava* everything else is attained.⁸¹ For Shankara says that just as one may get to the missing animal by searching for it through its footprints, similarly when the self is attained everything is attained. The very knowledge of the self is its attainment.⁸² *Brahmaanubhava* is so transcendental that there is no direct means of attaining it. According to Shankara looking for means to attain *Brahmaanubhava* would be like swimming on land under the impression that it is water; or like searching in space for the footprints of birds.⁸³ Thus, *Brahmaanubhava* is eternal, uncaused and identical with absolute reality. It consists in recognizing that one is *Brahman*.

NOTES

1. The word '*Brahman*' appears for the first time in the *Rig Veda* as related various sacred utterances, which were believed to have magical powers. So, initially it meant 'spell' or 'prayer', which can be used for the attainment of one's wishes and desires. In the *Brahmanas*, it began to signify that which stands behind God as their ground and basis. Finally, in the Upanishads, this terms came to stand for the unitary principle of all beings, the knowledge of which frees one from finitude. Cf. Eliot Deutsch, p. 9.

2. Cf. *BSB*, I, i, 1, pp. 11-12.

3. Ramkant A. Sinari, p. 67.

4. Swami Virswarananda (trans.), *Brahma-Suutra* (Mayavata, Almora, Himalayas: Advaita Ashrama, 1948), I, i, 2, p. 26 (hereafter: *BSB*, Virsawarananda).

5. George Thibaut (trans.), *Brahma-Sutras*, vol. XXIV, Introduction, pp. xxiv - xxv (hereafter: *BSB*, Thibaut).

6. S. Radhakrishnan (ed.), *The Principal Upanishads* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1953), p. 272.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 617.

8. Cf. Paul Deussen, *The System of Vedanta*, trans. Charles Johnson (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1912), pp. 211-212. Cf. also *BUB*, II, i, 20

9. S. Radhakrishnan and C.A. Moore (eds.), *A Source Book in*

Indian Philosophy, 5th printing (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 507.

10. In interpreting the Upanishadic text, Shankara is of the opinion that one must accept only those texts which speak of *Brahman* without qualities and forms. "But other texts speaking of *Brahman* with form", he says, "have the injunctions about meditations as their main objectives. So long as they do not lead to some contradictions, their apparent meaning should be accepted. But, when they involve contradictions, the principle to be followed for deciding one or the other is that those that have the formless *Brahman* as their main purport are more authoritative than the others which have not that as their main purpose. It is according to this that one is driven to the conclusion that *Brahman* is formless and not its opposite". Cf. *BSB*, III, ii, 14, p. 612.

11. "Brihadaaranayaka Upanishad", *IV*, v, 13, R.E. Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, 2nd revised ed. (New York: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 147 (hereafter: *BU.*, Hume).

12. Cf. *B.S.B.*, III, ii, 16, pp. 613-614.

13. Cf. *ibid.*, III, ii, 18-20, pp. 615-617.

14. Baskali asked Bhava three times about the nature of *Brahman*. The latter remained silent all three times, but finally he replied, "I have already spoken, but you cannot comprehend that the self is silence". *ibid.*, III, ii, 17, p. 614.

15. Cf. Eliot Deutsch, p. 9.

16. Cf. *BSB*, I, i, 1, p. 12.

17. Cf. *ibid.*, II, iii, 7, p. 455.

18. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 456.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 457.

20. Organ Troy Wilson, *The Self in Indian Philosophy* (London: Mouton & Co., 1964), p. 104.

21. Cf. *AB*, p. 118.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

23. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 136. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 156-157.

24. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 136-137.

25. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

26. *BU.*, III, viii, 1, Hume, p. 118.

27. "Chaanduukhya Upanishad", *V*, ix, 1, Hume, p. 234 (hereafter: *Ch.U.*, Hume).

28. Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1966), pp. 86-87.
29. Radhakrishnan S., *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 513.
30. *BUB*, VI, v, 6, pp. 500-501.
31. Shankara, *Gaudapaadakaarika Bhaasya and Maandukya Upanisad Bhaasya*, trans. Swami Nihilananda (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1955), IV, 85 (hereafter: *GKB*).
32. *VC*, p. 65.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
34. Shankara, *Upadeshasaahasrii*, trans. Swami Jagadaananda, 6th ed. (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1979), II, xvi, 70, p. 189 (hereafter: *UI*).
35. *BSB*, IV, i, 2, p. 815.
36. *Ibid.*, I, i, 4, p. 23.
37. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 116.
38. Ch. U., VI, x, 3, Hume, p. 248.
39. *BU*, I, iv, 10, Hume, p. 83.
40. *Ibid.*, II, v, 10, p. 103.
41. "Aiteriya Upanishad", III, i, 3, Hume, p. 276 (hereafter: *AU*, Hume).
42. 'Ganga' is the Sanskrit name for the river Ganges.
43. Cf. *VSS*, PP. 90, 95.
44. Cf. *AB*, Introduction, p. 89.
45. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 90.
46. *BSB*, IV, i, 3, p. 818.
47. Cf. *AB*, Introduction, p. 90.
48. Cf. *VSS*, IV, 148-168, pp. 91-105.
49. Cf. Eliot Deutsch, p. 49.
50. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 50.
51. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 39.
52. *BUB*, III, ix, 28.7, p. 393.
53. Cf. *ibid.*
54. A. Ramamurthi, p. 19.
55. *BUB*, II, iv, 14, pp. 260-261.
56. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 99.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
58. Cf. *BSB*, I, I., 4, p. 22.
59. Cf. *AB*, No. 17, p. 136.; Cf. also *BUB*, IV, iii, 23, p. 462.
60. Cf. *BUB*, IV, iii, 21, p. 460.

61. Cf. *ibid.*, II, iv, 12, pp. 255-257.
62. "Mundaka Upanishad", III, ii, 8, Hume, p. 276 (hereafter: *MU*, Hume); Cf. also "Prasanna Upanishad", VI, 5, p. 389 (hereafter: *PU*, Hume).
63. A. Ramamurthi, p. 103.
64. Cf. *BUB*, III, iv, 2, p. 326.
65. Shankara, *Bagavat Giita Bhaasya*, trans. Mhadeva Sastri (Madras: V. Ramaswami Sastrulu & Sons, 1961), XIII, 2 (hereafter: *BGB*).
66. A. Ramamurthi, p. 104.
67. *BUB*, IV, iv, 6, pp. 500-501.
68. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 115.
69. Cf. *BUB*, III, v, 1, pp. 330-331.
70. *UI*, II, xvii, 40, p. 203.
71. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 22.
72. *UI*, II, xviii, 24, p. 225.
73. "Maanduukiya Upanishad", VIII, Hume, p. 392 (hereafter: *Ma. U.*, Hume).
74. *UI*, II, xviii, 24, p. 225. Cf. also A. Ramamurthi, p. 23.
75. Cf. *TUB*, II, 1.
76. Cf. Satchidananda Murthi, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedaanta* (Waltair: Andhra University Press, 1959), p. 64.
77. *UI*, I, ii, 79, p. 51.
78. Cf. *AB*, No. 1, p. 118.
79. Cf. *BUB*, I, iv, 7, p. 96.
80. Cf. *ibid.*
81. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 58.
82. Cf. *BUB*, I, iv, 22, pp. 95-96.
83. Cf. *ibid.*, IV, iv, 22, p. 527.

CHAPTER III

BRAHMAAJIJNAASA: MOVEMENT FROM APARAA VIDHYAA TO PARAA VIDHYAA

In the preceding two chapters, we attempted to study the *aparaa vidhyaa* and *paraa vidhyaa*, viz., the phenomenal and noumenal states of man. Our consideration of the *aparaa vidhyaa* made us aware that in phenomenal existence we are caught up with the *lishvara -- jiiva* experience. On the other hand, our analysis of the *paraa vidhyaa* helped us to understand that the ultimate reality behind the universe is *Brahman*, the pure consciousness in *jiiva* is *Aatman* and that they are fundamentally one. The true destiny of man is achieved, when the aspirant frees himself from the phenomenal way of living and moves towards the transcendental path. In other words, when the aspirant moves from *aparaa vidhyaa* to the state of *paraa vidhyaa*, he attains his true destiny. To quote Shankara: "The following knowledge (the right knowledge of the *substratum*) does not arise without negating the previous one (the superimposed knowledge), as the knowledge of the rope does not come without destroying that of the snake in a snake-rope."¹ Thus, for Shankara, man's movement towards authenticity is similar to climbing a ladder, in which, the lower steps or stages are given up, when the higher stage is attained. The process of this movement from *aparaa vidhyaa* to *paraa vidhyaa* is what we call *Brahmaajijnaasa*. In this chapter, we shall look into the nature, stages and end of *Brahmaajijnaasa*.

3.1. NATURE OF *BRAHMAAJIJNAASA*

Brahmaajijnaasa is the process of attaining *Brahmaanubhava*. It implies all the efforts made by the aspirant to move from *aparaa* to the *paraa* state of existence. In the following section, we will describe the meaning of *Brahmaajijnaasa* and distinguish it from *paraa vidhyaa* or *Brahmaanubhava*.

3.1.1. MEANING:

Since *Brahmaanubhava* is an immediate and direct experience, there is no need of any means to attain it. Besides, as an absolute and trans-empirical experience, it is not possible to attain it by the use of any empirical or relative means. But, though we cannot bring about *Brahmaanubhava*, still we can remove ignorance and pave the way for *Brahmaanubhava*. As the non-realization of the self is a result of ignorance; the removal of ignorance is all that we need to do in order that *Brahmaanubhava* can happen in us. "The attainment of the highest (*Brahmaanubhava*)", says Shankara, "means merely the removal of ignorance and nothing more."² In darkness, though the objects are in contact with the senses, still we are not able to perceive them because of the presence of darkness. When we remove the darkness, we are able to perceive the objects as they are. For example, in semi-darkness a stump of a tree appears like a man; when the light comes in, we can recognize the real nature of the object in question, i.e., the tree stump.³ This is much the same in *Brahmaanubhava*. It is due to ignorance that the absolute reality, the *Brahman*, is seen as the world of phenomena. All that is required to attain *Brahmaanubhava* is to remove the ignorance that blinds one in order to see his own nature. It is the wrong knowledge of the self that obstructs the perfect knowledge of the self, just as the perception of the silver in the pearl shell obstructs the perception of the pearl shell. When the obstruction of wrong knowledge is removed, the real nature of the self becomes self-revealed.⁴ Thus, for Shankara, "except for the removal of the superimposition of the non-self on the self, no effort, whether bodily or mental, is necessary for the realization of the self."⁵

Brahmaajijnaasa is the process undertaken by the aspirant to remove the superimposed knowledge. It literally means the 'desire for the realization of *Brahman*'. *Brahmaajijnaasa* includes all the efforts the aspirant makes to arrive at the *para vidhya* state. It would also embrace the different means used by the aspirant to transcend the dualities of the empirical order and attain the identity consciousness. Shankara's Advaita Vedaanta recognizes a dualism in the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa*. In other words, he speaks of a direct method and an indirect method in *Brahmaajijnaasa*. The direct method involves a deep understanding of the illusoriness of

the phenomenal reality, the fundamental oneness of everything in *Brahman* and a discriminative consciousness that would enable the aspirant to break through the appearance and apprehend the underlying absolute reality in the manifoldness of the world. But the direct method may not be possible for everyone, as all may not be able to attain the vision of pure reason and discriminating consciousness. To such persons an indirect method is proposed, in which the lower nature of man, such as emotions and activities, are satisfied before one moves towards the higher intellectual discriminative consciousness. For Shankara, the indirect paths of service and love are not, by themselves, capable of removing total ignorance, but gradually they open the individual aspirant to a life of wisdom.⁶

The indirect method opens within the individual aspirant a willingness to surrender his energy in a life of service and to give himself with a loving heart. The willing surrender of one's life in generous service calls one to live a life of sacrifice and action (*karma*). For such a life of action, it is necessary to work towards eliminating selfish motives and intentions that stem from animal instincts in man. Besides, the aspirant must learn to do everything he does without any self interest (*nishkaama karma*).⁷ Thus, action done in love and faith would open the heart of the aspirant for a higher level of existence. The life of sacrifice is a stream through which the divine flow can envelop the heart of the aspirant to a deeper and fuller life of love and devotion (*bhakti*). A life of devotion prepares the seeker for deeper levels of sweetness and bliss. These transformations take place gradually, leading the seeker to still higher stages.⁸

Devotion is of two types, viz., *bheda-upaasana* and *abheda-upaasana*. In *bheda-upaasana*, a difference-in-identity is kept in view. The seeker in this state, while he enjoys the delights of union in love, keeps himself separate. *Abheda-upaasana* is a state in which the identity with the absolute is kept in view. Here, the aspirant gradually loses himself in the object of love and worship. Thus, in the latter state there is the possibility of identity consciousness, as life in the world does not seem anything more than the mental life of the seeker. Such an identity consciousness can take place in two different processes, viz., the process of sinking and the process of expansion. In the sinking process, the seeker feels that the soul is placed in the all pervasive consciousness. Feeling the immanence of

the bliss, the seeker surrenders himself completely. This complete surrender brings about a psychological and spiritual transformation in the seeker. He experiences every mental modification in a new vision and meaning as everything is viewed in relationship to the infinite. There is complete delight and deep satisfaction in the soul. The intensity of devotion in love, the inner delight and satisfaction make the finite self-consciousness forget itself and be absorbed in the immanent infinite consciousness. The process of expansion consists in the gradual realization in the seeker that he is the immanent principle of the cosmos. When this realization takes over the aspirant he no longer feels that he is placed in the vastness of the cosmos, but rather finds that the entire universe is the reflection of his own being. In other words, he feels within himself the totality of existence. In the process, his sense of finite personality dissolves into an impersonal, expansive conscious existence."

Though Shankara was convinced of the primacy of the direct method of knowledge (*jnaana*) for the removal of ignorance, he did give a place for the indirect method because of its practical necessity. For the vast majority of people in the world would not be able to give themselves directly to the demands of a life that involves reflection and intellectual activity. But, if persons have given themselves to lower levels of existence, i.e., service and love, gradually they would come to desire wisdom, transcending the empirical state of existence. It was Shankara's belief that, for most people, the path of wisdom can begin to have meaning when they have satisfied the will and the heart, as it will lead to the realization of the absolute behind the illusory and the relative. The focus of *niskaama karma* on service to others and *bhakti* on love of the supreme Lord, would make easy the life of real renunciation of the phenomenal state of living. This is probably the reason that Shankara retained the *jiiva - Ishvara* idea in his system of thought, even though he was convinced of the truth of *Brahman - Aatman* identity. In other words, Shankara admitted the possibility of a life love in service and service in love, only as a help to those seekers of *Brahman* who otherwise would not have had the opportunity to open themselves to a life of reflection (*vicaara*) and knowledge (*viveeka*).¹⁰

In speaking of the various means to remove ignorance, Shankara argues that neither action (*karma*) nor devotion (*bhakti*) are able to remove ignorance. These two means work in the realm of

ignorance: the former concentrates on performing the various actions in the world of phenomena, and the latter helps the aspirant to concentrate on the supreme Lord. Both action and devotion presuppose duality and are not opposed to ignorance. A man who performs good actions and is a devoted man can still be in the illusion of ignorance and may never know the true nature of *Brahman*. Therefore, action and devotion do not succeed in removing ignorance. Shankara very strongly argues for the primacy of knowledge in the removal of ignorance. Knowledge is directly opposed to ignorance. Knowledge and ignorance about a particular reality cannot co-exist in a person, for knowledge, as it were, drives away ignorance. Though knowledge cannot bring about *Brahmaanubhava*, still it can indirectly remove ignorance by its very presence. "Whether ignorance means doubt or false knowledge", says Shankara, "it always is removable by knowledge only, but not by action in any of its form, for there is no contradiction between ignorance and action."¹¹

Thus, *Brahmaajijnaasa* is the process, in which, the aspirant removes the ignorance, that is characteristic of the *aparaa* state of existence and moves towards the *paraa* state. Shankara, though, holds for the primacy of *jnaana*; he recognizes the significance of *karma* and *bhakti* for pragmatic reasons. Now, our task is to clarify the relationship between *Brahmaajijnaasa* and *Brahmaanubhava*.

3.1.2. BRAHMAAJIJNAASA AND BRAHMAANUBHAVA

The aspirant, having taken upon himself the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa*, goes through its different stages. These help him to get rid of ignorance which is the cause of duality and multiplicity. When ignorance is removed, and with it all multiplicity, the truth about oneself dawns. For Shankara, the *jnaana* path is the fundamental aspect of *Brahmaajijnaasa*, as only knowledge is able to remove ignorance. In *jnaana* path, by hearing doubt is removed from an unprepared mind that the Upanishads cannot impart the knowledge of *Brahman*. Reflection removes the doubt that the self and *Brahman* cannot be one, especially by giving logical and reasonable arguments. Through meditation the mind is withdrawn from all distractions and things other than *Brahman*. This process of *Brahmaajijnaasa* gradually removes all traces of ignorance from the

aspirant and thereby opens the way for *Brahmanubhava*, the ultimate liberation. Hearing, reflection and meditation generate knowledge by the removal of ignorance. When all consequences of ignorance, such as duality and differences, are removed there dawns the self-knowledge or *Brahmanubhava*.¹²

Brahmaajijnaasa does not cause absorption into *Brahman*, because it deals only with what is known from hearing. The knowledge attained through *Brahmaajijnaasa* is an indirect knowledge. The knowledge attained through the process of *Brahmaajijnasa*, by concentrating on the import and meaning of the scripture, is the highest intellectual knowledge possible. Nevertheless, *Brahmaanubhava* is not attained with *Brahmajijnasa*, but it is above and beyond it, since it is the direct and immediate experience of one's own self. De Smet remarks the following about *Brahmaajijnaasa* and its relationship to *Brahmaanubhava*:

Brahmaajijnaasa is only a preparation, a progressive removal of obstacles to knowledge, a protracted suicide of *ajnaana* (ignorance). *Vidhya* (true knowledge) cannot be a result, but a direct, independent realization, an awakening to reality, an intuition suddenly dawning upon the seeker. It is direct knowledge, while the result affected by the whole *Brahmaajijnaasa* can be nothing higher than an indirect knowledge.¹³

The occurrence of *Brahmaanubhava* is simultaneous with the removal of ignorance from the seeker. When ignorance is removed by the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa*, there follows immediately the truth about oneself, i.e., one's absolute absorption into *Brahman*. At this state the indirect knowledge of reflection (*vicaara*) gives way to right discrimination (*viveeka*). Now, there is no activity and the intellect of the aspirant sees through the appearance, recognizing his oneness with *Brahman*. At this stage, the aspirant knows that he is *Brahman*, and all duality and multiplicity disappear, since he realizes the fact that all is *Brahman*.¹⁴ This realization of one's absorption into or identity with *Brahman* is *Brahmanubhava*, the true liberation. Thus, *Brahmaajijnaasa* is a preparation, while *Brahmaanubhava* is the end.

3.2. STAGES OF *BRAHMAAJIJNAASA*

Now that we have clarified the meaning of *Brahmaajijnaasa* and its difference from *Brahmaanubhava*, we shall take up the study of the different stages of *Brahmaajijnaasa*, especially in relation to Shankara's *sjnaana* path. In order to study the scriptures and thereby remove ignorance, Shankara proposes certain physical, moral and intellectual preparations. These form the three stages of *Brahmaajijnaasa*. The physical preparation aims at helping the seeker to attain full control over his body and this is done by what Vedaantins call *Hathayoga*. The moral preparation has for its goal the purification of mind, by removing all inclinations to evil. The intellectual preparation intends to grasp the full import of the scripture with intellectual study of the scriptural texts. We shall, now, elaborate these three in detail.

3.2.1. *HATHAYOGA: THE PHYSICAL PREPARATION*

The high intellectual penetration involved in the study of the scriptures implies that the seeker of *Brahmaanubhava* has full control over his bodily organism. The stability of the gross body is required for its normal functioning. When it comes to preparing oneself for higher intellectual and spiritual training, there is need to discipline the body sufficiently so as to make it a fit instrument for the realization of *Brahman*. The system of training that prepares the body for such a higher state of existence is called *Hathayoga*. It increases vitality in the body, gives good health and preserves great amounts of energy within the aspirant, as *Hathayoga* opens the aspirant for the life-process of the cosmic *praana*.¹⁵ The two main elements of *Hathayoga* are *asana* (posture) and *pranayama* (control of *praana*).

Asana consists in placing the body in various postures. It helps the body to get rid of restlessness that blocks deep reflection and concentration. *Asana* brings the entire physical organism of the aspirant under the control of his will. The posture is different from other types of physical exercises, as its aim is to make the body best fitted for the highest type of experience. The *Hathayogin* keeps his body free from all impurities, his nervous system in tact and gains control over the different muscles of the body by the practice of

aasanas.¹⁶ *Pranayaama* is a method, with the help of which, the aspirant controls his vital power or breathing, which is the basis of organic life. It keeps under check one's inhalation and exhalation; it helps one to achieve complete will power over one's life-force. If practiced consistently, one can learn to restrain the vital-process completely. According to Advaitins, *pranayaama* has two purposes. Firstly, it brings about perfection in the body. Secondly, it helps to awaken the *pranic* dynamism, i.e., the vast stored-up energy, which opens the aspirant for extra-ordinary consciousness. As a result, the moral and spiritual possibilities are awakened in the *Hathayogin*. *Pranayaama*, thus, helps the aspirant to control the instincts, passions and impulses that disturb the peace of mind. It can be practiced in two ways: firstly, as a purely physical practice, to keep the heart-beat under control, without any plan of control of the mind, and secondly, as a psycho-physical practice, to control the lower passions, to open in the seeker higher qualities and to help mental and spiritual discipline. The practice of *pranayaama*, in the latter way, is of great help to the seeker of *Brahmaanubhava*.¹⁷

When one has completed the practice of *Hathayoga*, he has made the first step into the process of *Brahmaajijnasa*. The total control of body, by way of posture and breath-control prepares the seeker of *Brahmanubhava* to move into the next stage, viz., moral preparation.

3.2.2. MORAL PREPARATION

If the intellect is to be able to understand the import of the *mahaavaakyas* or scriptural statements, it must be pure. The knowledge of *Brahman* revealed in the scripture, though expressed in terms of duality, still is the highest knowledge that can be known by the human intellect in the empirical realm. This knowledge cannot be grasped if the intellect is not open to understand eternal truth. Just as a stained mirror does not reflect things clearly, so an impure mind cannot grasp *Brahman* intellectually from the study of the scriptures. Shankara affirms this point in his commentary on *Mudnaka Upanishad* as follows:

Though the intellect in all beings is intrinsically able to make the self known [from the study of the scrip-

ture], still being polluted by such blemishes as attachment to external objects, etc., it becomes agitated and impure, and does not, like a stained mirror or ruffled water make the reality of the self known, though it is ever at hand.¹⁸

Shankara uses another analogy to illustrate the same fact. Fire, by its nature, is able to burn wood. But, if the wood is wet, fire is not able to burn it. In the same way intellect, though it is able to know and understand the import of the scriptural statements, because it is clouded by passions and attachments to things, does not grasp *Brahman* from the study of the *mahaavaakyas*.¹⁹ In other words, scriptural knowledge fails to accomplish its end if man is not perfectly pure at heart. The capacity of the mind to discriminate between truth and untruth is weakened when it is swayed by passions and sensual pleasures.²⁰ Thus, it is important to prepare oneself spiritually and to free the intellect from all passions, attachments and prejudices, in order to know the true nature of *Brahman* from the study of the scriptures and from the instructions of the teacher. Therefore Shankara proposes four disciplines called the instruments of spiritual knowledge (*sadhanachatyashaya*), which the aspirant must practice before he ever begins the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa* (search for *Brahman*), by the study of the scripture under the guidance of the teacher (*guru*).

The first moral condition required of the aspirant in order that he be able to begin his move towards *Brahmaanubhava* is discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal (*nityaanityavastuviveka*). It consists in an intuitive, firm conviction that *Brahman* alone is the absolute ground of all things or that which is really real, and that all other things are unreal and phenomenal. *Viveka* (discrimination) is the most fundamental quality that is necessary in an individual, because without it the other moral conditions are not possible. In other words, if one has not discriminated between the real and the unreal and has not recognized the absoluteness of *Brahman* there is no motivation to strive for its attainment.²¹

The second moral means for the removal of ignorance is renunciation (*vairaagya*), which consists in not seeking the enjoyments of the fruits here and here-after. It implies rigorous self-discipline to control the inner tendency of the aspirant to wander

amidst sensuous experience and enjoy it. Renunciation is aimed at purification of emotions, perfection of the mental being and mastery over thought-consciousness. It would enable the aspirant to eliminate lawless tendencies, impulses and tendencies of animal nature, and to build up good habits of mind.²² Renunciation is, thus, the giving up of all the pleasures of the eyes, the ears and the other senses. By renunciation one also gives up objects of transitory enjoyment, the desire for a physical body, as well as for the highest kind of spirit-body of a god.²³ It is an attitude of indifference to all the seen and unseen results attainable by various means, whereby one becomes devoted to the scriptural teaching, and is not carried away by one's own natural desires. Renunciation is not the state of absolute desirelessness or *Brahmaanubhava*, but a state in which one desires nothing but self-realization.²⁴

In renunciation one foregoes the pleasures the world can offer so that one can concentrate on the study of the scripture. Therefore, a life of renunciation give the aspirant the opportunity to go in uninterrupted search after the goal of human existence by a deeper understanding of the scriptural statements (*mahaavaakyas*). Any person who is interested in absolute freedom must take every step to transcend earthly ties and involvements by way of renunciation. Vedaantins speak of two types of renunciation, *vibidisha sannyasa* and *vidwat sannyasa*. *Vibidisha sannyasa* is the renunciation for the acquisition of knowledge. This is practiced by the seeker; it does not consist merely in giving up worldly pleasures, but rather involves a systematic search after the life of wisdom. The aspirant, while practicing this type of renunciation, besides denouncing attachment to phenomenal enjoyments, seeks after hearing and reflecting about *Aatman* and concentrating upon it. *Vidwat sannyasa* is a renunciation one practices after the attainment of true knowledge. Complete freedom from all desires and activities is characteristic of this type of renunciation. This is desireless existence, in which renunciation co-exists with true knowledge.²⁵

Thirdly, the aspirant should try to live a virtuous life by the practice of six treasures (*shatsamapatti*). When practiced, these virtues help the aspirant's inner faculties and make possible the cultivation of higher knowledge. The six virtues taught by Shankara are the following: firstly, calmness (*sama*), which consists in developing the quality of inner serenity so that one can dwell on

Brahma after abandoning all the desires by renunciation; secondly, self-control (*dama*), which helps the aspirant to restrain his senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste, and thus opens him to hear and to listen to the instructions of the teacher; thirdly, self-settledness (*uaaparati*), which is the withdrawal from all objects of enjoyment. This helps the aspirant to relinquish all the joys of worldly life and embrace the life of a *sannyasin* (monk); fourthly, forbearance (*titiksha*), which is the endurance of all the sufferings of this life. It helps the aspirant to not be agitated by love and hate, pleasure and pain, and all such pairs of opposites; fifthly, faith (*sraddha*), which is the firm conviction and intuitive belief in the existence of the ultimate reality. At this same time, it is not a mechanical or unquestioning belief, but a conviction based on intellectual understanding of what is taught in the scriptures about ultimate reality; sixthly, complete concentration (*samaadhaana*), which is the fixing of the mind on *Brahman* as taught by the scripture and a competent teacher. These six virtues direct one's attention to the attainment of *Brahmanubhava*.²⁶

The fourth moral condition is the aspirant's hunger for liberation (*mumukshutva*). It consists in possessing an intense desire to be rid of ignorance and to attain *Brahmaanubhava*. "It is an intense longing of the student to free himself from all bondages pertaining to the body, the mind and the ego."²⁷ It is not a restless desire, but a result of the ethical practices mentioned above. Without this longing for liberation the ethical practices are really meaningless because a man may become morally perfect, and may achieve many supernatural powers, but if the desire for self-realization is absent in him, all his virtues will be of no real significance.²⁸ It is this longing and desire for true knowledge or *Brahmaanubhava* that gives motivation and meaning to the whole process of *Brahmaajjnaasa*.

3.2.3. INTELLECTUAL PREPARATION

The aspirant who is endowed with the above-mentioned four disciplines of spiritual knowledge is qualified to undertake the actual study of the scripture which will in turn bring about the actual removal of ignorance. Shankara says:

This knowledge [that the self is *Brahman*] should be imparted only to him whose mind has been pacified, who has controlled his senses and is freed from all defects, who has practiced the duties enjoined by the scriptures and is possessed of good qualities, who is always obedient to the teacher and aspires only after liberation and nothing else.²⁹

These four moral disciplines purify the intellect of the aspirant, freeing him from all passions and attachment, so that he can give himself uninterruptedly to the study of the scriptures.

The study of the scripture and the understanding of its import and meaning takes place in three states. The first stage is hearing (*sravana*), the second is the state of reflection (*manaana*), the final stage is meditation (*nididhyaasana*). These three, namely, hearing, reflection and mediation, constitute the objective intellectual conditions for the removal of ignorance.

3.2.2.1. Hearing (*Sravana*)

Hearing implies the idea of 'being taught'. At the first stage of the understanding of the meaning of the Vedaantic statements, the aspirant is introduced, by competent teachers to the teachings of Advaita. The need for a teacher at this stage is very much stressed in the scriptures. "A *guru* is like a boat on that boundless ocean which has for its water the principal struggle due to the rotation in the cycle of birth, decay and death."³⁰ Just as a boat is a place of safety for one who struggles in the ocean aimlessly, so the teacher by his teaching directs one to union with *Brahman*, freeing him from transmigration. Again, Kaatha Upanishad Bhaasya states: "When propounded by a teacher who sees no variety and is one with (*ananya*) the propounded *Brahman*, doubts whether the self exist or not . . . do not arise any longer for the self is such that it banishes doubts of all kinds."³¹ Thus *sravana* or hearing is the initiation of the aspirant to the traditional Vedaantic doctrine transmitted and passed on by the teachers.

Sravana, at the same time, is the mental activity which helps the understanding of Upanishadic texts, leading to their only import, viz., *Brahman*. This is achieved by an examination of the texts

through six tests, namely, commencement, ending, repetition, uniqueness, result, eulogy, and reason.³² In the third chapter of the Chaandoogya Upanishad we have a typical illustration of this first stage, namely, hearing. Here the aspirant, Sivetaketu, the grandson of Aruna, is instructed by his father, but using the above mentioned six tests. The subject matter of this instruction is '*Brahman*, the one without a second'. Analysis of the six tests used in hearing in relation to the text in question gives us an idea about the practice of hearing or *sravana*.

The first and the second tests mentioned are commencement and ending. They refer to the presentation of the subject matter of the section at the beginning and at the end of the section. The subject matter is introduced in the beginning of the section in the words, "one only without a second"³³ and again at the end in the words "Thus has all this world that [*Brahman*] for its self."³⁴ The second test is repetition, which consists in the frequent presentation of the subject matter again and again. For instance, the subject matter "*Brahman* is one without a second" is repeated nine times in this section, in different words.³⁵ The third is uniqueness, which means that the nature of the subject matter is such that it cannot be attained through any other means of knowledge than the study of the scriptures. In this section the subject matter "*Brahman* is one without a second" cannot be achieved in any other way except from the understanding of the meaning of the *mahaavaakyas*. Fourth, the result is the usefulness of the subject matter of the section. In this section the realization that *Brahman* is one without a second brings about the self-knowledge of *Brahmaanubhava*. In other words, the utility of the knowledge of *Brahman* as the one without a second is its attainment. Fifth, eulogy consists in praising the subject matter at different places of the section. It is found in this section in the words: "Have you ever asked for that instruction by which one hears what has not been heard; one thinks what has not been known; one has spoken in praise of *Brahman* without a second."³⁶ Finally, reason consists in demonstrating the subject matter of the section. In this section we have the demonstration of "*Brahman* is one without a second" in the words: "As by a lump of clay, all that is made of clay is known . . . every modification being an effect of speech, a mode and the clay is the only reality."³⁷ In other words, just as in knowing a lump of clay, we can know the nature of all things made of clay, so

also in knowing that *Brahman* is one without a second, the nature of everything in the world is known, for *Brahman* is the ground of everything. Thus, a reason is furnished to demonstrate the subject matter of the section.³⁸ Hence, by hearing the meaning of the *mahaavaakya* from the teacher the aspirant becomes familiar with the import of the scripture.

3.2.2.2. Reflection (*Manaana*)

The Keena Upanishad Bhaasya speaks about the second intellectual condition required for the removal of ignorance, viz., *manaana*, as follows:

After being addressed by the teacher, the disciple (*shyshya*) sat at the solitary place and attended to nothing else (*ekaanta*), concentrated his thoughts (*suamhita*) and pondered over the meaning of *uagma* [the traditional teaching pointed out by his *guru*], arrived at a conclusion through reasoning, made it [the teacher's instructions] his own experience, went back to his teacher and explained: 'I think, I now know *Brahman*'.³⁹

This passage clearly shows the nature and function of *manaana* or reflection. It is a mental activity which consists in the employment of favorable arguments for the removal of the apparent contradictions that might arise during the study of the scripture against other means of valid knowledge. The truth pointed out by the teacher is difficult to grasp and seems to contradict the ordinary perception and knowledge obtained from *pramaanas* other than scripture. Thus, it is very important that the aspirant strengthen his conviction at this stage by looking for rational bases for the teaching received from the teacher in *sravana* or hearing. Professor Ramamurthi clearly points out the role of *manana* as follows:

The purpose of it [*manaana*] is to fortify one's conviction of the truth from the scripture and to rid oneself of all doubts. . . . Another important function of reflection is to make one comprehend the real

meaning of the scriptural statements by consistently interpreting them so that the apparent inconsistencies are resolved.⁴⁰

But, though at this stage of reflection one looks for arguments and reasons to justify the knowledge of *Brahman* received in *sravana*, still the arguments and reasons sought to strengthen one's conviction must not be contradictory to the teaching of the Upanishads. For, the scriptural authority is absolute, and reason is subservient to revelation especially with regard to our knowledge of *Brahman*. Therefore, for Shankara, *manaana* is "that continuous reflections performed with the aid of reasoning, and subservient to the teaching of the Upanishads, upon secondless reality, known through *sravana*."⁴¹

At this stage, the aspirant makes use of the negative method of Advaita Vedaanta, viz., *apavaada* (negation), more than ever before. *Apavaada* or negation consists in the elimination of what something is not, in order that one may attain the truth about that particular thing. In other words, it is "the elimination of the falsely superimposed attributes (*vivarttha*) in order to discover the true nature of a thing."⁴² The rope appears as a snake in the illusion. By negating the illusory snake the true nature of the rope is perceived; by negating the attributes of the illusory water in the mirage one discovers the true nature of the desert; by negating the illusory silver we obtain the true nature of the shells scattered on the beach. This ability to distinguish between the real and the unreal Shankara calls discrimination. It is this discriminating ability that helps us to understand the true nature of things. It is much the same with our knowledge of *Brahman*. By negating, through discrimination the attributes of the non-self, one attains the true nature of the *Atman*; and by negating the world of names and forms one attains the knowledge about *Brahman*, the absolute reality.⁴³

Negation, then, consists in the refutation of the knowledge established by the method of superimposition or *adhyaropa*. In the scriptures we find many statements about the ultimate reality expressed in terms of negation. "That which is invisible (*adneesya*), ungraspable (*agranya*), without family (*agootra*), without caste (*avarana*), without sight or hearing (*acaksisrotra*), without hand or foot (*apanipaada*), immortal (*nitya*) . . . imperishable (*avyaaya*)"⁴⁴

is *Brahman*. "The self is that which has been desired as neither this nor that."⁴⁵ "It (*Brahman*) is imperishable . . . , undecaying . . . , unattached . . . , unsettled. It never feels pain, never suffers injury, it is transcendent."⁴⁶ These passages from the scripture witness to the fact that these negated qualities like birth, death, hunger, thirst, pain and pleasure never did belong to the absolute *Brahman*, even though these attributes were given to *Brahman* by one in the state of ignorance. Neither do these superimposed qualities affect the ultimate reality in any way. Thus, the "*via negativa* of Advaita Vedaanta . . . safeguards the unqualified oneness of the state of being called *Brahman*."⁴⁷

Brihadaraanyaka Upanishad speaks of *Brahman* with the words '*neti neti*' (not so, not so).⁴⁸ In fact this statement does not make us perceive something directly as the statement "this is a book" makes us perceive a book. Therefore, '*neti neti*' does not tell us anything positive about the nature of *Brahman*. But in fact it is the most proper way of describing *Brahman*, since it is devoid of all qualities. The term '*neti*' consists of two words: '*ne*' which means 'not' and '*iti*' which means 'so'. The word '*iti*' indicates the presence of something or a quality right here which is negated by the '*ne*'. Thus, '*iti*' used with '*ne*' points to something that is negated. The repetition of '*neti*' twice covers all possible predications that are to be eliminated.⁴⁹ '*Neti neti*' only denies the attributes superimposed on *Brahman* and not the *Brahman*, for such denial of both the *Brahman* and the superimposed qualities would lead to pure void (*suunya*) and to Nihilism. For Shankara says, "Know . . . that the *sruti* 'not large', etc., is meant to negate the false superimposition (of largeness, smallness, etc. on the self) as it would be description of a void if it were meant to negate those qualities from one other than the self."⁵⁰ Just as the denial of the illusion of the snake leaves with the reality of the rope, so too the denial of the qualities superimposed on *Brahman* reveals *Brahman* in its entirety. For according to Shankara '*neti neti*' denies not absolutely everything, but only everything but *Brahman*.⁵¹

At the same time the use of '*neti neti*' before a descriptive sentence does not necessarily mean that particular descriptive sentence in question is false, but rather it only means that the sentence is not applicable or not appropriate in the case of *Brahman*. Consequently, what this approach has done is to generate a third

kind of connotation which one can make of descriptions. No longer are descriptions either true or false: some of them may be given a third kind of evaluation, namely, what had been termed 'inappropriate' or 'inapplicable'.⁵²

A clear illustration of *regressus* to *Brahman* by way of negation is found in Brihadaaranyaka Upanishad. Gargi, the daughter of Vacaknai questions Yajnavalkya, "Since the world is woven on water, on what is water woven?" He replies that it is on the wind that water is woven. She continues the question in a similar manner asking on what the wind is woven? The wind is woven by the atmosphere worlds, and this by the world of Gandharvas, and this by the world of the sun, and sun by the world of the moon, and moon by the world of the stars, and stars by the world of gods, and gods by the world of *Indra*, and *Indra* by the world of *Prajapati*, and *Prajapati* by the world of *Brahma*. Gargi persists in her question and asks on what the world of *Brahman* woven? Yajnavalkya replies, "Gargi, do not question too much, lest your head fall off. In truth you are questioning too much about a divinity about which further questions cannot be asked. Gargi do not over-question."⁵³ Thus, Yajnavalkya using the method of negation moves towards *Brahman*, eliminating all adjuncts of limitation (*upaadhi*) starting from the lowest.

Sometimes in scriptural passages we find twofold negations.⁵⁴ In statements like *Brahman* is "not known and beyond the unknown"⁵⁵ and "neither gross nor subtle,"⁵⁶ what is denied is not only one attribute but also its opposite. Commenting on this statement which describes *Brahman* as "neither *sat* (existent) nor *asat* (non-existent),"⁵⁷ Shankara says "Since the Knowable (*Brahman/Aatman*) is beyond the reach of senses . . . it cannot be . . . an object of consciousness accompanied with the idea either of existence or of non-existence, and, therefore, not said to be *sat* or *asat*."⁵⁸ It is clear from this comment of Shankara, that, in such negations, the notion of *sat* and *asat* are understood from the *vyavahaara*, and not the *paramaarthaviewpoint*. From the supreme point of view of absolute knowledge, the term '*sat*' applies purely to *Brahman*. But it is quite natural in the course of *Brahmaajijnaasa* that one understand such terms as '*sat*' or '*asat*' in the ordinary meaning they have for those who are still immersed in ignorance. In that case what the aspirant understands by '*sat*' primarily is the object of his senses, which should be negated with respect to *Brahman*.⁵⁹ Thus, the negative

method completely does away with all false attribution of *Brahman* and, thereby, paves the way for true knowledge.

Thus, in the state of *manaana* the aspirant by way of negation de-super-imposes the phenomenal reality from *Brahman*, and understands the full import of the Vedaantic statements like '*tat tvam asi*' in their indirect or implicit meaning. *Manaana*, therefore, logically establishes the truth of identity by critical reflection and discourse.⁶⁰ At the end of the stage of reflection all ignorance is removed; the aspirant is intellectually convinced of this identity with *Brahman* and thus moves towards the next stage, viz., meditation.

3.2.2.3. Meditation (*Nididhyaasana*)

The final stage leading to the complete removal of ignorance and, thus, to the direct realization of the self is mediation or *nididhyaasana*. If an aspirant, having heard the teacher, is successful in his reflection and is intellectually convinced of his identity with *Brahman*, then he is ready to strive for the direct realization or *Brahmaanubhava*. *Nididhyaasana* is a mental activity consisting in withdrawing the mind from all other things and concentrating it on *Brahman*.⁶¹ *Nididhyaasana* "strikes deep the Vedaantic wisdom into our heart. It eradicates the innate confusion of the body with the soul."⁶² Meditation is not a concentration of oneself on *Brahman* as an external and separate entity. It is an activity of the mind "in which the mind is turned completely inward, and is firmly fixed on the inner self and its identity with *Brahman* till one's finitude and individuality is dissolved."⁶³

Nididhyaasana has two forms, viz., *samprajnaat-samaapatti* and *asamprajnaat-samaapatti*. *Samprajnaat-samaapatti* is a form of meditation in which the aspirant witnesses modifications of consciousness, while meditating on the *mahaavaakyas*. In this type of meditation, there are two stages. The initial stage is characterized by the knowledge of the modification of mental consciousness that was originated by meditating on the Vedaantic statement '*tat tvam asi*'. The aspirant, therefore, is conscious of himself, the meditator and witness of the modification that has taken place in the consciousness, and of the modification created by the meditation on the scriptural axiom at that particular moment. The later stage of *samprajnaat-samaapatti* is free from all thoughts regarding the

origin of the modification that is produced in the consciousness as the result of meditation on the *mahaavaakya*. Since the meditation is intense, at this state the temporal and spatial marks of modification are not available to the consciousness of the meditator. The aspirant is aware only of himself, as the witness, and the modifications produced by his meditation on the Vedaantic aphorism.⁶⁴

Asamprajnat-samaapatti is a state of meditation in which the consciousness of the aspirant practicing meditation is not characterized by any modifications. In it, there is no sense of duality, as all modifications produced by the meditation on the scriptural axiom have ceased to exist. As there is no subject-object duality in this state of meditation, the *Aatman* becomes the subject and object of meditation, as the identity without any modifications is arrived at as the result of *asamprajnat-samaapatti*.⁶⁵

Thus, by repeated exercise of meditation one moves to a greater depth of absolute consciousness. This consciousness of the identity with the absolute, removes all the effects of ignorance. By focusing more on his inner self, by way of meditation, the aspirant makes the journey inward until he experiences his absolute identity with *Brahman*.

3.3. SAMAADHI: THE END OF BRAHMAAJIJNAASA

In the last two sections of this chapter, we considered the nature of *Brahmajijnaasa* and its various stages, especially with reference to Shankara's *jnaana* path to self-realization. The preparations of the aspirant at the physical, moral and intellectual levels, makes him focus more on his inner nature wherein he finds the ultimate source of his existence. The end of this journey is the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava* or *Samaadhi*. In this section, we shall attempt to elaborate the nature of the state of *Samaadhi* and the nature and characteristics of *Brahmajjnanani*.

3.3.1. NATURE

The realization of one's absorption in, or identity with, *Brahman* is *Samaadhi* (*Brahmaanubhava*). It is the true liberation and the ultimate end of the seeker and is of the same nature of *Brahman*. Therefore, *Brahman* and *Samadhi* are identical, for liberation is no-

thing else but becoming one with *Brahman*. In the liberated state the aspirant knows that he is *Brahman*. As a result, all duality and multiplicity disappear; one knows now that all, including oneself, is *Brahman*. In the *Samaadhi* state nothing new is attained in the aspirant, for he only realizes what he is from all eternity.⁶⁶

According to Shankara, the realization of *Samaadhi* takes place in three stages of consciousness. The first stage is the *asmbhaava-bhaavana* which consists in the removal of the thought of the non-existence of *Brahman* when one hears that ' *Brahman*, as undivided consciousness, exists'. The second stage is *drishyamaa-rjnaana*. Here, the discriminative capacity is more advanced and one is able to penetrate the appearance to get into the essence of reality. Now, one is able to remove the *avidhyaa* that everything is material and become conscious of the immutable being of *Brahman*. At these stages, the knowledge is only indirect, mediate and based on subject-object distinction. The third stage is that of identity-consciousness (*Brahmaanubhava*). At this stage, the seeker experiences the deepest core of his being that *Aatman* is identical with *Brahman*, the ultimate source behind the universe in the process removing the ignorance about the illusoriness of the phenomenal reality. This final stage gives us direct knowledge of *Brahman*.⁶⁷ Commenting on these three stages of consciousness Mahendranath Sircar says:

The first stage marks out the origin and continuity of the *vritti*, the second, its final disappearance, the third is the stage of knowledge. Between the second stage and the expression of *Aatman* in the third, if we can speak in such a way, there is no sequence of time. They are simultaneous. . . . *Aatman* is known only by implication as one invariably associated with the denial of illusory forms of *Avidhyaa* and of *Avidhyaa* itself.⁶⁸

According to Vedaantins there is a difference between the perception of *Aatman* or *Brahman* in the *Brahmaanubhava* state and the perception of concrete facts in the phenomenal existence. In the perception of concrete things, the *manas* goes out and takes on itself the determination of the object. Here, the perceiver becomes aware of the existence of the object, because of the fact that *manas*

takes the form of the object, and thereby removes the perceiver's concrete ignorance about the object. If we take the example of the pot as the object of consciousness, it is known because the *manas* goes out through the senses and takes on itself the form of the pot: this modification of the mind removes the ignorance about the pot and as a result, consciousness expresses the object. This process is technically known as *salavaapya*. But the perception of *Brahman* or *Aatman* in *Samaadhi* is very different. In the perception of *Brahman*, the *manas* does not take any concrete form, as *Brahman* has no form: *Brahman* is *vrittivaapya*. So, the mind does not go out to experience *Brahman*, but rather it is transformed into *Brahman*, putting an end to all forms of ignorance.⁶⁹

The later Advaitic writers speak of two stages in *samaadhi*, depending on the intensity and the nature of concentration, viz., the *Savikalpaka samadhi* (determinate absorption) and *Nirvikalpaka samaadhi* (indeterminate absorption). In *savikalpaka samaadhi*, the aspirant abides in *Brahman*, the secondless reality, but still retains his 'I -- consciousness.' Here, there seem to exist the distinction between the 'knower,' the 'known' and the 'knowledge'. These later Advaitins compare this state to one who sees the clay elephant and also the clay that permeates the elephant. In other words, at this stage, the seeker is already possessed by the truth, but still unable to realize it entirely. But *Nirvikalpaka samaadhi* is the total absorption into *Brahman*. There is no 'I -- consciousness' or subject-object duality. Just as a lump of salt, when dissolved in salt water, is no longer perceived to be distinct from the water, likewise, the mental state in *Nirvikalpaka samaadhi* takes the form of *Brahman*. It is no longer perceived to be distinct from *Brahman* and cannot be separated from *Brahman*. At this stage, *Brahman* or the self alone shines by its own radiance, and the aspirant experiences his absolute identity with *Brahman*.⁷⁰

If we accept the distinction of two different states in *samaadhi*, then without any doubt the latter state, i.e., the state of *Nirvikalpaka samaadhi*, is the same as *Brahmanubhava* in which the absolute identity between the seeker and *Brahman* is realized. Such a realized seeker becomes a *Brahmajnaani*.

3.3.2. BRAHMAJNAANI

Brahmajnaani is one who possesses true *jnaana* about *Brahman*. He is in the state of transcendental consciousness. He would be purely unconscious of the empirical order, as it would not affect him in any way. The vision of *Brahmajnaani* is no longer obscured by the phenomenal world, its variety of realities and their meanings. His state of existence cannot be described in positive terms, as it surpasses any type of description. He is enlightened and free, fully unaffected by the pains and gains of *aparaa* existence. In his innermost essence, he knows that he is the eternal consciousness, ultimate truth and bliss.⁷¹

When *Brahmajnaani* reaches the transcendental peak of existence, he is called *Videhamukta*. For *Videhamukta* the empirical world is no more a reality as he has awakened to a new vision of existence in which every form of illusion is removed. *Videhamukta* is said to have attained *Videhakaivalya*, which involves the freedom of being alone and undisturbed, denial of the body and forsaking of future life. In this state, the *karmic* seeds that leads to future births have been destroyed by the clear vision of identity. The effects of past *karma* have been obliterated. As a result, there is no reason for the individual to continue living in the phenomenal world. *Videhamukta* passes into a calm existence, having been lost to the empirical world and shedding his artificial personality that is characteristic of *jiiva*. Such a state is identical with the dawn of knowledge about *Brahman*.⁷²

Shankara is of the opinion that *Brahmaanubhava* or *Nirvikalpaka samaadhi* is possible even when one is alive, and that it is possible for everyone to attain this identity with *Brahman* if he gives himself to the process of *Brahmaajjnaasa* and works on removing ignorance, the cause of duality. In *Bagavat Gita Bhasya*, Shankara says: "A *yogi* (in the Advaitic sense) attains *Brahmanirvaana* (same as *Brahmaanubhava*), the bliss of being *Brahman* or liberation by being *Brahman* here itself, that is, while he is alive."⁷³ Again commenting on the Upanishadic statement "by being *Brahman* one attains *Brahman*," Shankara says that *Brahmaanubhava* is possible while one is alive and there is no need for one to wait until death for its attainment. When ignorance is fully destroyed, the real nature of the self is revealed.⁷⁴ Such a person, who enjoys the liberated state in

the present life is called *Jiivanmukta*. In fact, death does not change the essential condition of the *jiivanmukta*, but only brings to a close the effects of the accumulated action (*karma*) which is still bearing fruit (*prarabdha*).⁷⁵ In other words, death puts an end to the present life which is the effect of *prarabdha*.

3.3.3 *JIIVANMUKTA*

Now that we have established that *Brahmaanubhava* is possible for everyone, even in this life, there arises the question whether behavior is possible for a *jiivanmukta*? Since there is no duality in this transcendental experience, is it possible for the liberated man to live in this world of duality? Even if it is possible for him to live in this world, what is his nature, what are some of his basic characteristics, and how is he different from an ordinary unrealized person? In this section, we will attempt to answer these basic questions regarding *Jiivanmukta*.

The behavior of the liberated man can be distinguished from that of others on the basis of the absence of ignorance and its effects. The fully realized soul does not possess any trace of ignorance, and sees everything in *Brahman*. Thus, the behavior of *Jiivanmukta* is characterized by oneness, while an ignorant person's behavior is based on the experience of differences. Though *Jiivanmukta* lives in the world of duality, he is not disturbed by the pairs of opposites; he sees all things in terms oneness with *Brahman*. He is not affected by anything, since he sees everything in himself. An ignorant person considers others as different from himself and shapes his relations with them accordingly, whereas the liberated man does not see others as different from himself and shapes his relationship with others in terms of oneness.⁷⁶ Since the *Jiivanmukta* sees everything in relation to his own self, the absolute *Brahman*, nothing can bring any change in his self.

Another important quality that characterizes a *Jiivanmukta* is fearlessness. He cannot be afraid of anything. For Shankara says, "Fear is caused by a second entity or by things conceived to exist as different from the self. And when this notion of a second entity is eliminated by the realization of oneness, there will be no source of fear."⁷⁷ An ignorant person sees everything in terms of differences, and so there is every reason that there is fear in an unliberated man.

But for the one who has realized himself as the absolute and indestructible self, there is nothing to be afraid of because he is the one and the absolute.

Jiivanmukta transcends scriptures, ethical imperatives and social conventions. As an aspirant, while working towards this ultimate realization, he eradicated all his passions, prejudices and attachments, and concentrated on *Brahman* alone. Thus, when he has attained the identity with *Brahman*, he is free from all faults and never makes a false step or sets a bad example. The great ethical virtues such as humility, unselfishness, purity, kindness, and fellow-feeling, which prior to the attaining of knowledge he assiduously practiced for the purification of the mind, now adorn him like jewels. He does not seek them or need them, but they cling to him.⁷⁸

The liberated man alone knows the true nature and meaning of freedom. He is free from all the bondages imposed on men. He is the all-embracing self, and is absolutely free from the cares and worries of life. Swami Nihilananda portrays the freedom enjoyed by the liberated man as follows:

Sometimes a fool, sometimes a sage, sometimes possessed of regal splendor, sometimes a wanderer, sometimes behaving like a motionless python that waits for its food to come to it, sometimes wearing a benign expression, sometimes honored, sometimes insulted, sometimes unknown . . . thus lives a man of realization ever happy in the knowledge of *Brahman*.⁷⁹

Thus, whatever may be the state or condition he is in, the *Jiivanmukta* is free to conduct himself according to that condition. He is, in himself, the absolute and lacks nothing, and so is disturbed by nothing whatsoever. Thus, *Jiivanmukta* enjoys a freedom which is not found in a man of ignorance.

A *Jiivanmukta* is desireless and free from sorrow or grief. Desire arises when an object of one's wish is not attained; and sorrow and grief arise when the object of one's affection or desire is no longer with him. A person is sad, because he has lost something which was dear to him. In fact desires, grief and sorrow are based on the experience of differences. *Brahman* or the self is the absolute

reality and lacks nothing. In attaining the self everything else is attained, for *Brahman* is the ultimate source of everything. Thus, desirelessness or the absence of grief and sorrow, in case of the *Jiivanmukta*, is not due to the suppression of desires, but because of his realization of *Brahman*, after reaching which there remains nothing to be desired.⁸⁰

A *Jiivanmukta* lives in this bodily state as long as there lasts the accumulated effects of the past actions that have begun to bear fruit (*prarabdha*). Until that time *Jiivanmukta* might engage himself in working for the welfare of others. As a possessor of a body, which is the result of earlier *karma*, he experiences that which is characteristic of material forms, like hunger, thirst, illness and old age. But he is never overwhelmed by these, for he knows the truth of their passing nature and of his nature as the absolute *Brahman*. The liberated man is one who "sees nothing in the waking state, even as in dreamless sleep; who, though beholding duality, does not really behold it, since he beholds only the absolute; who though engaged in work is inactive."⁸¹

All that we have said about the behavior of a *Jiivanmukta* are only approximations. Just as *Brahman* and *Brahmanubhava* are incomprehensible and indescribable, so too the nature and the characteristics of *Jiivanmukta* are not describable. All we can say about the *Jiivanmukta* is said about him and his behavior, from our phenomenal point of view. All we have done, in trying to describe the qualities of the *Jiivanmukta* is to negate qualities like fear, desire, duality and differences, which are characteristic of those who live under the sway of ignorance. In other words, we have only said what the *Jiivanmukta* is not and not what he is; like *Brahman*, he is indescribable. Therefore, the so-called characteristics mentioned above are only a possible way of talking about *Jiivanmukta* from the phenomenal point of view. From the *paramaarth*a or absolute point of view, *Jiivanmukta* is *Brahman*, and is of the nature of the unknowable and indescribable *Brahman*.⁸²

NOTES

1. *UI*, II, ii, 3, p. 89.
2. *MUB*, I, i, 5.
3. Cf. *AB*, Introduction, pp. 42-43.

4. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 61.
5. *BGB*, XVIII, 50.
6. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 219-220.
7. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 221-222.
8. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 222.
9. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 222-225. *Bheda-upaasana* involves duality, as in it the seeker, while experiencing his delight in the Lord, keeps himself separate. *Abheda-upaasana*, which leads to the loss of finite consciousness and an absorption into infinite consciousness, would require reflective criticism and discriminating consciousness to destroy ignorance, as ignorance is destroyed by knowledge alone. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 223-224.
10. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 220-221, 225-226.
11. A. Ramamurthi, p. 67. Cf. also *BGB*, V, 12. Cf. also *BUB*, III, i, p. 285. The knowledge we are speaking of here is the intellectual grasp of the import of the scriptural sayings. This intellectual understanding of what is revealed in the scriptures about *Brahman* helps one to eliminate the superimposed qualities on the self or *Brahman*. According to Shankara, the scriptures, which are the supreme and final authority regarding the self or *Brahman*, obtain their authoritativeness only because they serve to eliminate the superimposition of qualities attributed to the self, but not by revealing what is altogether unknown. The scriptures negatively point to the nature of *Brahmaanubhava*. Cf. *BGB*, II, 18, p. 39.
12. Cf. *BSB*, I, i, 4, p. 43.
13. R.V. de Smet, *Theological Method of Shankara* (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1953), pp. 165-166.
14. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 226.
15. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 229-230.
16. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 230.
17. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 230-231.
18. *MUB*, II, pp. 155-156.
19. Cf. Shankara, "Statasloki", *The Works of Shankara* (Srirangam: Srivanivilas, 1910), XV, no. 40.
20. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 69.
21. Cf. *BSB*, I, i, 1, p. 9.

22. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 240.

23. Cf. *VC*, p. 35. Cf. also *BSB*, i, 1, 1, p. 9.

24. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 70.

25. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 240-241. Though renunciation is one of the important moral conditions in *Brahmaajijnaasa*, it is wrong to think that it cannot be dispensed with. If an aspirant's heart is pure and his mind is not swayed by worldly enjoyments, then he would not need renunciation to move into a deeper level of knowledge. Vedaantic thinkers hold divergent views as to the necessity of renunciation as a condition in moral preparation. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 242-243.

26. Cf. *AB*, Introduction, pp. 34-35. Cf. also *VC*, pp. 35-36.

27. *BSB*, I, i, 1, p. 9

28. Cf. *AB*, Introduction, p. 36.

29. *UI*, II, xvi, 72, p. 190.

30. *BUB*, I, iv, 9, p. 56.

31. *KUB*, II, 8.

32. Cf. *BSB*, I, i, 4, pp. 25, 30, fn. 62, 80.

33. Cf. *CU*, III, ii, 1.

34. Cf. *ibid.*, III, xvi, 3.

35. Cf. *ibid.*, III, xv, 3.; III, xvi, 3.

36. Cf. *ibid.*, III, i, 3.

37. Cf. *ibid.*, III, i, 4.

38. Cf. *VSS*, V, 185-190, pp. 112-115.

39. Ke. U. B., II, i, 4, p. 25, fn. 62.

40. A. Ramamurthi, p. 72.

41. *VSS*, V, 191, p. 115.

42. *AB*, Introduction, p. 42.

43. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 42. Cf. also *VSS*, IV, 137, p. 86.

44. *MU*, I, i, 6, Hume, p. 367.

45. *BU*, II, iii, 6, Hume, p. 97.

46. *ibid.*, III, ix, 26, Hume, p. 125.

47. Eliot Deutsch, p. 9.

48. *BU*, II, iii, 6.

49. *BUB*, II, iii, 6, p. 335. Cf. also *BSB*, III, ii, 22, p. 623.

50. *UI*, II, iii, 3, p. 91.

51. Cf. *BSB*, III, ii, 22, p. 624.

52. Cf. Blackwood, "Neti, Neti - Epistemological Problem of Mystical Experience", *Philosophy East and West*, XIII, (1963), p. 205.

53. *BU*, III, iv, I, Hume, p. 111.

54. Cf. R.V. de Smet, p. 247.

55. "Keena Upanishad", I, 3, Hume, p. 335 (hereafter: Ke. U., Hume).

56. *BU*, III, viii, 8, Hume, p. 118.

57. *BG*, XIII, 12.

58. *BGB*, XIII, 12.

59. Cf. R.V. de Smet, p. 248.

60. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 246.

61. *BSB*, I, i, 4, p. 25, fn. 62.

62. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 246.

63. A. Ramamurthi, p. 72.

64. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 246-247.

65. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 247.

66. Cf. Paul Deussen, *The System of Vedanta*, p. 401. Since *Brahmaanubhava* is of the same nature of *Brahman* Shankara held that liberation cannot be attained by any means other than knowledge. Cf. *ibid.*

67. Cf. *PI*, VII, 56.

68. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 276.

69. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, pp. 277-279. Cf. also *PI*, VII, 90-92.

70. Cf. *AB*, Introduction, pp. 99-100.

71. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 286-288.

72. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 288-289.

73. *BGB.*, V, 24.

74. Cf. *BUB*, IV, iv, 6, pp. 500-501.

75. Cf. Advaitins speak of three kinds of effects of action (*karma*), which influence the future life of an individual. The first of these effects of action is *sanchita karma*, the accumulated or stored up fruits of action; the second is *aagamī karma*, the fruits of action

yet to come; and the third is *praravdha karma*, which consists of actions that are bearing fruit at present. According to Advaitins, the *Jiivanmukta*, by removal of ignorance breaks all effects of the past action and of the action yet to come. But, *praravdha*, i.e., the liberated man's actions that are bearing fruit at the present, will influence his present life, until it comes to a close. Thus, death does not change essentially the condition of *Jiivanmukta*, but it only puts an end to the accumulated *karma*, which is still bearing fruit. Cf. *VSS*, VI, 217, pp. 125-126.

76. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 54.

77. *BUB*, I, iv, 2. Cf. also *TUB*, II, vii, 1.

78. Cf. *AB*, Introduction, pp. 111-112.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

80. Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 55.

81. A. B., Introduction, pp. 113-114.

82. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 287.

PART TWO

FROM CARE TO TRANSCENDENCE: THE HEIDEGGERIAN PATH

Part Two studies the Heideggerian path to authentic human destiny. According to him, Dasein's path to authenticity is a movement from care to transcendence. Dasein's state of existence, his being-in-the-world, is one of care (*Sorge*). At this stage, he is caught up in and concerned with entities and other Daseins which he encounters as a being-in-the-world. He has to be bothered with a number of concerns, epistemological, relational and existential. Chapter four focuses on Dasein as care. Life, enmeshed by the cares of everydayness, does not give Dasein the true meaning of his existence, because deep in the core of his being he is transcendence, and is called to a life focused on Being (*das Sein*). In other words, Dasein's authentic destiny is linked to his belonging-together to Being, and his life must be lived by being-toward-Being. In Chapter five, we will elaborate the goal, the way and the attainment of Dasein's life, characterized by being-toward-Being. Chapter six looks at the process of this path to authenticity. For this purpose, *Ereignis*, the realm in which Dasein's movement from the state of care to transcendence takes place, is analyzed. The two stages of this path and its end, viz., Dasein's total authenticity, also are considered. In order to bring these points into focus, themes from early and later Heidegger are taken up in a comparative light. In short, part two studies Dasein's movement to authentic human destiny as visualized by Martin Heidegger.

CHAPTER IV

CARE: DASEIN'S BEING-IN-THE WORLD

Dasein, by his very nature, is a being-in-the-world. His being-in-the-world is characterized by care, with its threefold concerns. Dasein's epistemological concerns stem from the fact that he finds himself in the world, understands the world and expresses his understanding in discourse. As a result of this 'being-in' of Dasein, he possesses the characteristics of existence, mineness and authenticity or inauthenticity and enjoys a priority over every other entity in the world. Dasein also has a relational concern, which takes him to encounter entities and other Daseins, like himself. The network of relationships he forms by these twofold encounters, constitutes what can be called Dasein's world. Besides, Dasein faces an existential concern in which he has to cope with his fallenness, authenticity and temporal-historical nature. This chapter attempts to unfold the threefold concerns of Dasein that constitute his being as care in his being-in-the-world.

4.1. DASEIN'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONCERN

Dasein is a unique being. On the one hand, he is "like any other entity, present-at-hand as real",¹ and on the other hand, he is not a 'mere thing' because he is involved with entities in circumspective concern (*Besorgen*) and discovers the kind of being a thing is. "Dasein . . . is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement . . . as their kind of being, and which, thus, can make themselves known as they are in themselves."² Human existence understood in this sense of the horizon in which every other reality in the world can have their meaning, Heidegger calls 'transcendence'. The term 'transcendence' means 'to pass over', 'to step over' and 'to go through'.³ Heidegger understands the term in relation to Dasein's 'being-in-the-world'. As transcendence, Dasein goes beyond all entities, including himself as a being and understands himself⁴ and other things in their being. As Heidegger puts it: "What is transcendence

is, indeed beings themselves and that every being that can be and become unconcealed to Dasein, including, that being which exists as 'its (his) self' (i.e. Dasein)."⁵ In other words, the human existent is the 'formative' agent of the world. He transcends beings and draws them out of their fundamental hiddenness and endows them with being, i.e., with meaning and truth. Dasein, by his very nature, is transcendence and only by transcending beings is his nature is realized.⁶ Speaking on this point J.L. Metha says:

Heidegger defines transcendence as the ground of ontological difference;⁷ it is by virtue of his transcendence that man (human existence) can distinguish between Being and being and so relate himself to essents in the light of his comprehension of Being. In transcendence, Dasein goes beyond all essents as such, including itself (himself) reaching up world, which is part of the structure of transcendence, of Dasein's 'being-in-the-world'.⁸

Having stated that Dasein is unique and different from all essents, in the following pages we shall proceed to consider this human transcendence by analyzing his nature, characteristics, and priority.

4.1.1. NATURE OF DASEIN

Heidegger characterizes human existence as 'being-in-the-world'. This expression contains two notions: 'being-in' (*In-Sein*) and 'in-the-world' (*in-der-Welt*).⁹ Thus, human existence is essentially 'being-in'. It involves the idea of 'there' (*Da*).¹⁰ So human existence is the '*Da*' of the '*Sein*' of the world. In other words, it is in the 'there' of human existence, i.e., in his 'being-in' the world that being is disclosed. Dasein's 'being-in' is the basis of his familiarity with the world and in which the structure of the world is disclosed.¹¹ The main concern, of this section is to dwell on the nature of Dasein by analyzing the way in which Dasein is in his 'there', viz., his 'being-in'. In elaborating this point, we will consider the meaning and modes of Dasein's 'being-in' and knowing the world as a typical mode of Dasein's 'being-in'.

4.1.1.1. Meaning of Dasein's 'Being-in'

Dasein's 'being-in' is not the same as "withinness" (*Inwendigkeit*), in which sense we speak of one present-at-hand essent in another. Here the term 'in' is taken in its spatial sense and we consider something as containing a thing. For example, apple is in the basket, water is in the bucket and the garment is in the cupboard.¹² "Being-in' is distinct from the present-at-hand insideness of something present-at-hand 'in' something else that is present-at-hand".¹³ So Dasein's 'being-in' does not mean a spatial 'in-one-anotherness' (*In-einander*)¹⁴ or 'side-by-sideness' (*Neben-einander*).¹⁵ 'Being-in' also is not to be understood on the subject-object schema because such a schema would divide the 'being-in' between the subject and the object, which amounts to side-by-side presence of the present-at-hand entities as the subject and object.¹⁶

Dasein's 'being-in' is not spatial, but existential. In this sense, the term 'in' derives from terms '*innen*' (to reside), '*wohnen*' and '*sich aufhalten*' (to dwell).¹⁷ Thus, 'being-in' here means 'to be at home with', 'to reside alongside', 'to be familiar with', 'to be involved in' and 'to be entrusted with that familiarity with the world about'.¹⁸ In this sense we speak of someone 'being in a profession', 'being in a conspiracy' and 'being in love'. Here 'being-in' refers to a personal and existential 'inhood' which implies the relationship of dwelling and involvement. Thus, 'being-in' means Dasein's being accustomed to his environment and in relationship to the entities of his surroundings. In other words, it involves Dasein's entanglement with things of his world.¹⁹ Dasein's 'being-in' comes in various ways. It consists in having to do something, producing something, consuming something, abandoning something, interrogating, considering, and determining. All these activities show Dasein's interest in things and his concern for them. They can be called Dasein's care-taking (*Besorgnis*).²⁰

The care-taking or 'being-in' is not an occasional property of Dasein which he sometimes has and other times does not have. We cannot speak of Dasein without his 'being-about' with entities. So 'being-in' is the essence of Dasein's being.²¹ The most fundamental trait of Dasein's 'being-in' is what Heidegger calls '*Erschlossenheit*', i.e., the disclosedness of Dasein: "Dasein is its (his) disclosedness."²² Hence, Dasein's 'being-in' or 'there' is the clearing (*Lich-*

tung) within which the world is discovered or disclosed. Referring to the traditional metaphor of human nature in man, Heidegger says that this metaphor is an ontic way of pointing to the existential-ontological structure of human existence as disclosedness. To say that Dasein is 'lit up' (*erleuchtet*) means that as 'being-in-the-world' he is cleared (*gelichtet*) or is a lighting-process. Dasein is illumined not by any other kind of being, but by his opened-up-ness to entities, which belongs to his very structure. It is the clearing of Dasein towards all entities of the world and is the basis of his familiarity with the world; it enables Dasein to encounter entities and be involved with them.²³ Dasein's 'being-in' is identical with the disclosedness of the world. To quote Heidegger: "... the world is 'there' its being-there is (Dasein's) 'being-in'."²⁴ We could say that Dasein's 'being-in' is a state of Dasein's being, in which as opened-up-ness or the lighting-process he dwells among entities in concerned dealings (*Besorgen*) and discovers (*endeckt*) them in their being.

4.1.1.2. *Modes of Dasein's 'Being-in'*

In clarifying the meaning of Dasein's 'being-in', we have been looking at the general lay-out of the 'Da' or the 'there' of human existence. In this section, we want to look into the 'how' of this 'Da' of Dasein, i.e., the 'how' of Dasein's 'being-in'. In other words we would like to consider the basic modes or ways in which Dasein is disclosive. There are three modes of Dasein's 'being-in', i.e., Dasein discloses himself in three ways: 'state-of-being' (*Befindlichkeit*),²⁵ 'understanding' (*Verstehen*) and discourse (*Rede*). We shall briefly consider each of these.

4.1.1.2.1. *State-of-Being*

Heidegger gives the name 'state-of-being' (*Befindlichkeit*) to the first determining awareness of oneself as 'being-in-the-world'. It refers to the way Dasein is 'placed' (*sich finden*) in life and in the world. It is the 'already-being-found-himself-thereness' of Dasein.²⁶ The state-of-being, for Heidegger, is an existential of Dasein, which is prior to all psychological moods²⁷ and belongs to Dasein's existential structure. What is indicated ontologically by

this term, '*Befindlichkeit*', is what is ontically most familiar to Dasein, viz., his moods (*stimmung*) and his 'being attuned' (*Gestimmtheit*) to the world. In other words, the existential structure of Dasein's state-of-being is revealed through his ontic moods. "Mood", thus "is the lived expression of the state-of-being."²⁸ Dasein, as state-of-being, is never free of moods and is attuned to the world in one way or other. With the help of the moods Dasein discovers that he is in a particular way.

State-of-being with its ontic expression or moods discloses the 'being-in' of Dasein in three ways, viz., in Dasein's being delivered over to his moods, in his concerned dealing with entities and in his being submissive to the world. In the state-of-being, firstly, the Dasein is, as it were, 'delivered over' to his moods²⁹ and finds himself in one or other type of encounter which is beyond his control. Moods often overcome Dasein and he could affect them only to a limited degree. Often Dasein does not choose the particular situation, in which, he finds himself. For example, Dasein is thrust into a fearful mood without wanting to enter into that state. Thus, Dasein is always in one or another mood and shows himself "as a naked 'that it (he) is' and has to be."³⁰ Consequently, Dasein does not start his existence, but finds himself as already existing, whether it be in a given situation or from his origins. His existence has already started without his ever knowing or choosing. Dasein's Being as "that it (he) is" does not give a clear indication as to his origin and destiny. The 'whence' (*woher*) and the 'whither' (*wohin*) of Dasein remain obscure and hidden. Though these are hidden, Dasein is disclosed as a being that already is in one or another mood. It is Dasein's non-theoretical awareness of himself as being revealed in his moods, as an essent that is delivered, and which is a naked fact that Heidegger calls 'thrownness' (*Geworfenheit*).³¹

Dasein is thrown and is in a continuous throw which he can 'never get back behind'.³² Dasein's thrownness must be conceived as the "facticity of its (his) being delivered over."³³ Facticity is different from factuality (*Tatsachlichkeit*) of the present-at-hand entities. Heidegger calls the factuality of entity the '*factum brutum*' (brute fact).³⁴ But Dasein's facticity consists in that he is his 'there' in such a way that he finds himself in his world. Facticity is "the mood (that) brings Dasein before the 'that-it (he) -is' of its (his) 'there', which as such stares it (him) in the face, with the inexora-

bility of an enigma."³⁵ Facticity, therefore, refers to the unavoidable and unchangeable character of the thrownness of Dasein. Though in the state-of-being Dasein is factically thrown into his moods, he should master his moods through knowledge and will. In other words, Dasein should take responsibility for himself as if he were his own making, i.e., Dasein must overtake his own thrownness and accept it as his way to be (*zu sein*) and hold responsibility for it.³⁶

Secondly, in the state-of-being the thrownness of Dasein is revealed as a thrownness into the world of entities. The thrown Dasein is not revealed as an isolated subject, but as a 'totality-to-be-in-the-world'³⁷ and as having inseparable relationships with the entities of this world. In other words, in Dasein's thrown existence not only his own existence is revealed, but also the existence of other Daseins; the world with all its entities is disclosed. It would mean that in the state-of-being, Dasein's 'being-in-the-world' is disclosed, by which Dasein shows not only that he is a thrown Dasein among other entities, but also 'that he has to be', i.e., he is a thrown existence, who directs himself by being concerned with things and persons in the world. Thus in the state-of-being Dasein finds himself as a 'way to be', which is the basic condition for the possibility of discovering the world with its entities by moving towards them dynamically.³⁸

Thirdly, since in the state-of-being Dasein is primarily disclosed as a 'being-in-the-world' and is attuned towards entities in circumspective concern, he is disclosed as one who is submissive to the world. Considered as thrownness, Dasein finds himself in the world. He seems to be someone passive; the world moves towards Dasein and he has to submit himself, as it were, to the world. Through Dasein's openness to the world, Dasein discloses himself as thrown to the submissiveness to the world. Since he is open to the world, Dasein can be affected, impressed and threatened in his 'Da' by entities and other Daseins. For example, a journey by a car or a train may be looked at as something dangerous or particularly welcoming depending on the 'what-for' of the journey. The 'what-for' brings about different moods on Dasein and thereby affect his attitude towards the journey. If one expects something disturbing after the journey, this 'what-for', viz., the expectation of something disturbing, would effect the mood of fear. This, in turn, would make

Dasein take the journey as something dangerous or the speed of the train as something alarming. On the other hand, if something particularly interesting is expected after the journey, then the mood effected may be joy. In this mood, Dasein would see the very things -- the journey by the train and its speed -- as something welcoming.³⁹ Thus, the world outside, by bringing about various moods in Dasein and changing his attitudes towards existential situations, affects Dasein and thereby makes him submissive. To quote Heidegger:

The fact that this sort of thing (an entity present-at-hand) 'matters' to it (Dasein) is grounded in one's state-of-being; and as a state-of-being it (he) has already disclosed the world as something by which it (he) can be threatened for instance. Only something which is in the state-of-being of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that what is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by attunement of a state-of-being.⁴⁰

In "*Befindlichkeit*", therefore, the compelling force of the world is revealed. Things encounter Dasein and in some way he is at the mercy of things, as he is constantly exposed to the world. Speaking of this characteristic of the state-of-being, Heidegger writes: "Existentially a state-of-being implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us."⁴¹ In state-of-being, Dasein is disclosed as a thrown existence, which is involved with entities in the world, and thereby, in some way affected by them. As an essential mode of Dasein's disclosedness, the state-of-being, by pointing to Dasein's thrownness and facticity, represents more of Dasein's passive mode of disclosedness. Now, we turn our attention to the second mode of Dasein's disclosedness, viz., understanding.

4.1.1.2.2. *Understanding*

Traditionally 'understanding' (*Verstehen*) had a reference to the intellectual grasp of things. But, for Heidegger it is a mode in which Dasein can overtake his thrown existence of the state-of-

being. '*Verstehen*' implies the ability to stand Dasein's thrownness, in the sense that it can be actively developed. Understanding is not a property of Dasein, but is rooted in Dasein's 'ability to be' (*seinskoennen*); it is a basic mode of Dasein's being. "Dasein is in every case what it can be and in the way in which it is its possibility."⁴²

Though Dasein is primarily 'being-possible' (*Moeglichsein*), there is a difference in the way Dasein has possibilities and the way in which a present-at-hand entity 'has' possibilities. The possibility of an entity is discovered in terms of 'what-it-is', viz., its usability (*Dienlichkeit*) or serviceability (*Verwendbarkeit*). But, Dasein constantly goes beyond 'what-he-is' towards 'what-he-is-not-yet'. As regards understanding, Dasein's 'being-in' involves that it is always directed towards some 'for-the-sake-of-which' (*Worumwillen*). Since understanding is not merely a theoretical grasp of Dasein's possibilities, but a capacity to achieve these possibilities, it positively effects by manipulating the resource. For example, understanding a hammer's involvement consists not merely in knowing that a hammer is for driving nails, but in knowing how to carry this out.⁴³ "Understanding is the existent being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-being; and it is so in such a way that this being discloses in itself (himself) what its (his) being is capable of."⁴⁴ This essential tendency of understanding to press forward into Dasein's possibilities Heidegger refers to as projection (*Entwurf*). The term "*entwerfen*" literally means 'to throw something off'. In ordinary usage it means to sketch, to draft or to design a project. Thus, for Heidegger the project of Dasein involves understanding himself -- as the thrown projection -- and the entities in terms of his possibilities, and to actualize these possibilities even though he does not have a full thematic grasp of this projection.⁴⁵ "As projecting, understanding is the kind of being of Dasein, in which it (he) is its (his) possibilities as possibilities."⁴⁶

As understanding, Dasein is a being-towards-possibilities. The projecting of understanding has the possibility of developing itself (*sich auszubilden*) which Heidegger calls interpretation.⁴⁷ In interpretation, understanding does not become anything different, but becomes itself. In fact, interpretation is grounded in understanding and not vice versa. Nor does interpretation bring any new information about what is understood, but rather it consists in working out the possibilities which are already projected in under-

standing. Thus, "in it (interpretation) the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it."⁴⁸ For example, we interpret a hammer, as a hammer having some assignment in an equipmental system.

There are two moments involved in the act of interpretation, viz., the 'as structure' (*als-Struktur*) and the 'fore-structure' (*vor-Struktur*). In his interpretative circumspection, Dasein understands an entity in its 'in-order-to', i.e., that an entity is for such and such purpose. When Dasein understands what something is for (*Wozu*), it is understood as what Dasein is to take the thing in question for; whenever Dasein sees something, he sees it as something. For example, he sees a table as a table, a chair as a chair, a door as a door, and a bridge as a bridge. The 'as' that makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood, Heidegger calls 'as-structure'. The pre-predicative explication of what is understood by means of the 'as', lies before (*liegt vor*) Dasein making any thematic assertion about it. Again, in the understanding of something as something, Dasein does not throw any signification over something that is present-at-hand or add a value on it, but rather Dasein lays-bare only what he has encountered in his involvement with that entity. In other words, in interpretation Dasein makes clear what is already there in entities, as entities.⁴⁹ So, in interpretation the 'as-structure' is made explicit.

The exposition of the 'as-structure', i.e., interpretation, is grounded in the 'fore-structure', which consists of a 'fore-having' (*Vorhabe*), 'fore-sight' (*Vorsicht*), and 'fore-conception' (*Vorgriff*). Firstly, every case interpretation is based on something we have in advance, i.e. a fore-having. It consists in Dasein's comprehension of his world, in its totality, purpose and involvements. In other words, what Dasein has, in advance, is the total range of ways in which Dasein relates to an entity, which is interpreted in terms of its 'in-order-to' or 'what-it-is-for'. Secondly, interpretation is characterized by a fore-sight, which is an interpretative assimilation that takes place under the guidance of some consideration in respect to what is understood or explicated. Fore-sight, therefore, brings limits on fore-having by seeing something from a certain point of view. Thirdly, there is the fore-conception in which the interpretation occurs in terms of a conceptual scheme, whereby an entity is interpreted as itself. Thus, in every interpretation there is present a

fore-structure and an as-structure. The clarification of the as-structure by the fore-structure is what we call interpretation. In other words, whenever something is interpreted as something it is based on a fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception.⁵⁰

The entity that is interpreted is expressed in an assertion (*Aussage*). Heidegger considers assertion as a derivative form of interpretation, which in the final analysis is grounded in understanding.⁵¹ In clarifying the full structure of assertion Heidegger attributes three significations to assertion. Firstly, the preliminary signification of assertion is "pointing out" (*Aufzeigen*) in the sense of 'holding up for view', 'drawing attention to' or 'exhibiting'. In this sense Heidegger is referring to the original meaning of the Greek term "*logos*" as "*appophanasis*", viz., letting an entity be seen from itself.⁵² In the assertion 'the hammer is too heavy', what is discovered is not the meaning, but rather an entity ready-to-hand (*Zuhanden*).⁵³ Thus, assertion 'points out to' and 'represents' the reality of the entity. Secondly, assertion means apredication in which a subject is given a specific character by attributing to it a predicate, and thereby determining the subject by the predicate. What has been exhibited in the first sense has been narrowed down by giving an added determination through the predicate. In the assertion 'the hammer at the table is heavy', we have narrowed down the denotation of the statement by a new predicate 'at the table'. The second sense still has the idea of 'pointing out'.⁵⁴ Thirdly, assertion means communication (*Mitteilung*) or speaking forth (*Heraussage*). Assertion is communication in the sense that it lets other Daseins also see what is exhibited as thus determined. What is shared through communication is a common mode of concernful dealing with an entity. The communication is aimed at inducing the other to adopt the same concernful relationship towards that entity.⁵⁵ Bringing together these three significations of assertion, we can define assertion as "a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates."⁵⁶

4.1.1.2.3. *Discourse*

Besides '*Befindlichkeit*' and '*Verstehen*', discourse (*Rede*) is the third fundamental existential of Dasein's 'being-in. For Heidegger, "Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility."⁵⁷ Discourse

underlies both interpretation and assertion as both presuppose understanding and articulation in discourse. Thus, the intelligibility of being-in-the-world “. . . expresses itself as discourse.”⁵⁸ Heidegger distinguishes between discourse (*Rede*) and language (*Sprache*). Language is the spoken form of discourse. “The way in which discourse gets expressed is language.”⁵⁹ Language is a totality of words in which discourse has a “worldly” being of its own. The discourse is an existential of Dasein, while language is a fact, an entity present-at-hand-within-the-world and a ready-to-hand, with the help of which discourse can be expressed. Language can be broken up in words, but discourse is that which gives meaning. As meaningful articulation of the attuned understanding discourse is part of the existential constitution of the openness (being-in) of Dasein.⁶⁰

There are basically four structural components of a discourse: What is spoken of (*das Worueber der Rede*); what is spoken as such (*das Geredete als solches*); Communication (*Mitteilung*); and Expression (*Ausprechung*). Firstly, what is spoken of in all forms of discourse -- whether it be accepting or refusing, demanding or warning, pronouncing, consulting or interceding -- are always about something. “Talking is talk about something.”⁶¹ Thus, discourse shows in its own structure the basic pattern of Dasein’s mode of being, i.e., the disclosedness of being-in-the-world.⁶² Secondly, what is spoken about (*das Beredete*) in discourse -- whether it be request, question or statement -- is always a ‘talk to’ someone in a definite way. In other words, in discourse there is “something said-in-the-talk-as-such” (*ein Geredete als solches*) which is intended to reach someone outside of Dasein. “In this ‘something said’ discourse communicates.”⁶³ Thirdly, the discourse is not communication (*Mitteilung*) in the sense of giving some information and experiences, such as, opinions and wishes from within one Dasein to another. The communication Heidegger speaks of is taken in the wider existential sense, in which, Dasein-with is essentially manifested in a co-state-of-being (*Mitbefindlichkeit*) and a co-understanding (*Mitverstehen*). In discourse, being-with becomes explicitly shared, in the sense of taking hold of, and appropriated.⁶⁴ Fourthly, through discourse Dasein expresses himself. Whenever Dasein communicates something in what is ‘said-to-talk’, he expresses himself (*spricht sich . . . aus*) in discourse. In this expres-

sion Dasein does not give something from within himself, because as being-in-the-world he is already "outside" when he understands and expresses. What is expressed, in discourse is precisely this "being-outside", i.e., Dasein's state-of-being. Dasein's being-in, in its state-of-being, is made known in discourse and is indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the "tempo" of the talk and the way of speaking.⁶⁵ These components of discourse are not to be considered as empirically determined properties of a language. They are existential characteristics rooted in the ontological structure of Dasein, which makes language ontologically possible.⁶⁶

Discourse, as an existential state of Dasein, discloses and constitutes Dasein in his possibilities. 'Hearing' (*Hoeren*) and 'keeping silent' (*Schweigen*) are two modes that belong to discourse. Besides, these two show how discourse and understanding are interconnected. We would briefly look into the two modes of discourse. When we do not hear something aright, we say we have not understood what is said by the other. It is not by some accident that we say this, because Dasein hears only because he understands. Besides, 'giving ear to' is an existential openness of Dasein for others and for his own potentiality-for-being. The ability to hear, which basically comes from understanding, in the primordial sense of 'being-open' is the basis of what Heidegger calls 'hearkening' (*Horchen*). It is a type of listening which is prior to sensing tones and sounds. Dasein, as dwelling along side the entities within-the-world, 'just hears something all around' (*das nur-herum-hoeren*), like sounds of motorcycles, moving cars and talking. This type of hearing is a privation. But hearkening consists in the existential possibility of the talking being understood. Understanding arises neither in too much talk (*zu vieles reden*) nor busily 'hearing all around'; only one who understands can hearken or listen (*zu-hoeren*).⁶⁷

Another important mode of discourse is keeping silent, which also has its basis in understanding. In conversation, he who keeps silence can contribute more by developing a more authentic understanding. But, the one who talks too much can do a lot of damage in the sense that he reduces comprehension to triviality by his incessant talk. But, to be silent does not mean that one should be dumb. A dumb person, not being able to speak, will all the more like to speak.

One who is accustomed to keeping silence all the time is not able to keep genuine silence at a given moment, as he would never be speaking anyway. One can keep silence authentically, only in genuine discoursing. To be able to keep silence, Dasein must have something to speak, i.e., he must have understanding.⁶⁸

Now that we have considered the modes of Dasein's 'being-in', viz., state-of-being, understanding and discourse, we shall analyze Dasein's knowing the world (theoretical knowledge) as a mode of Dasein's 'being-in' founded in Dasein's being-in-the-world.

4.1.1.3. Knowing the World: A Founded Mode of Dasein's 'Being-in'

Traditional epistemology considered Dasein's knowing the world with reference to the subject-object relationship. Dasein is the subject and the world is his object. Such a conception presumes Dasein as an entity present-at-hand; the knowledge he has by the subject-object relationship is, as it were, a quality of the subject. But Heidegger considers Dasein's basic constitution as being-in-the-world. 'Being-in', as we have seen, is an existential of Dasein in the sense that Dasein is familiar with his world. His involvement and familiarity with the world is one of concern and care-taking. Thus, every dealing of Dasein relating to the world is founded on this care-taking involvement of Dasein. Therefore, knowing, which is a primordial involvement of Dasein with the world, must fundamentally be a care-taking. Heidegger says: "Knowing is a kind of being which belongs to being-in-the-world."⁶⁹ Therefore, the interpretation of knowledge as a relation between subject and object lacks the truth. "Subject and object do not coincide with Dasein and the world."⁷⁰

From what we have said it is clear that Dasein's knowing the world is grounded in Dasein's 'being-already-alongside-the-world'. It involves not a mere fixed staring at something that is present-at-hand, but it is being fascinated by the world with which Dasein is involved. Though fascinated by the present-at-hand entity and being alongside this entity, by abstaining from manipulations with it Dasein thereby stands face to face with it as a spectator. Looking at an entity in this mode is characteristic of the cognitive care-taking of

Dasein's knowing the world. Cognitive care-taking, i.e., Dasein's knowing the world by means of his looks which are more or less determined by his view points, amounts to a mode of dwelling alongside the entities within the world. In such a dwelling, where Dasein holds himself back from all manipulation and utilizations,⁷¹ the perception of the present-at-hand (the world) is completed. So, the perception is reached when Dasein addresses himself to something as something and discusses it as such. In other words, perception becomes an act of making something determinate when the something is interpreted as something. What is perceived and made determinate by interpretation can be expressed in a proposition. According to Heidegger, the perceptive retention of an assertion about something is not a mere representation of the knowledge that is appropriated by Dasein, but is itself a way of being-in-the-world.⁷²

When Dasein directs his looks towards something and understands it as something he does not come out of an "inner sphere" in which he was initially; rather he is always "outside" alongside entities, thus belonging to a world which is already discovered by him. Again, in such an act of knowing the Dasein does not go out of an "inner sphere", when it dwells alongside the entity to know and determine its character. Rather, it is still "inside" in the sense that he is himself "inside" as a being-in-the-world, which knows. To quote Heidegger: "... the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which he knows remains outside. It (he) does so as Dasein",⁷³ i.e., as a being-that-is-already-alongside-entities. Heidegger, thus, considers all forms of knowing, whether it be perception in which knowledge is attained, forgetting, error or delusion in which knowledge is seemingly obliterated, as modifications of Dasein's primordial being-in as a being-in-the-world.⁷⁴

On account of Dasein's knowing the world, which is founded on his care-taking involvement with the entities, he achieves a new status of being towards (*Seinstand*) the world, which Dasein discloses in himself. This involvement of Dasein with the world, viz., his 'being-in', is not arrived at in the phenomenon of knowing, nor does it arise from the way in which the world acts upon Dasein. Rather, only because Dasein is 'being-in' has he the capacity for this

specific mode of cognition, i.e., knowing the world. Thus, "knowing (the world) is a mode of Dasein founded upon (its) [his] being-in-the-world."⁷⁵

4.1.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF DASEIN

Dasein's nature cannot be expressed as to his whatness (*Was-sein*), but has to be understood in his own way of being (*Zu-sein*). In other words, the essence of Dasein cannot be described by enumerating his qualities and attributes, but only by analyzing how he is in relation to himself and to his world.⁷⁶ Dasein is a unique being, different from mere present-at-hand entities. Dasein is an 'existent being', while the present-at-hand entities just 'are'. While Dasein is the questioner of the being of entities, the entities are things that are questioned.⁷⁷ Heidegger thus characterizes the nature of Dasein as existence, mineness and authenticity or inauthenticity.

4.1.3.1. Existence

According to Heidegger, "the essence of Dasein lies in its (his) existence."⁷⁸ Heidegger's use of the term 'existence' must be distinguished from the traditional term 'existential', which refers to the entities present-at-hand.⁷⁹ The German term '*Existenz*' etymologically means 'to stand out from'. Dasein 'ex-sists',⁸⁰ i.e., stands out from all other things in the world in the sense that, unlike all other things, Dasein is open to himself and to his world. Besides, he also takes responsibility for himself and the world; to some extent, he can shape his destiny and that of his world.⁸¹ In this sense, Dasein, as existence, is ec-static, which literally means: standing beyond the static entities of this world. For Heidegger, all other beings are, but they do not exist. He highlights this point as follows: "Man (Dasein) alone exists. The rock is, but it does not exist. The tree is, but it does not exist. The horse is, but it does not exist. The angel is, but it does not exist. God is, but he does not exist."⁸² In this statement, Heidegger does not deny the reality of entities like rock or tree, but only points to the unique type of being of Dasein as existence. Dasein as existence "is set apart in the realms of beings as the only existing being which can undertake an inquiry into Being in terms of his peculiar existence."⁸³

This ecstatic nature of Dasein as existence, i.e., standing beyond things that are static and understanding their being, brings to light another significant aspect of human existence. Since Dasein is not a mere thing but is "to be" (*zu-sein*) or existence, he is not something static, but a reality that is to be achieved. To exist is to-be-on-the-way (*unterwegssein*). This would imply that Dasein is always stretched forward towards his still-to-be-realized being. Thus, human existence is never complete in his being and we can never aim at possessing an exhaustive understanding of his nature at a given moment, as there always is something outstanding. Dasein is an existence, which is "already-begun-still-to-be-achieved."⁸⁴

In this regard other things present-at-hand are different from Dasein. They possess a static quality about them; they have their fixed and given essences; their properties and qualities can be listed. For example, a table or a piece of stone can be described in terms of color, hardness, length and weight. Besides, for them, their own being is never an issue; they do not transcend their realm. Dasein, however, is not stable, but dynamic. Human existence cannot be understood in terms of properties, but only in terms of his possibilities. Dasein does not have a fixed essence as things have. The essence of Dasein, if we can speak of one at all has to be related to the fulfilling of his possibilities in the context of his concrete existence. Heidegger says: "... those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity (Dasein) are not proportion present-at-hand of some entity. . . . (But) are in each case possible ways for it (him) to be and no more than that."⁸⁵ Thus, "in each case Dasein is its (his) possibility and it (he) 'has' this possibility but not just as a property . . . , as something present-at-hand would."⁸⁶ So, as existence, Dasein is a being which stands out above other entities present-at-hand and moves towards actualization of its possibilities, thereby ever remaining 'on the way' (*unterwegs*).

4.1.3.2. *Mineness*

Dasein is existence and is his own possibilities, which are yet to be realized. Therefore Dasein does not have any fixed essence, and there is a uniqueness about the individuality of Dasein. Dasein is always someone's own existence. Human existence cannot be grasped as an instance or special case of some genus of the things

present-at-hand.⁸⁶ To these present-at-hand entities, their own being is never an issue. But Dasein is "that entity which in its (his) being has this very being as an issue. . . ."⁸⁸ Therefore, unlike other entities, human existence cannot be a matter of indifference and he can never be substituted for another.⁸⁹ So Dasein "... is in each case mine."⁹⁰ Since human existence by his very nature is one's own and cannot be treated as a specimen of a class, "one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it (him)."⁹¹ Therefore, Heidegger concludes that the essence of Dasein lies in the fact "that in each case it (he) has its (his) being to be and has it as its (his) own."⁹²

4.1.3.3. Authenticity or Inauthenticity

Since Dasein is existence, i.e., he is not a finished product, but an on-going possibility which is one's own (*Jemeinigkeit*), he has constantly to choose from the possible ways for him to be. That is why Heidegger says: "In each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it (he) is in each case mine."⁹³ Dasein, thus, has the ability to choose the particular way of his being-in-the-world. "And because Dasein is in each case essentially its (his) own possibility, it (he) can in its (his) very being 'choose' itself (himself) or win itself (himself); it (he) can lose itself (himself) and never win itself (himself) or only 'seem' to do so."⁹⁴ This would mean that Dasein is a possibility which can realize or neglect, develop or reject, build up or forget his own being. Human existence is what he makes of himself, and his own being becomes for himself his own constant problem. In other words, Dasein can either stand out as the distinctive type of being that he is, or he can be involved in a routine manner of living in which his possibilities are not determined by himself, but are taken over and dictated to him by the pressures of circumstances and society, and thereby live a mediocre existence.⁹⁵

Thus, we can speak of two fundamental ways in which Dasein can exist, viz., an authentic and an inauthentic human existence. Human existence is authentic (*eigentlich*) when he 'owns' his own possibilities of being or chooses himself as his ownmost possibility. It is inauthentic (*uneigentlich*) when he is blind to his own possibilities either by ignoring or giving them up.⁹⁶ Dasein often finds himself in the inauthentic state; but authenticity is not something

which can be gained once for all, but must be decided as new situations come along. Besides, inauthenticity is not a less or lower degree of being or a mere aspect of authenticity. As modes of Dasein, authenticity and inauthenticity are based on Dasein's character of 'my-ownness'. Dasein is an issue for himself not only in the state of authenticity, but also in the state of inauthenticity, even though the latter is a mode of fleeing.⁹⁷

4.1.2. PRIORITY OF DASEIN

Our consideration of the characteristics of Dasein, viz., Dasein as existence, which is characterized by his own possibilities, which can be realized or neglected depending on his choices that are authentic or inauthentic respectively, clearly points to the fact of the priority of Dasein over other entities. Dasein is a special being, which is capable of encountering beings and laying-bare their being, meaning and truth. In this section, in considering the priority of Dasein, we will attempt to uncover the relationship of Dasein to Being (*das Sein*), meaning and truth.

4.1.2.1. *Dasein and Being*

Speaking of Dasein and his relationship to being, Heidegger remarks the following:

Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it (he) is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its (his) very being, that Being is an issue for it (him). But in that case, that is a constitutive state of Dasein's being, and this implies that Dasein in its (his) being, has a relationship towards Being -- a relationship which itself is one of Being.⁹⁸

Thus, Heidegger claims that Dasein, even before he poses the question of Being, has some comprehension of Being. In Dasein's relationship with other beings, they are open to him, and he is able to know not only what they are, but also how they are. In other words, Dasein is able to comprehend what makes them what they are, viz.,

their being. When Dasein expresses his moods in exclamations (e.g. Snake!) the 'is' is already presupposed. Besides his own moods express his being, i.e., it is in such and such a way.⁹⁹ Dasein's comprehension of Being is not a clear concept, but obscure, pre-conceptual and for the most part undetermined and vague. Dasein's primordial comprehension of Being is not only pre-conceptual, but also unquestioning in the sense that it calls no attention to itself and raises no questions. Speaking of Dasein's basic understanding of Being, Heidegger states: "... this vague average understanding of Being is still a fact."¹⁰⁰

Though Dasein's understanding of Being is preconceptual and vague, it renders the Being-question possible. If Dasein did not have this fundamental comprehension of Being, he would never be able to raise the question of Being at all. This comprehension of Being is not something accidental to Dasein. The very name Heidegger ascribes to human existence, viz., Dasein (the 'Da' of 'Sein') points to how the comprehension of Being is fundamentally rooted in Dasein's Being. In other words, this primordial comprehension of Being constitutes Dasein's ontological structure. That is why Heidegger remarks: "Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being."¹⁰¹ This quality of Dasein's comprehension of Being makes Dasein ontically distinct from all other entities, even though Dasein, like any other entity, is an entity in the world. "Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it (he) is ontological."¹⁰² Our earlier characterization of Dasein as existence is founded on his understanding of Being. "It is only on the basis of Comprehension of Being that existence is possible."¹⁰³

Heidegger, thus, speaks of a threefold priority of Dasein due to his relation to Being. Firstly, Dasein has an ontic priority in that he is existence, i.e., he is ecstatic, stands out from (*ek-sistiert*) and transcends other beings, besides his openness to Being. Secondly, it has an ontological priority because Dasein is able to understand Being (*Sein-Verstand*). Thirdly, Dasein has a priority, which Heidegger calls an ontico-ontological priority, in that by his understanding of Being he understands his own being, that of other Daseins and that of entities. In such understanding Dasein provides the ontico-ontological conditions for the possibility of any other ontologies.¹⁰⁴ Thus, Dasein is the worldly human being which provides in himself an opening for the Being to be revealed. Human

existence is the questioner of Being and in posing the question about Being he creates an opening that transcendently grounds all other realms of inquiry.¹⁰⁵ Since the meaning of entities and their truth are grasped in their relation to Dasein, we shall move on to consider Dasein's relation to meaning and truth.

4.1.2.2. *Dasein and Meaning*

Generally speaking the meaning of something is that which makes it intelligible or understandable. In other words, anything that is intelligible is said to have meaning, even though it is not expressed explicitly or thematically. "Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility . . . of something maintains itself."¹⁰⁶ A being is intelligible, i.e., it has meaning, only when it is revealed in its enabling ground, viz., Being. In this sense meaning really refers to Being of beings. When one comprehends the Being of beings, then the entities become meaningful. That is why Heidegger writes: "Strictly speaking, 'meaning' signifies the 'upon-which' of the primary projection of the understanding of Being."¹⁰⁷

Since the meaning of a being is related to the understanding of its being, and the understanding of the Being of beings is something that belongs to the structure of Dasein, we can say that the meaning of beings is something essentially related to Dasein. So the meaning of the phenomena and that of the propositions, in the final analysis, depends on Dasein. The human Dasein, thus, is the meaning-giver of his own existence and that of the things present-at-hand. In the strict sense, we cannot speak of non-human entities having meaning, as their meaning ultimately depends on the meaning-giver, i.e., the human existence. For example, the meaning of a tree is discovered, not by the tree itself, but by Dasein as a meaningful object of aesthetic beauty or that of a thing ready-to-hand; or a building is not a home unless Dasein gives it that meaning by dwelling or by caring for it. Thus, the meaning of beings is fundamentally based on the concerned dealings of Dasein towards these entities. To quote Heidegger:

Meaning is an existentials of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'. Dasein

only 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of 'being-in-the-world' can be 'filled-in' by entities discoverable in that disclosedness. Hence only Dasein can be meaningful . . . or meaningless. . . . That is to say, its (his) own being can be appropriated in understanding or can remain neglected to non-understanding.¹⁰⁸

4.1.2.3. *Dasein and Truth*

In putting forth his theory of truth, Heidegger begins with the traditional understanding of truth. Traditional thinkers gave a logical interpretation of truth and said that the essence of truth lies in the correspondence (*adequatio*) between the intellect and the object. The 'place' of the logical truth, thus arrived at, is assertion or judgment.¹⁰⁹ Heidegger, while not denying the validity of this interpretation of truth, considers it as inadequate, as it does not enter into the deeper existential level. In all such agreements the relation is between two entities, as subject and as object. This relation is of such a nature, that the judgment 'so' expresses that which is judged 'as' it is in itself. Thus, the 'so . . . as' (*sowie*) constitutes the nature of the agreement. Heidegger raises the question of the basis of the 'so . . . as' agreement. According to him, the agreement is based on what he calls 'confirmation'. "Confirmation signifies the entity's showing itself in its self-sameness. The confirmation is accomplished on the basis of the entity's showing itself."¹¹⁰ The assertion 'someone is coming in' is true not because there is an agreement between my intellect and the coming in, but because it can be confirmed by looking towards the entrance of the house and by checking it for myself. In other words, the logical agreement 'so . . . as' is based on a deeper experience of the one coming in and confirming in existentially.¹¹¹ Therefore, the truth is not founded in the agreement between the knower and the known object, but rather, it consists in uncovering or discovering (*Entdeckend-sein*) the what of the entity's showing itself by confirmation. So, we can speak of a statement being true only when we discover the essent in itself and give utterance to it by letting-itself-be-seen. Thus, "being-true ('truth') - means Being uncovering."¹¹²

From what we have said, it is clear that truth in its most pri-

mary form is Being-discovering, whether it be in entities or in Dasein. This mode of uncovering of Being is a mode which is disclosure or unconcealment (*aletheia*). Since Dasein is that being which is disclosure par excellence, he is the basic truth on whom all other truths are rooted. The truth of any being is discovered so long as Dasein is. The truth of things present-at-hand is secondary to that of Dasein's way of being. Dasein's truth consists in Being-discovering, while the truth of things depends on being discovered in their discoveredness. Even a scientific principle such as Newton's law, the principle of contradiction and all such truths are true only so long as Dasein is. Until Newton discovered the law, it was hidden and concealed. It became a law only when it was discovered and exhibited by Newton. Since all truths are rooted in Dasein, we cannot speak of eternal truths, unless Dasein is eternally existing.¹¹³ On this point Heidegger remarks as follows:

Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness is essentially in truth. Disclosedness is a kind of being which is essential to Dasein. 'There is' truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed.¹¹⁴

To say that all truth is relative to Dasein, however, does not mean that the truth is subjective in the sense of being left out in the hands of an arbitrary subject. Nor do we say that entities are in untruth. Heidegger stresses the primacy of Dasein in the disclosure of truth. The discovery of truth is made possible through Dasein's openness to Being in essents, and through the truth of the essents being disclosed to him independently of his subjective whims. This, also, adds to truth an universal validity.¹¹⁵ In other words, we could say that Dasein is, as it were, a screen on which the truth of essents can come alive. Dasein does not create truth, but only lays-bare and uncovers the truth that is in an essent. Only as related to Dasein can an essent have its truth.

From our consideration of Dasein's nature, characteristics and priority, we aimed at clarifying the epistemological concern of Dasein. This is based on his 'being-in' as existence and marks his being qualitatively different from that of any other entities of the

world. Having done that, we can analyze the 'in-the-world' aspect of Dasein's being, viz., his relational concern.

4.2. DASEIN'S RELATIONAL CONCERN

By the very fact that Dasein is in-the-world, he is relational. In his everyday existence Dasein is involved actively with other entities towards which he has concerned involvement and other Daseins, who are similar to him and towards whom he has the relationship of 'being-with' (*Mitsein*). Considering Dasein in his relational dimension, in this section, we would make an attempt to see Dasein as related to entities, to other Daseins and to the world, which is the totality of Dasein's network of references regarding entities and other Daseins.

4.2.1. DASEIN AND ENTITIES

When we consider Dasein as relational, the first notion we encounter is Dasein's being as part of the environment. It is indicated by the German term '*Umwelt*',¹¹⁶ i.e., the environmental world. It is that which is closest to Dasein in his encounter as a being-in-the-world.¹¹⁷ The environmental world of Dasein's encounter is filled with entities other than Dasein. These entities 'belong to the world' with which Dasein has dealings (*Umgang*).¹¹⁸ In order to understand Dasein's relation to these entities of the environmental world, we must clarify their nature and the nature of Dasein's dealings with them.

4.2.1.1. Entities as Present-at-Hand and Ready-to-Hand

The entities of the environmental world are viewed by Dasein from two perspectives, viz., the theoretical and practical. When Dasein adopts a viewing that is theoretical¹¹⁹ in the sense of observing (*Hinschauen*), the entity appears to Dasein as something present-at-hand (*das Vorhandene*). This present-at-handness (*Vorhandenheit*) is the state of something being 'on hand'. Looking at an entity from this perspective conveys a sense of objectification to the entity in question. Here the entity is seen apart from its sphere of daily involvement, and therefore as something static which occupies

a place. In this way an entity is considered as a 'mere thing' out there.¹²⁰ If Dasein views an entity from the practical point of view, i.e., in Dasein's concerned dealings with that entity, then the entity presents itself to the Dasein as an 'equipment' or a 'tool' (*Zeug*) that can be put to use for a particular purpose. Thus, we can speak of equipment for writing, working, transporting and measuring. This ability to be used for a purpose is characteristic of equipment.¹²¹ Because of this quality, Heidegger refers to equipment as the 'ready-to-hand' (*das Zuhandene*), that is, something handy, conveniently near and suited for use by Dasein. Just as a hand is familiar with the glove which is on the hand, so also Dasein is familiar with entities within-the-world.¹²²

From what we have said so far, about entities, it is clear that Heidegger speaks of the same entity as something present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. This does not imply a division within the entity itself. The difference comes about because of the way Dasein views the same entity. If Dasein views the entity in the theoretical perspective, he sees the entity as present-at-hand, out there. If he views the same entity from the practical point of view, i.e., in terms of his concerned dealings with the entity, he sees the entity as a tool, ready-to-hand. In the former case, the entity is seen in its static nature, while in the latter case, the entity is seen in its dynamic aspect of usability or serviceability.¹²³

For Heidegger, Dasein's relationship with entities is mainly one of proximity and involvement.¹²⁴ This overall involvement of the care-taking of Dasein towards equipment and the encountering of them as ready-to-hand, Heidegger calls concern (*Besorgen*). In this state of concern equipment and its being matter to Dasein. The concern of Dasein towards entities is characterized by an existential cognition which Heidegger calls circumspection (*Umsicht*). '*Umsicht*' means 'to look around' or 'to look about'. Circumspection is characterized not by a detached looking at entities, but involves the actual use of the equipment. In circumspection Dasein 'looks about' to see if the tools are in order for a particular purpose, or if the tool selected is best for the job. For example, circumspection is concerned about discovering whether a hammer is appropriate for the job of hammering. Thus, concern does not just dwell on the entity, like theoretical cognition, but instead passes through and goes beyond to the task to be accomplished. Besides, circumspection re-

veals not only the 'in-order-to' of a ready-to-hand, but also discovers the particular equipment in relation to the equipmental system of which, it is a part.¹²⁵ Circumspective concern, thus, is that which reveals to Dasein the being of equipment, viz., its equipmentality (*Zeughaftigkeit*).

Now that we have considered the difference between the present-at-hand and the read-to-hand entities, and the basic type of involvement of Dasein towards them, viz., the circumspective concern, we can turn our attention to the Being of such equipment which is Dasein's concern.

4.2.1.2. *Entities in Their Equipmental Referential Totality*

Equipment, as we mentioned is basically an 'in-order-to' or "for-the-purpose-of" (*Um-zu*) and its reality is always understood in relation to something else. For example, the pencil is for writing and the car is for driving. "In the 'in-order-to' as structure there lies an assignment or a reference of something to something."¹²⁶ Since in its very structure equipment is related to another, we cannot speak of an implement having meaning in itself, but always in relation to an equipmental totality. So the reference 'for' (food for eating and money for buying) is the basic feature of equipment, in its relation both to other equipment, and to an equipmental system to which it belongs. To quote Heidegger:

Taken strictly, there is no such thing as equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipments, in which it can be the equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to'. . . . A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of *um-zu* the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability.¹²⁷

Therefore, the equipmentality of the equipment consist in that it always belongs to and accompanies other instruments, and resides in a purposeful referential totality of equipment. Only by being part of such a referential whole can the purpose of equipment be achieved and actualized. For example, inkstand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad,

table, lamp, furniture, door and room, never show themselves as they are for themselves. But if understood as equipment for residing, taken in its totality, all these individual equipments have their significance in relation to the unity of the pattern of these references.¹²⁸

Equipment shows its equipmentality, not only in its dealings with the other tools alone, but also with the work (*Werk*) as that which is produced as a result of 'working at' something, for example, footwear. "The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered."¹²⁹ The work produced, i.e., footwear, is the 'towards-which' (the purpose) of the tools; besides it also has a reference to its own 'towards-which' in relation to its usability. Again, it has a reference to the material 'out of which' or 'whereof' (*Woraus*) it is made, i.e., the leather. Finally the work produced has a reference to the 'for-the-sake-of-whom', viz., the person, who would use it.¹³⁰ Thus, the equipmental dealings are conditioned by the various modes of reference and assignments of the 'in-order-to' relating to the work itself.¹³¹

The equipmental dealings, therefore, are not isolated involvements only among the tools, but also are closely related to other such complex patterns relating to the work done and 'for-the-sake-of-which' it is done. All these relational patterns relating to the equipments are interrelated, which results in an equipmental system or an equipmental referential totality. The complex equipmental involvements often remain unnoticed or are taken for granted by Dasein in his everyday existence. But Dasein comes to grip with them and becomes aware of such a relational complex only when the smooth functioning of these systems is disturbed. "The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather there when we concernfully submit ourselves to them. . . . But when an assignment has been disturbed -- when something is unusable for some purpose -- then the assignment becomes explicit."¹³²

Heidegger speaks of three ways, in which, the breakdown in the equipmental system can take place and, in turn, can bring to Dasein's circumspection the complex equipmental references which he tends to lose sight of in his everyday existence. Firstly, the equipmental system is disclosed to Dasein in its totality when he is doing a work, especially when he encounters equipment as damaged and unusable. In this state the implement falls out of its totality and becomes unusable to do the work for which it is intended. Heidegger

calls this inability of the equipment to be an equipment 'conspicuousness' (*Auffälligkeit*). Here we see that equipment, having lost its equipmentality, lies before us as a present-at-hand entity or as something 'un-ready-to-hand'. Secondly, the equipmental system discloses itself when Dasein discovers that particular equipment, which is intended to be used for performing a task, is missing. The more urgently Dasein needs the equipment to that extent authentically it encounters un-readiness-to-hand of the missing equipment. This absence of the equipment to perform a task is called obtrusiveness (*Aufdringlichkeit*) where equipment presents itself as un-readiness-to-hand by its non-availability. Thirdly, an equipmental system is disclosed, when the equipment, losing its readiness-to-hand, stands in the way of achieving an 'in-order-to' or purpose. This type of presence of an equipment, as blocking the achievement of the purpose is called obstinacy (*Aufässigkeit*). Here the equipment is neither unusable nor missing, but becomes un-readiness-to-hand by not letting the intended purpose be achieved.¹³³

In each of these modes, viz., conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy, the equipment, as it were, loses its character of readiness-to-hand and brings to the fore the characteristic of the objective present-at-handness of an entity. In other words, in all these modes, a particular equipment presents itself in an un-readiness-to-hand in a given equipmental-referential complex. In presenting itself thus, an equipment not only reveals itself to Dasein's circumspection as unusable, unavailable or missing and thereby, standing in the way of a task to be performed, but also reveals everything connected with this equipmental system, viz., the work and all that goes with it.¹³⁴ We could, for example consider the carpenter at work in his workshop. His work goes on smoothly and while involved in work the whole working referential complex is, as it were, lost to him. Suddenly, he finds the hammer missing or the plane no longer works. This breakdown in the equipments, hammer or plane, reveals to him not only that a particular equipment is out of order, but also the work situation in which this particular tool has failed. In this connection, Arland Ussher remarks: "The world as world is only revealed when things go wrong."¹³⁵ To quote Heidegger:

When something ready-to-hand is found missing,
though its everyday presence . . . has been so

obvious that we have never taken any notice of it, thus making a break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with and what it was ready-to-hand for (the equipmental system). The environment announces itself afresh.¹³⁶

Thus, in the context of the equipment, the totality of the equipmental referential complex is lit up, and the equipmentality of the equipment and the environmenting world is revealed to the circumspective concern of Dasein.

The entities are present in the environmental world as equipment ready-to-hand and things present-at-hand in the cognition of the equipmental referential system. The notion of the environment involves the idea of space. So, in the next section, we shall consider the entities as related to space, i.e., in their spatiality.

4.2.1.3. Entities in their Spatiality

Heidegger, like Descartes,¹³⁷ did not think of space as something that is empty and later filled up with things. For Heidegger, space is not something limited to entities in the world, but is also related to Dasein. It is only in relation to Dasein's spatiality, that the spatiality of the entities ready-to-hand can be grasped. So, in his analysis of space, Heidegger looks into the spatiality of entities and that of Dasein.¹³⁸

The spatiality of entities ready-to-hand is manifested in two ways. Firstly, in his everyday dealing with an equipment, Dasein finds the ready-to-hand equipment as being close to Dasein. The term Heidegger uses, namely, '*Naehe*' can be translated as 'closeness' or 'nearness'. It indicates the nearness of something close to us.¹³⁹ The term 'readiness-to-hand' indicates the characteristic of closeness. Every entity that is 'at-hand' or that can be handled points to the varying closeness or distance from, and to, the one who handles that entity. But this 'closeness' which is the fundamental characteristic of the entity's ready-to-hand is not to be taken in measurable distances, but in terms of Dasein's circumspective con-

cern. In this sense we can speak of the spectacles that one wears on the nose as being further away than the picture out there on the wall; or the bus for which one is running is closer than the ground on which one runs.¹⁴⁰ The second characteristic that the ready-to-hand entities reveal is one of direction (*Richtung*). It also must be understood in relation to Dasein's circumspective concern.¹⁴¹

These two features, viz., closeness and direction, give equipment a place (*Platz*) in the equipmental-referential totality. In other words, they constitute a piece of equipment in a 'locality', giving it a fixed *locus* and setting it in the proper place in the schema of equipmental referential totality. Thus, 'having-a-place' is different from 'being in a position (*Stelle*) in space', which is a 'random occurring', 'lying around' or 'being a present-at-hand entity somewhere'. Thus 'having-a-place' or 'locality' and belonging to an equipmental totality give an answer to the question about the 'whither' (*das Wohin*) of an equipment. The 'whither' is an ontological condition for the possibility of an equipment to have a place in the equipmental totality.¹⁴² "This 'whither' which makes it possible for equipment to belong to somewhere . . . we call the region."¹⁴³ The referential totality of the equipment is ontologically prior to the equipmentality of particular equipment. In the same way, the region as the 'whither of the equipmental totality is ontologically prior to the 'locality' of particular equipment.

Speaking of the region, Heidegger says that it should not be understood in the geographical sense. But, the region is the 'whither' the readiness-to-hand is put to account as a matter of Dasein's concern. For example, Heidegger speaks of regions of life and death in relation to churches and graves, which are laid according to the rising of the sun and its setting.¹⁴⁴ Thus, all these features, viz., closeness and direction and their togetherness constituting the region relating to the spatiality of the equipment, can be discovered only in relation to the spatiality of Dasein. So, let us move on to consider the spatiality of Dasein.

Corresponding to the spatiality of the equipment, Dasein's spatiality is constituted of two existentials, viz., de-distancing (*Entfernung*) and directionality (*Ausrichtung*).¹⁴⁵ The first is de-distancing, for which Heidegger uses the German term '*Entfernung*'. The term communicates the idea of 'bringing closer', de-distancing "amounts to making farness vanish, . . . making remoteness of some-

thing disappear (and) bringing it close.”¹⁴⁶ In other words, it is a capacity of Dasein to bring about closeness. By its active circum-spective concern Dasein can bring an entity close. For example, when one learns about the plan and means of building a shopping complex in the city, one brings closer the parts of this equipment totality. By so doing one brings close circumspectively the equipment which one will use as a means to actualize the project and achieve one’s ends. Thus, de-distancing is a circum-spective bringing close of an equipment. It is possible for Dasein because it is an intrinsic tendency that belongs to the very being of Dasein. “In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness”¹⁴⁷ which is not a bringing close in terms of measurable distance, but one relates to the circum-spective concern of Dasein. For example, ‘a good walk’ or ‘a stone’s throw’ has a definiteness relating to Dasein’s concern. Measurements, such as, ‘an half hour walk’ is to be understood in terms of duration rather than that of number. A pathway that is long ‘objectively’ may be shorter, very long or hard-going, depending on Dasein’s concerned look.¹⁴⁸ “Circumspective concern decides the closeness and farness of what is proximally ready-to-hand environmentally.”¹⁴⁹ Thus, “Dasein is spatial in the sense that it (he) discovers space circum-spectively, so that indeed it (he) constantly comports itself (himself) de-distantly towards the entities, thus spatially encountered.”¹⁵⁰

The second characteristic of Dasein’s spatiality is directionality. The idea of directionality is implied in de-distancing because every bringing close involves a direction from which the equipment is brought close, or the region in which it has locality. Dasein’s directionality, like that of de-distancing, is something that essentially belongs to him and he takes these directions along with him, being guided by circum-spective concern.¹⁵¹ Dasein’s spatiality, by way of de-distancing and directionality, makes him encounter the equipmental ready-to-hand, in terms of the twin characteristics of equipment, viz., closeness and direction.¹⁵²

4.2.2. DASEIN AND OTHER DASEINS

In the last section, we have been dealing with the entities and their relation to Dasein. But, in Dasein’s being-in-the-world, he is not only involved with entities, but also related to other Daseins.

Dasein's world, whether it be related to entities or other Daseins, is a 'with-world' (*Mitwelt*). Dasein is 'along-with' (*bei*) entities; but he is 'with' (*mit*) Daseins. The other Daseins are neither present-at-hand entities or ready-to-hand tools, but are essents like Dasein. Heidegger remarks: "These entities (other Daseins) are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are like very Dasein, . . . in that they are there too and with it (him)."¹⁵³ In this section, we could explore the nature of Dasein's relationship with other Daseins.

4.2.2.1. *Being-with: An Existential of Dasein*

The nature of Dasein's relationship with the other is characterized by 'being-with' (*Mitsein*). Dasein as being-in-the-world is always 'Dasein-with' (*Mitdasein*) and he shares a 'with-like' (*Mithaften*) character with others. Thus, Dasein as 'being-in' is always a 'being-with'" and his world is a 'with-world' (*Mitwelt*).¹⁵⁴ The notion of Dasein as 'being-with' is indicated in Heidegger's consideration of Dasein's relation to the tools in a work produced (e.g. a footwear). The 'towards-which' of its usability is related to a 'for-the-sake-of-whom', i.e., to someone who would wear it. Thus, in a work-situation, Dasein is not only related to the environmental world of equipments, but in the last analysis also to essents with Dasein's kind of being, which he encounters as the user, the wearer or the one who possesses. So, Dasein's world is a co-world and his 'being-in' is 'being-with-others'.¹⁵⁵

The 'being-with' of Dasein is, in every case, characteristic of one's own Dasein. The statement 'Dasein is essentially being-with' is not to be taken in the ontical sense of one concrete entity being related to another concrete entity environmentally and factically.¹⁵⁶ It must be taken in the existential-ontological meaning, i.e., being-with as an existential of Dasein. Heidegger's contention is that Dasein is always being-with in his structure, whether or not factically (ontically) the other is present-at-hand or perceived.¹⁵⁷ This claim of Heidegger is based on another assumption, that in the pre-theoretical everyday experience of Dasein, i.e., in his existential perception, he has no experience of the self. The reason Heidegger is in favor of the assumption is the basic existential experience of Dasein. Dasein's everyday life is lived amidst various demands to be

met and tasks to be performed in relation to the others, and not as a self giving orders or as witnessing events that are taking place.¹⁵⁸ The primary experience of Dasein as being-with is described by William Ralph Schroeder as follows:

The materials one works on are made by others; the tasks one performs are taught by others; the products one makes are destined for others; the functional use of things come to them collectively -- everyone understands what things are for; one's own understanding is a specification of this common sense. One's existence is always articulated in a world . . . with others.¹⁵⁹

For Heidegger, the relatedness of Dasein to the other is an *a priori* and it precedes all other empirical (ontical) relationships to the other. In fact the basic relationship of being-with is what makes possible an ontic encounter among Daseins.¹⁶⁰ Not possessing this basic existential relatedness to the other amounts to lacking the specific mode of existence is characteristic of Dasein.¹⁶¹

Since Dasein's primordial existential experience of his being is that of being-with-others, it follows that one cannot define others without any reference to Dasein. Nor can one think of the other in a detached manner of observation, but encounters the other in one's practical concerns. Thus, the other is experienced not as distinct from oneself, but as similar to oneself, engaged in tasks like oneself and involved in cares like oneself. In other words, one experiences the other as one's replica.¹⁶² Thus, Heidegger holds that Dasein's basic experience of the other is not "that they are present-at-hand, self-sufficient beings whose minds are hidden, but rather that they are engaged, accessible beings, who share the same instruments and gathering places and function very much like oneself."¹⁶³ It is only because every Dasein is essentially being-with that each can experience the other Dasein in his own being-with. To quote Heidegger: "Only in so far as one's own Dasein has the essential structure of being-with is its (his) Dasein-with as encounterable by others."¹⁶⁴ Heidegger sums up the basic nature of Dasein's relationship to the other as follows: